Appellant
Schall, Commissioner of New York City Department of Juvenile Justice
Appellees
Gregory Martin, Luis Rosario, Kenneth Morgan
Appellant's Claim
That pretrial preventive detention of juveniles under New York's Family CourtAct does not violate the "fundamental fairness" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Judith A. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General of New York
Chief Lawyer for Appellees
Martin Guggenheim
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 June 1984
Decision
Upheld the state of New York's claim and overturned two lower courts' decisions banning pretrial detention of juveniles.
Significance
The ruling settled the dispute over whether preventive detention of juveniles, considered likely to engage in further crime prior to their trials, servesa legitimate state objective. The state successfully argued that its system of procedural protections satisfied requirements of the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. As highlighted by the dissenting opinion, the needfor substantially reforming the nation's juvenile court systems became widelyrecognized. Both the proponents of tougher punishment and advocates for a juvenile rehabilitation emphasis sought to reduce the informal arbitrariness ofjuvenile judicial decisions by providing more structured sentencing guides.The practice of detaining juveniles received increased public support duringa period of rising youth violence in the 1990s.
In the late 1970s, the New York Family Court Act allowed short term detention(confinement) of accused juveniles prior to having their cases resolved. Under normal procedures, following arrest of a juvenile, a probation officer would determine if the case should go to juvenile court based on an interview with the juvenile and the arresting officer. If so, an "initial appearance" hearing was held next. There a judge determined if preventive detention was justified based on whether the juvenile was at "serious risk" to commit more offenses prior to a final hearing. A formal consideration of specific facts in the case was not required. If detained, the juvenile was entitled to as many astwo more hearings within 14 days after the initial appearance for serious crimes, three days for lesser offenses. The maximum potential detention time for serious offenses was 17 days, for others it was six. Juveniles were kept separate from adult criminals and screened to determine whether non-secure or secure detention facilities were appropriate. Both included educational and recreational programs and counseling by social workers.
Between December of 1977 and March of 1978, police arrested three 14-year oldjuveniles, Gregory Martin, Luis Rosario, and Kenneth Morgan, in three separate incidents on a variety of charges including robbery, assault, and possession of a loaded gun. Given their ages, they came within jurisdiction of New York's Family Court. Martin, detained for 15 days between arrest and resolutionof his case, was found guilty and placed on two years probation. Rosario, who had other assault charges pending, was detained for six days. His case waslater dropped. Morgan, who also had charges pending from another incident, was detained for eight days. He was found guilty and placed in custody for 18 months.
While in detention, Martin filed a suit on behalf of all similarly detained juveniles challenging the legality of preventive detention. Joined later by Rosario and Morgan in the suit, Martin claimed pretrial detention violated theDue process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Due Process guarantees each individual fairness before the law in legal proceedings.Equal Protection essentially requires that a law be a reasonable means of achieving a government objective. The U.S. District Court accepted the case.
During the trial both sides provided case histories of over 30 individuals including general statistics on the relation between pretrial detention and howthe cases were ultimately resolved. Testimony also centered on general juvenile court processes. After weighing the evidence, the district court ruled the Family Court Act did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, but did violate due process. The district court ordered the release of all detained juveniles. The state appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals which affirmed the district court decision. The appeals court found that "the vast majority of juveniles detained" are ultimately released after their cases were heard. Therefore, the detention served more as a punishment for untried juveniles than a prevention of additional crime. The lack of any significant confinement after their trials contradicted any claimed need for pretrial confinement for community protection. Consequently, the court determined the process was unconstitutional toward all juveniles.
Juvenile System of Justice
During the early period of U.S. history, courts treated juveniles accused ofcrimes as "little" adults. Though reformatories came into existence in the early nineteenth century, a substantially different philosophy in treating juveniles did not evolve until near the end of that century. Concepts that "childhood" was a distinctly different stage of life and that juveniles had greaterreceptiveness to rehabilitation then gained acceptance. By 1925 almost all states had established juvenile court systems distinctly separate from the adult legal system. The recognized state paternal-like interest in the welfare of children made juvenile proceedings quite different than those for adults. The systems emphasized rehabilitation, informality, low visibility, and avoidance of criminal-like convictions. Preventive detention became central to thejuvenile justice system. However, formal procedural protections provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had fallen by the wayside with the separation from adult courts.
Not until the 1960s did the Supreme Court enter the issue of constitutional rights in juvenile systems. In In re Gault (1967), the Court ruled "that certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to juveniles." These protections included application of the DueProcess Clause. In Bell v. Wolfish (1979), the Court found due process required that preventive detention not constitute punishment. However, theCourt held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) that juveniles did not have a right to trial. In effect, most of the Bill of Rights was extended to juvenile offenders regarding procedural matters. The detailed interpretation of these rights for juveniles was left for later cases.
Is Teenage Preventive Detention Legal?
In 1984 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Schall caseto determine the constitutionality of juvenile preventive detention under the Due Process Clause. The Court split the question concerning detention intotwo parts. First, does preventive detention serve a legitimate state interest, such as protection of property or citizens' safety? Secondly, are procedural safeguards adequate to ensure fairness? Justice Rehnquist, writing for themajority in a 6-3 vote, found that preventive detention of juveniles "servesthe legitimate state objective . . . of protecting both the juvenile and society from the hazards of pretrial crime." Rehnquist wrote "if parental controlfalters, the state must play its part" and the juvenile's liberty may be outweighed by state's interest in promoting the child's welfare. The Court recognized that juveniles often lack experience and judgement to avoid detrimentalsituations. Regarding the second question, the system of hearings created bythe state to review each case served to satisfy "fundamental fairness" required by due process. This system provided sufficient safeguards against unnecessary court actions since the juvenile had various means of appealing the detention while being held. Rehnquist did not find that pretrial detention was punishment as found by the lower courts and, in fact, noted "some obvious flaws in the statistics and case histories" used by the lower courts. Regarding prediction of future criminal conduct, the Court held that a prediction was reasonably attained through experienced assessments by the New York Family Court judge based on a variety of factors. Rehnquist considered Martin's argumentthat many juveniles are released immediately following their trial not relevant to the appropriateness of preventative detention. Many released juvenileswere, in fact, subject to conditions or probation, similar to the close supervision provided by detention. Rehnquist concluded the detention process authorized by state law is fairly applied and does not violate due process.
Joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Stevens, Justice Marshall wrote that neither the argument of state interest nor the adequate existence of procedural safeguards justified preventive detention as authorized by the Family Court Act. Regarding state interest in protecting juveniles from wrongdoing, Marshall noted those juveniles assigned to secured facilities were often giveninstitutional clothing and mixed with juveniles already convicted of seriouscrimes. Given the impressionability of juveniles, the pretrial detention authorized by the New York law likely caused injury equivalent to adult imprisonment. Marshall asserted the state must show much more urgent interest than simply "legitimate" to justify "deprivation of liberty." Secondly, in regard toprocedural safeguards, Marshall highlighted that "initial appearance" hearings to determine if detention is justified usually lasted less than 15 minutes.He further noted juvenile court-assigned lawyers usually knew little of thejuvenile's background and character, the lack of rules to fairly guide judges' determinations, minimal first hand knowledge of the incident at question, and sketchy initial appearance records the judge had for assisting his consideration. These factors made the process significantly arbitrary, thus not measuring up to the fairness standard of due process.
Impact
After Gault recognized substantial rights of juveniles in the justicesystem, a series of cases including Schall a juvenile's right to trial, preventive detention, and dealt with the possibility of capital punishment.The Court increasingly yielded to states in dealing with juvenile justice matters.
General opinion grew through the 1980s and 1990s that the juvenile justice system, characterized by highly inconsistent procedures and sentencing, was ingreat disrepair. Nationwide statistics indicated that from 1985 to 1994 teenarrests for violent crimes rose 72 percent, while corresponding adult arrestsfell four percent. Meanwhile, government efforts in controlling youth activities were met with charges of racial and social class bias. The public increasingly favored punishment over rehabilitation. Juvenile court judges increasingly assigned juvenile cases to adult courts. Some state legislatures responded by creating stiffer penalties, particularly for serious juvenile crimes. Studies showed teen crime fell significantly in those areas where tougher treatment occurred. As a result, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 offering funding grants to states adopting tougherpunishment standards. In reaction, advocates for juveniles pointed to other studies showing rehabilitation measures promoted by juvenile justice systems still worked in many cases.
Due process questions, as in Schall, rose again in the late 1990s withother systems of preventive detention. Often without the benefit of a trial,juveniles were sent to "bootcamps" for youths at risk. The camps offered tough treatment characterized as "behavior modification" or "attitude adjustment." The Schall decision was also used as a guide for preventive detention of other classes of people in civil law cases including the mentally incompetent and drug and alcohol addicts.
Juvenile preventive detention issues continued to attract considerable debatethrough the late 1990s. Pretrial detention was criticized on the basis thatfuture criminal behavior by individuals can not be reliably predicted. Many individuals could be wrongly detained. The likelihood of guilt was recommendedas a larger factor to be considered in addition to history of violent behavior. Society continued to struggle with balancing an juvenile's right to presumption of innocence before trial with increasing fears of crime.
Related Cases
Curfews for Juveniles
The effectiveness and constitutionality of curfew ordinances for juveniles are highly controversial.
Cities with high juvenile crime rates considering a curfew may remain on firmconstitutional ground. Dallas, Texas' curfew has become a model for other cities, reporting a 30 percent drop in violent crimes by juveniles since 1994.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the Dallas curfew ordinance. President Clinton has supported curfews, and funds have been appropriated in thisregard. Across the United States, the percentage of the 200 largest cities utilizing curfews rose from less than 50 percent in 1990, to almost 75 percentin 1995.
Curfew ordinances have been challenged as unconstitutional by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), parents, and juveniles. Although the U.S. SupremeCourt has not addressed the issue, some state courts have found curfews unconstitutional. Washington and California courts have rejected curfews unless it can be shown that their use will clearly correct a specific problem. Whilesome cities have seen dramatic drops in youth crime, according to a survey of387 cities by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, only around 30 percent of respondents described the results as "very effective."
Sources
Court Decisions--Juvenile Curfews, http://www.mrsc.org/legal/curfew/courtcur.htm.
Keeping Our Kids on the Right Track, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/rttrack.htm.
The Seattle Times, http://www.seattletimes.com/extra/browse/html97/altcurf_040797.html.
Schall, Commissioner of New York City Department of Juvenile Justice
Appellees
Gregory Martin, Luis Rosario, Kenneth Morgan
Appellant's Claim
That pretrial preventive detention of juveniles under New York's Family CourtAct does not violate the "fundamental fairness" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Judith A. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General of New York
Chief Lawyer for Appellees
Martin Guggenheim
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 June 1984
Decision
Upheld the state of New York's claim and overturned two lower courts' decisions banning pretrial detention of juveniles.
Significance
The ruling settled the dispute over whether preventive detention of juveniles, considered likely to engage in further crime prior to their trials, servesa legitimate state objective. The state successfully argued that its system of procedural protections satisfied requirements of the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. As highlighted by the dissenting opinion, the needfor substantially reforming the nation's juvenile court systems became widelyrecognized. Both the proponents of tougher punishment and advocates for a juvenile rehabilitation emphasis sought to reduce the informal arbitrariness ofjuvenile judicial decisions by providing more structured sentencing guides.The practice of detaining juveniles received increased public support duringa period of rising youth violence in the 1990s.
In the late 1970s, the New York Family Court Act allowed short term detention(confinement) of accused juveniles prior to having their cases resolved. Under normal procedures, following arrest of a juvenile, a probation officer would determine if the case should go to juvenile court based on an interview with the juvenile and the arresting officer. If so, an "initial appearance" hearing was held next. There a judge determined if preventive detention was justified based on whether the juvenile was at "serious risk" to commit more offenses prior to a final hearing. A formal consideration of specific facts in the case was not required. If detained, the juvenile was entitled to as many astwo more hearings within 14 days after the initial appearance for serious crimes, three days for lesser offenses. The maximum potential detention time for serious offenses was 17 days, for others it was six. Juveniles were kept separate from adult criminals and screened to determine whether non-secure or secure detention facilities were appropriate. Both included educational and recreational programs and counseling by social workers.
Between December of 1977 and March of 1978, police arrested three 14-year oldjuveniles, Gregory Martin, Luis Rosario, and Kenneth Morgan, in three separate incidents on a variety of charges including robbery, assault, and possession of a loaded gun. Given their ages, they came within jurisdiction of New York's Family Court. Martin, detained for 15 days between arrest and resolutionof his case, was found guilty and placed on two years probation. Rosario, who had other assault charges pending, was detained for six days. His case waslater dropped. Morgan, who also had charges pending from another incident, was detained for eight days. He was found guilty and placed in custody for 18 months.
While in detention, Martin filed a suit on behalf of all similarly detained juveniles challenging the legality of preventive detention. Joined later by Rosario and Morgan in the suit, Martin claimed pretrial detention violated theDue process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Due Process guarantees each individual fairness before the law in legal proceedings.Equal Protection essentially requires that a law be a reasonable means of achieving a government objective. The U.S. District Court accepted the case.
During the trial both sides provided case histories of over 30 individuals including general statistics on the relation between pretrial detention and howthe cases were ultimately resolved. Testimony also centered on general juvenile court processes. After weighing the evidence, the district court ruled the Family Court Act did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, but did violate due process. The district court ordered the release of all detained juveniles. The state appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals which affirmed the district court decision. The appeals court found that "the vast majority of juveniles detained" are ultimately released after their cases were heard. Therefore, the detention served more as a punishment for untried juveniles than a prevention of additional crime. The lack of any significant confinement after their trials contradicted any claimed need for pretrial confinement for community protection. Consequently, the court determined the process was unconstitutional toward all juveniles.
Juvenile System of Justice
During the early period of U.S. history, courts treated juveniles accused ofcrimes as "little" adults. Though reformatories came into existence in the early nineteenth century, a substantially different philosophy in treating juveniles did not evolve until near the end of that century. Concepts that "childhood" was a distinctly different stage of life and that juveniles had greaterreceptiveness to rehabilitation then gained acceptance. By 1925 almost all states had established juvenile court systems distinctly separate from the adult legal system. The recognized state paternal-like interest in the welfare of children made juvenile proceedings quite different than those for adults. The systems emphasized rehabilitation, informality, low visibility, and avoidance of criminal-like convictions. Preventive detention became central to thejuvenile justice system. However, formal procedural protections provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had fallen by the wayside with the separation from adult courts.
Not until the 1960s did the Supreme Court enter the issue of constitutional rights in juvenile systems. In In re Gault (1967), the Court ruled "that certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to juveniles." These protections included application of the DueProcess Clause. In Bell v. Wolfish (1979), the Court found due process required that preventive detention not constitute punishment. However, theCourt held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) that juveniles did not have a right to trial. In effect, most of the Bill of Rights was extended to juvenile offenders regarding procedural matters. The detailed interpretation of these rights for juveniles was left for later cases.
Is Teenage Preventive Detention Legal?
In 1984 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Schall caseto determine the constitutionality of juvenile preventive detention under the Due Process Clause. The Court split the question concerning detention intotwo parts. First, does preventive detention serve a legitimate state interest, such as protection of property or citizens' safety? Secondly, are procedural safeguards adequate to ensure fairness? Justice Rehnquist, writing for themajority in a 6-3 vote, found that preventive detention of juveniles "servesthe legitimate state objective . . . of protecting both the juvenile and society from the hazards of pretrial crime." Rehnquist wrote "if parental controlfalters, the state must play its part" and the juvenile's liberty may be outweighed by state's interest in promoting the child's welfare. The Court recognized that juveniles often lack experience and judgement to avoid detrimentalsituations. Regarding the second question, the system of hearings created bythe state to review each case served to satisfy "fundamental fairness" required by due process. This system provided sufficient safeguards against unnecessary court actions since the juvenile had various means of appealing the detention while being held. Rehnquist did not find that pretrial detention was punishment as found by the lower courts and, in fact, noted "some obvious flaws in the statistics and case histories" used by the lower courts. Regarding prediction of future criminal conduct, the Court held that a prediction was reasonably attained through experienced assessments by the New York Family Court judge based on a variety of factors. Rehnquist considered Martin's argumentthat many juveniles are released immediately following their trial not relevant to the appropriateness of preventative detention. Many released juvenileswere, in fact, subject to conditions or probation, similar to the close supervision provided by detention. Rehnquist concluded the detention process authorized by state law is fairly applied and does not violate due process.
Joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Stevens, Justice Marshall wrote that neither the argument of state interest nor the adequate existence of procedural safeguards justified preventive detention as authorized by the Family Court Act. Regarding state interest in protecting juveniles from wrongdoing, Marshall noted those juveniles assigned to secured facilities were often giveninstitutional clothing and mixed with juveniles already convicted of seriouscrimes. Given the impressionability of juveniles, the pretrial detention authorized by the New York law likely caused injury equivalent to adult imprisonment. Marshall asserted the state must show much more urgent interest than simply "legitimate" to justify "deprivation of liberty." Secondly, in regard toprocedural safeguards, Marshall highlighted that "initial appearance" hearings to determine if detention is justified usually lasted less than 15 minutes.He further noted juvenile court-assigned lawyers usually knew little of thejuvenile's background and character, the lack of rules to fairly guide judges' determinations, minimal first hand knowledge of the incident at question, and sketchy initial appearance records the judge had for assisting his consideration. These factors made the process significantly arbitrary, thus not measuring up to the fairness standard of due process.
Impact
After Gault recognized substantial rights of juveniles in the justicesystem, a series of cases including Schall a juvenile's right to trial, preventive detention, and dealt with the possibility of capital punishment.The Court increasingly yielded to states in dealing with juvenile justice matters.
General opinion grew through the 1980s and 1990s that the juvenile justice system, characterized by highly inconsistent procedures and sentencing, was ingreat disrepair. Nationwide statistics indicated that from 1985 to 1994 teenarrests for violent crimes rose 72 percent, while corresponding adult arrestsfell four percent. Meanwhile, government efforts in controlling youth activities were met with charges of racial and social class bias. The public increasingly favored punishment over rehabilitation. Juvenile court judges increasingly assigned juvenile cases to adult courts. Some state legislatures responded by creating stiffer penalties, particularly for serious juvenile crimes. Studies showed teen crime fell significantly in those areas where tougher treatment occurred. As a result, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 offering funding grants to states adopting tougherpunishment standards. In reaction, advocates for juveniles pointed to other studies showing rehabilitation measures promoted by juvenile justice systems still worked in many cases.
Due process questions, as in Schall, rose again in the late 1990s withother systems of preventive detention. Often without the benefit of a trial,juveniles were sent to "bootcamps" for youths at risk. The camps offered tough treatment characterized as "behavior modification" or "attitude adjustment." The Schall decision was also used as a guide for preventive detention of other classes of people in civil law cases including the mentally incompetent and drug and alcohol addicts.
Juvenile preventive detention issues continued to attract considerable debatethrough the late 1990s. Pretrial detention was criticized on the basis thatfuture criminal behavior by individuals can not be reliably predicted. Many individuals could be wrongly detained. The likelihood of guilt was recommendedas a larger factor to be considered in addition to history of violent behavior. Society continued to struggle with balancing an juvenile's right to presumption of innocence before trial with increasing fears of crime.
Related Cases
- In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
- McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
- Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
- Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
Curfews for Juveniles
The effectiveness and constitutionality of curfew ordinances for juveniles are highly controversial.
Cities with high juvenile crime rates considering a curfew may remain on firmconstitutional ground. Dallas, Texas' curfew has become a model for other cities, reporting a 30 percent drop in violent crimes by juveniles since 1994.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the Dallas curfew ordinance. President Clinton has supported curfews, and funds have been appropriated in thisregard. Across the United States, the percentage of the 200 largest cities utilizing curfews rose from less than 50 percent in 1990, to almost 75 percentin 1995.
Curfew ordinances have been challenged as unconstitutional by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), parents, and juveniles. Although the U.S. SupremeCourt has not addressed the issue, some state courts have found curfews unconstitutional. Washington and California courts have rejected curfews unless it can be shown that their use will clearly correct a specific problem. Whilesome cities have seen dramatic drops in youth crime, according to a survey of387 cities by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, only around 30 percent of respondents described the results as "very effective."
Sources
Court Decisions--Juvenile Curfews, http://www.mrsc.org/legal/curfew/courtcur.htm.
Keeping Our Kids on the Right Track, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/rttrack.htm.
The Seattle Times, http://www.seattletimes.com/extra/browse/html97/altcurf_040797.html.
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