Schall v. Martin

During the early period of U.S. history, courts treated juveniles accused of crimes as "little" adults. Though reformatories came into existence in the early nineteenth century, a substantially different philosophy in treating juveniles did not evolve until near the end of that century. Concepts that "childhood" was a distinctly different stage of life and that juveniles had greater receptiveness to rehabilitation then gained acceptance. By 1925 almost all states had established juvenile court systems distinctly separate from the adult legal system. The recognized state paternal-like interest in the welfare of children made juvenile proceedings quite different than those for adults. The systems emphasized rehabilitation, informality, low visibility, and avoidance of criminal-like convictions. Preventive detention became central to the juvenile justice system. However, formal procedural protections provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had fallen by the wayside with the separation from adult courts.

Not until the 1960s did the Supreme Court enter the issue of constitutional rights in juvenile systems. In In re Gault (1967), the Court ruled "that certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to juveniles." These protections included application of the Due Process Clause. In Bell v. Wolfish (1979), the Court found due process required that preventive detention not constitute punishment. However, the Court held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) that juveniles did not have a right to trial. In effect, most of the Bill of Rights was extended to juvenile offenders regarding procedural matters. The detailed interpretation of these rights for juveniles was left for later cases.