Schall v. Martin

In 1984 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Schall case to determine the constitutionality of juvenile preventive detention under the Due Process Clause. The Court split the question concerning detention into two parts. First, does preventive detention serve a legitimate state interest, such as protection of property or citizens' safety? Secondly, are procedural safeguards adequate to ensure fairness? Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in a 6-3 vote, found that preventive detention of juveniles "serves the legitimate state objective . . . of protecting both the juvenile and society from the hazards of pretrial crime." Rehnquist wrote "if parental control falters, the state must play its part" and the juvenile's liberty may be outweighed by state's interest in promoting the child's welfare. The Court recognized that juveniles often lack experience and judgement to avoid detrimental situations. Regarding the second question, the system of hearings created by the state to review each case served to satisfy "fundamental fairness" required by due process. This system provided sufficient safeguards against unnecessary court actions since the juvenile had various means of appealing the detention while being held. Rehnquist did not find that pretrial detention was punishment as found by the lower courts and, in fact, noted "some obvious flaws in the statistics and case histories" used by the lower courts. Regarding prediction of future criminal conduct, the Court held that a prediction was reasonably attained through experienced assessments by the New York Family Court judge based on a variety of factors. Rehnquist considered Martin's argument that many juveniles are released immediately following their trial not relevant to the appropriateness of preventative detention. Many released juveniles were, in fact, subject to conditions or probation, similar to the close supervision provided by detention. Rehnquist concluded the detention process authorized by state law is fairly applied and does not violate due process.

Joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Stevens, Justice Marshall wrote that neither the argument of state interest nor the adequate existence of procedural safeguards justified preventive detention as authorized by the Family Court Act. Regarding state interest in protecting juveniles from wrongdoing, Marshall noted those juveniles assigned to secured facilities were often given institutional clothing and mixed with juveniles already convicted of serious crimes. Given the impressionability of juveniles, the pretrial detention authorized by the New York law likely caused injury equivalent to adult imprisonment. Marshall asserted the state must show much more urgent interest than simply "legitimate" to justify "deprivation of liberty." Secondly, in regard to procedural safeguards, Marshall highlighted that "initial appearance" hearings to determine if detention is justified usually lasted less than 15 minutes. He further noted juvenile court-assigned lawyers usually knew little of the juvenile's background and character, the lack of rules to fairly guide judges' determinations, minimal first hand knowledge of the incident at question, and sketchy initial appearance records the judge had for assisting his consideration. These factors made the process significantly arbitrary, thus not measuring up to the fairness standard of due process.