Appellant
Margaret R. Brown, et al.
Appellee
Thyra Thomson, Wyoming Secretary of State
Appellant's Claim
Wyoming's reapportionment plan to allocate one seat to Niobrara County in itsHouse of Representatives was unconstitutional and substantially weakened thevoting power of the plaintiff because it gave a small number of people "super" voting strength and totally disregarded a fundamental rule: one person, one vote.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Suellen L. Davidson
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Randall T. Cox
Justices for the Court
Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (writing for theCourt), William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
22 June 1983
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the Wyoming reapportionment plan for its House of Representatives, which allocated one seat to underpopulated counties, did not violate the equal protection clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.
Significance
In apparent disregard of previous rulings regarding the necessity to apportion using equal population ratios among voting districts, the U.S Supreme Courtupheld a Wyoming plan that would exceed acceptable ratio limits. With this decision the Court held that population equality was not the sole determination for establishing voting districts. The Court had affirmed (in previous decisions) that other criteria were acceptable such as maintenance of county boundaries and preservation of political subdivisions. However, the Court ruled that giving an undersized county representation despite lacking sufficient population served a state's interest in providing citizens in all counties representation in a state legislature. The interests of equal representation werenot firmly tied to population.
In 1890, when Wyoming became a state, its Constitution provided that each county "shall constitute a senatorial and representative district," and were thus granted the right to have at least one senator and one representative. Another provision of state statute stipulated that senators and representatives would gain their seats according to county population; counties with more inhabitants would have more seats. Dispute arose (in 1981) when the legislature of Wyoming tried to enact a new statute that provided for 64 seats in the Wyoming House of Representatives. With the new statute, state legislators had toreapportion voting districts. Thus began a battle between political parties for political advantage within the state.
In 1980 the state had almost a half million inhabitants. The ideal number ofpersons per representative in the House of Representatives should have been the population divided by the number of seats stipulated in Wyoming's proposedreapportionment legislation (64)--in this case, 7337 persons per representative. However, the state was divided into 23 counties and so substantial population differences impacted the size of voting districts. The resulting "deviation in population equality" created vastly different numbers of people per representative that was not the same for each county. Under this plan, the average deviation from ideal reapportionment was almost 16 percent (the maximumdeviation was almost 89 percent). Further, under the provisions of the proposed statute, even if a county, hypothetically, had no population at all, it was entitled to one representative. Thus the least populous county in the state(3,000 citizens lived in Niobrara County) was given one seat in the House ofRepresentatives. The statute's language also stipulated that if the minimumrepresentation provision was found to be unconstitutional, that county wouldbe combined into one voting district with a neighboring county. (Interestingly, this option would have populated the House of Representatives with only 63representatives.)
Appellants in this case were members of the League of Women Voters and residents of the seven largest counties in Wyoming. They filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court on the claim that allocation of one representative to Niobrara County tainted their voting privileges. Because appellants alleged thestate of Wyoming was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief (a decision by the court declaring the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement).
The Battle for Equal Representation
The federal district court held that some deviation in population equality might have been justified by the state's interest to follow other goals. Acceptable goals may have included "maintaining integrity of various political subdivisions" and "providing for compact districts of contiguous territory." However, the court felt that as little as a 10 percent deviation in population equality was discriminatory, therefore, the state was asked to justify the constitutionality of the statute.
The district court's review found as just and constitutional the state's policy to ensure each county had one representative in its legislature and theirneed to preserve the county boundaries. Even if a small county was denied onerepresentative, the court reasoned the outcome wouldn't change population disparity. The average deviation would be 13 percent in the plan which yielded63 representatives. The maximum deviation ratio would be 66 percent, (above the prescribed ratio of 10 percent). However, the 64-member plan would have been discriminatory to smaller counties, like Niobrara County, because it wouldnot have its own representative. Therefore the district court held that if the state adopted the 63-member plan, (which would grant small counties at least one seat in the Wyoming House of Representatives, then its statute would be constitutional.
Suellen L. Davidson argued the case for the appellants. (The appellants' casewas limited in scope because it chose to address only alleged disparities with regard to Niobrara Counts, but its claim was intended to be indicative ofthe problem of apportionment for all small counties.) According to the appellants, the issue in this case was whether the state could apportion representatives and ignore considerations of representation based on population. In their view, any allocation of seats in the House of Representatives, based on any other criteria than population was unconstitutional. The effect, appellantsargued, would be to substantially dilute the value of the votes of people living in larger counties. Moreover, the 63-seat plan totally disregarded a fundamental right: one person one vote. The appellants' attorney argued the outcome of such a plan would render the proposed statute unconstitutional because, although representation of the county was laudable, the plan essentially gave a vote to the county and not to the people residing in the county. Thus, it was more acceptable to combine smaller counties with larger ones to make one voting district (e.g., Niobrara County with neighboring Goshen County).
Randall T. Cox argued the case for the appellee. Cox agreed that while statesoften base apportionment on a population-based formula, small counties wereallocated one seat in the Wyoming House of Representatives in order to give all counties equal representation in the state's House of Representatives. Counsel suggested that population deviations did not diminish a fundamental individual right to equitable, free, and fair participation because legislative bodies respond to the majority and, in the case brought before the Court, Niobrara's representative would not alter that premise. As support for this argument, the appellee pointed out that the largest counties in the state accounted for election of 28 representatives out of 64. In fact, counsel maintained,that the very reason made it important for a small county to get its own representative in order to ensure each county had full and effective participation in crafting laws and in the political life of the state. For example, Cox went on to explain, the state regulated tax policy and financial aid accordingto county, not population. If a small county like Niobrara were combined with Goshen County to form one voting district, Niobrara's interests would likely suffer since there were three times more voters in Goshen. Alternatively, Niobrara would not risk suffering such marginalization if it had its own representative. Finally, the appellee argued, the affect of the 63-seat plan did not create a situation wherein minority interests threatened the minority.
Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. First the U.S. Supreme Court had to determine if it held proper jurisdiction. Then it would determine if the proposed 63-seat representation plan would change the plan's deviationfrom appropriate ratios of population to representatives and exceed constitutional limits. In Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the Court held that population must be the basis for state apportionment for voting districts electing representatives for the legislature in both state houses. However, the Court recognized that voting districts cannot be designed on absolute equality in terms of population in each county. Therefore, minor deviations were justified if a state could prove there were legitimate aims being served such as goals that were "maintaining the integrity of various political subdivisions" and "providing for compact districts of contiguous territory." However, in Connor v. Finch (1977) and White v. Register (1973), the Court had heldthat a difference of 10 percent in the number of inhabitants per county wasa tolerable deviation. Therefore any plan that exceeded that percentage created discrimination which had to be justified by the state in order to be constitutionally valid. The Court had jurisdiction.
While Wyoming's reapportionment plan exceeded the 10 percent tolerance, the Court reasoned the state had historically attempted to maintain various political subdivisions and preserve county borders. Since 1890, the state of Wyoming not only showed concern and endorsement of those objectives in the state constitution but strived to ensure every county was represented in the state legislature. Thus, in citing its decision in Abate v. Mundt (1971), wherein "a desire to preserve the integrity of various political subdivisions mayjustify an apportionment plan which departs from numerical equality," the Court found justifiable precedence to support the appellee's claim. Further, the justices could not find any sign that the reapportionment plan discriminated or caused any group of people injury. As the Court observed in Reynoldsv. Sims (1964), besides giving attention to strict population apportionment, the quality and the level of population difference must be observed.
Because appellants did not challenge the entire reapportionment plan, but just the clause that gave Niobrara County one seat in the House of Representatives, the justices needed to determine whether population disparity would be unconstitutional. The Court affirmed the lower court's findings that with the 64-seat plan political power would be focused in larger counties and deprive Niobrara County representation as guaranteed by the state constitution. Thus,the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Wyoming statute allocating one seat to small counties in the House of Representatives, specifically Niobrara County,was not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Minority Opinion
Justice Brennan filed the dissenting opinion. The justices could not agree with the majority's findings even though appellants had only challenged a partof the reapportionment plan. The minority opinion suggested the Court did notobserve the general constitutionality of the plan. The Equal Protection Clause requires a state to form legislative districts as evenly as possible. Thus, the minority justices felt that the Court failed to consider four importantissues: whether deviation was higher than 10 percent, (considered automatically discriminative according to Connor v. Finch); the validity of thereasons for the state's "inability" to decrease deviation in population equality; whether the plan truly served state policy in this matter; and whether such deviation was within constitutional limits, even if the state proved thatdeviations were justified by the state's intent.
Impact
The U.S. Supreme Court had, in prior cases, ruled that deviation in population equality above 10 percent was discriminatory. In this case, however, the Court affirmed a maximum deviation of 89 percent. (Even the average deviation of this plan--16 percent--exceeded the minimum allowable deviation.) However,Wyoming's 63-seat reapportionment scheme provided representation for the people of Niobrara County which would not have been possible if the state legislature adhered to apportionment strictly by population. Thus, even though the value of a vote in Niobrara County essentially was "valued" at twice the valueas would have been available under a strict "one person, one vote" determination, the Court reasoned that the exclusion of representation of that countyin the state legislature made such an exception acceptable. Thus, the Court provided yet another important criteria which state legislatures could use when reapportioning voting districts. A state did not have to strictly adhere toapportionment by population if (as the Court outlined in previous rulings) it needed to maintain political subdivisions, and merge adjoining areas into one voting district. Additionally, in concordance with their decision in Brown v. Thomson, the Court determined that the difference in population equality was legal if a state could justify a legitimate interest in doing so.
Related Cases
Margaret R. Brown, et al.
Appellee
Thyra Thomson, Wyoming Secretary of State
Appellant's Claim
Wyoming's reapportionment plan to allocate one seat to Niobrara County in itsHouse of Representatives was unconstitutional and substantially weakened thevoting power of the plaintiff because it gave a small number of people "super" voting strength and totally disregarded a fundamental rule: one person, one vote.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Suellen L. Davidson
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Randall T. Cox
Justices for the Court
Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (writing for theCourt), William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
22 June 1983
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the Wyoming reapportionment plan for its House of Representatives, which allocated one seat to underpopulated counties, did not violate the equal protection clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.
Significance
In apparent disregard of previous rulings regarding the necessity to apportion using equal population ratios among voting districts, the U.S Supreme Courtupheld a Wyoming plan that would exceed acceptable ratio limits. With this decision the Court held that population equality was not the sole determination for establishing voting districts. The Court had affirmed (in previous decisions) that other criteria were acceptable such as maintenance of county boundaries and preservation of political subdivisions. However, the Court ruled that giving an undersized county representation despite lacking sufficient population served a state's interest in providing citizens in all counties representation in a state legislature. The interests of equal representation werenot firmly tied to population.
In 1890, when Wyoming became a state, its Constitution provided that each county "shall constitute a senatorial and representative district," and were thus granted the right to have at least one senator and one representative. Another provision of state statute stipulated that senators and representatives would gain their seats according to county population; counties with more inhabitants would have more seats. Dispute arose (in 1981) when the legislature of Wyoming tried to enact a new statute that provided for 64 seats in the Wyoming House of Representatives. With the new statute, state legislators had toreapportion voting districts. Thus began a battle between political parties for political advantage within the state.
In 1980 the state had almost a half million inhabitants. The ideal number ofpersons per representative in the House of Representatives should have been the population divided by the number of seats stipulated in Wyoming's proposedreapportionment legislation (64)--in this case, 7337 persons per representative. However, the state was divided into 23 counties and so substantial population differences impacted the size of voting districts. The resulting "deviation in population equality" created vastly different numbers of people per representative that was not the same for each county. Under this plan, the average deviation from ideal reapportionment was almost 16 percent (the maximumdeviation was almost 89 percent). Further, under the provisions of the proposed statute, even if a county, hypothetically, had no population at all, it was entitled to one representative. Thus the least populous county in the state(3,000 citizens lived in Niobrara County) was given one seat in the House ofRepresentatives. The statute's language also stipulated that if the minimumrepresentation provision was found to be unconstitutional, that county wouldbe combined into one voting district with a neighboring county. (Interestingly, this option would have populated the House of Representatives with only 63representatives.)
Appellants in this case were members of the League of Women Voters and residents of the seven largest counties in Wyoming. They filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court on the claim that allocation of one representative to Niobrara County tainted their voting privileges. Because appellants alleged thestate of Wyoming was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief (a decision by the court declaring the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement).
The Battle for Equal Representation
The federal district court held that some deviation in population equality might have been justified by the state's interest to follow other goals. Acceptable goals may have included "maintaining integrity of various political subdivisions" and "providing for compact districts of contiguous territory." However, the court felt that as little as a 10 percent deviation in population equality was discriminatory, therefore, the state was asked to justify the constitutionality of the statute.
The district court's review found as just and constitutional the state's policy to ensure each county had one representative in its legislature and theirneed to preserve the county boundaries. Even if a small county was denied onerepresentative, the court reasoned the outcome wouldn't change population disparity. The average deviation would be 13 percent in the plan which yielded63 representatives. The maximum deviation ratio would be 66 percent, (above the prescribed ratio of 10 percent). However, the 64-member plan would have been discriminatory to smaller counties, like Niobrara County, because it wouldnot have its own representative. Therefore the district court held that if the state adopted the 63-member plan, (which would grant small counties at least one seat in the Wyoming House of Representatives, then its statute would be constitutional.
Suellen L. Davidson argued the case for the appellants. (The appellants' casewas limited in scope because it chose to address only alleged disparities with regard to Niobrara Counts, but its claim was intended to be indicative ofthe problem of apportionment for all small counties.) According to the appellants, the issue in this case was whether the state could apportion representatives and ignore considerations of representation based on population. In their view, any allocation of seats in the House of Representatives, based on any other criteria than population was unconstitutional. The effect, appellantsargued, would be to substantially dilute the value of the votes of people living in larger counties. Moreover, the 63-seat plan totally disregarded a fundamental right: one person one vote. The appellants' attorney argued the outcome of such a plan would render the proposed statute unconstitutional because, although representation of the county was laudable, the plan essentially gave a vote to the county and not to the people residing in the county. Thus, it was more acceptable to combine smaller counties with larger ones to make one voting district (e.g., Niobrara County with neighboring Goshen County).
Randall T. Cox argued the case for the appellee. Cox agreed that while statesoften base apportionment on a population-based formula, small counties wereallocated one seat in the Wyoming House of Representatives in order to give all counties equal representation in the state's House of Representatives. Counsel suggested that population deviations did not diminish a fundamental individual right to equitable, free, and fair participation because legislative bodies respond to the majority and, in the case brought before the Court, Niobrara's representative would not alter that premise. As support for this argument, the appellee pointed out that the largest counties in the state accounted for election of 28 representatives out of 64. In fact, counsel maintained,that the very reason made it important for a small county to get its own representative in order to ensure each county had full and effective participation in crafting laws and in the political life of the state. For example, Cox went on to explain, the state regulated tax policy and financial aid accordingto county, not population. If a small county like Niobrara were combined with Goshen County to form one voting district, Niobrara's interests would likely suffer since there were three times more voters in Goshen. Alternatively, Niobrara would not risk suffering such marginalization if it had its own representative. Finally, the appellee argued, the affect of the 63-seat plan did not create a situation wherein minority interests threatened the minority.
Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. First the U.S. Supreme Court had to determine if it held proper jurisdiction. Then it would determine if the proposed 63-seat representation plan would change the plan's deviationfrom appropriate ratios of population to representatives and exceed constitutional limits. In Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the Court held that population must be the basis for state apportionment for voting districts electing representatives for the legislature in both state houses. However, the Court recognized that voting districts cannot be designed on absolute equality in terms of population in each county. Therefore, minor deviations were justified if a state could prove there were legitimate aims being served such as goals that were "maintaining the integrity of various political subdivisions" and "providing for compact districts of contiguous territory." However, in Connor v. Finch (1977) and White v. Register (1973), the Court had heldthat a difference of 10 percent in the number of inhabitants per county wasa tolerable deviation. Therefore any plan that exceeded that percentage created discrimination which had to be justified by the state in order to be constitutionally valid. The Court had jurisdiction.
While Wyoming's reapportionment plan exceeded the 10 percent tolerance, the Court reasoned the state had historically attempted to maintain various political subdivisions and preserve county borders. Since 1890, the state of Wyoming not only showed concern and endorsement of those objectives in the state constitution but strived to ensure every county was represented in the state legislature. Thus, in citing its decision in Abate v. Mundt (1971), wherein "a desire to preserve the integrity of various political subdivisions mayjustify an apportionment plan which departs from numerical equality," the Court found justifiable precedence to support the appellee's claim. Further, the justices could not find any sign that the reapportionment plan discriminated or caused any group of people injury. As the Court observed in Reynoldsv. Sims (1964), besides giving attention to strict population apportionment, the quality and the level of population difference must be observed.
Because appellants did not challenge the entire reapportionment plan, but just the clause that gave Niobrara County one seat in the House of Representatives, the justices needed to determine whether population disparity would be unconstitutional. The Court affirmed the lower court's findings that with the 64-seat plan political power would be focused in larger counties and deprive Niobrara County representation as guaranteed by the state constitution. Thus,the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Wyoming statute allocating one seat to small counties in the House of Representatives, specifically Niobrara County,was not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Minority Opinion
Justice Brennan filed the dissenting opinion. The justices could not agree with the majority's findings even though appellants had only challenged a partof the reapportionment plan. The minority opinion suggested the Court did notobserve the general constitutionality of the plan. The Equal Protection Clause requires a state to form legislative districts as evenly as possible. Thus, the minority justices felt that the Court failed to consider four importantissues: whether deviation was higher than 10 percent, (considered automatically discriminative according to Connor v. Finch); the validity of thereasons for the state's "inability" to decrease deviation in population equality; whether the plan truly served state policy in this matter; and whether such deviation was within constitutional limits, even if the state proved thatdeviations were justified by the state's intent.
Impact
The U.S. Supreme Court had, in prior cases, ruled that deviation in population equality above 10 percent was discriminatory. In this case, however, the Court affirmed a maximum deviation of 89 percent. (Even the average deviation of this plan--16 percent--exceeded the minimum allowable deviation.) However,Wyoming's 63-seat reapportionment scheme provided representation for the people of Niobrara County which would not have been possible if the state legislature adhered to apportionment strictly by population. Thus, even though the value of a vote in Niobrara County essentially was "valued" at twice the valueas would have been available under a strict "one person, one vote" determination, the Court reasoned that the exclusion of representation of that countyin the state legislature made such an exception acceptable. Thus, the Court provided yet another important criteria which state legislatures could use when reapportioning voting districts. A state did not have to strictly adhere toapportionment by population if (as the Court outlined in previous rulings) it needed to maintain political subdivisions, and merge adjoining areas into one voting district. Additionally, in concordance with their decision in Brown v. Thomson, the Court determined that the difference in population equality was legal if a state could justify a legitimate interest in doing so.
Related Cases
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
- Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
- White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
- Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
- Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1996.
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