Brown v. Thomson

The federal district court held that some deviation in population equality might have been justified by the state's interest to follow other goals. Acceptable goals may have included "maintaining integrity of various political subdivisions" and "providing for compact districts of contiguous territory." However, the court felt that as little as a 10 percent deviation in population equality was discriminatory, therefore, the state was asked to justify the constitutionality of the statute.

The district court's review found as just and constitutional the state's policy to ensure each county had one representative in its legislature and their need to preserve the county boundaries. Even if a small county was denied one representative, the court reasoned the outcome wouldn't change population disparity. The average deviation would be 13 percent in the plan which yielded 63 representatives. The maximum deviation ratio would be 66 percent, (above the prescribed ratio of 10 percent). However, the 64-member plan would have been discriminatory to smaller counties, like Niobrara County, because it would not have its own representative. Therefore the district court held that if the state adopted the 63-member plan, (which would grant small counties at least one seat in the Wyoming House of Representatives, then its statute would be constitutional.

Suellen L. Davidson argued the case for the appellants. (The appellants' case was limited in scope because it chose to address only alleged disparities with regard to Niobrara Counts, but its claim was intended to be indicative of the problem of apportionment for all small counties.) According to the appellants, the issue in this case was whether the state could apportion representatives and ignore considerations of representation based on population. In their view, any allocation of seats in the House of Representatives, based on any other criteria than population was unconstitutional. The effect, appellants argued, would be to substantially dilute the value of the votes of people living in larger counties. Moreover, the 63-seat plan totally disregarded a fundamental right: one person one vote. The appellants' attorney argued the outcome of such a plan would render the proposed statute unconstitutional because, although representation of the county was laudable, the plan essentially gave a vote to the county and not to the people residing in the county. Thus, it was more acceptable to combine smaller counties with larger ones to make one voting district (e.g., Niobrara County with neighboring Goshen County).

Randall T. Cox argued the case for the appellee. Cox agreed that while states often base apportionment on a population-based formula, small counties were allocated one seat in the Wyoming House of Representatives in order to give all counties equal representation in the state's House of Representatives. Counsel suggested that population deviations did not diminish a fundamental individual right to equitable, free, and fair participation because legislative bodies respond to the majority and, in the case brought before the Court, Niobrara's representative would not alter that premise. As support for this argument, the appellee pointed out that the largest counties in the state accounted for election of 28 representatives out of 64. In fact, counsel maintained, that the very reason made it important for a small county to get its own representative in order to ensure each county had full and effective participation in crafting laws and in the political life of the state. For example, Cox went on to explain, the state regulated tax policy and financial aid according to county, not population. If a small county like Niobrara were combined with Goshen County to form one voting district, Niobrara's interests would likely suffer since there were three times more voters in Goshen. Alternatively, Niobrara would not risk suffering such marginalization if it had its own representative. Finally, the appellee argued, the affect of the 63-seat plan did not create a situation wherein minority interests threatened the minority.

Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. First the U.S. Supreme Court had to determine if it held proper jurisdiction. Then it would determine if the proposed 63-seat representation plan would change the plan's deviation from appropriate ratios of population to representatives and exceed constitutional limits. In Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the Court held that population must be the basis for state apportionment for voting districts electing representatives for the legislature in both state houses. However, the Court recognized that voting districts cannot be designed on absolute equality in terms of population in each county. Therefore, minor deviations were justified if a state could prove there were legitimate aims being served such as goals that were "maintaining the integrity of various political subdivisions" and "providing for compact districts of contiguous territory." However, in Connor v. Finch (1977) and White v. Register (1973), the Court had held that a difference of 10 percent in the number of inhabitants per county was a tolerable deviation. Therefore any plan that exceeded that percentage created discrimination which had to be justified by the state in order to be constitutionally valid. The Court had jurisdiction.

While Wyoming's reapportionment plan exceeded the 10 percent tolerance, the Court reasoned the state had historically attempted to maintain various political subdivisions and preserve county borders. Since 1890, the state of Wyoming not only showed concern and endorsement of those objectives in the state constitution but strived to ensure every county was represented in the state legislature. Thus, in citing its decision in Abate v. Mundt (1971), wherein "a desire to preserve the integrity of various political subdivisions may justify an apportionment plan which departs from numerical equality," the Court found justifiable precedence to support the appellee's claim. Further, the justices could not find any sign that the reapportionment plan discriminated or caused any group of people injury. As the Court observed in Reynolds v. Sims (1964), besides giving attention to strict population apportionment, the quality and the level of population difference must be observed.

Because appellants did not challenge the entire reapportionment plan, but just the clause that gave Niobrara County one seat in the House of Representatives, the justices needed to determine whether population disparity would be unconstitutional. The Court affirmed the lower court's findings that with the 64-seat plan political power would be focused in larger counties and deprive Niobrara County representation as guaranteed by the state constitution. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Wyoming statute allocating one seat to small counties in the House of Representatives, specifically Niobrara County, was not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.