Petitioner
Carl Brown
Respondent
Earl Hartlage
Petitioner's Claim
That the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibited candidates for public office in that state from promising any material benefit to voters if theywere elected, was a violation of the First Amendment's protection of free speech.
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Warren E.Burger, Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William H. Rehnquist
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
20 January 1982
Decision
That the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act constituted a limitation of free speech as guaranteed under the First Amendment.
Significance
Brown v. Hartlage reinforced the subordination of state election lawsto constitutionally protected freedoms, particularly the right to free speechguaranteed in the First Amendment.
On 15 August 1979, during a general election for the office of Jefferson County (Kentucky) commissioner, "C" District, candidates Carl Brown and Bill Creech held a press conference on television. During the conference, Brown and Creech cited the high expenses incurred by the administration of the incumbent,Earl Hartlage. Creech promised county taxpayers that if elected, he and Brown (who were both of the same political party) would lower their salaries voluntarily.
Soon afterward, the two learned that this statement was in violation of Section 121.055 of the Revised Statutes of Kentucky. Referred to as the Corrupt Practices Act, the law stated that "No candidate for nomination or election toany state, county, city or district office shall expend, pay, promise, loan or become pecuniarily liable in any way for money or other thing of value, either directly or indirectly, to any person in consideration of the vote or financial or moral support of that person." Upon becoming aware of this, Brown and Creech issued a joint statement declaring that they rescinded their promise in accordance with the law, "and instead pledge to seek corrective legislation in the next session of the General Assembly to correct this silly provision of State Law."
In the election on 6 November 1979, Creech was defeated, but Brown defeated the incumbent, Hartlage, by more than 10,000 votes. Hartlage filed suit in theJefferson County Circuit Court, declaring that because of Brown's violationof the Corrupt Practices Act, the election results should be nullified.
The trial court found that, because the salaries had been "fixed by law," Brown's promise was in violation of the act. But, the court reasoned, given thefact that Brown had retracted his statement, that his running mate had been defeated, and that the people had spoken overwhelmingly in their vote for Brown over Hartlage, the election results should be allowed to stand. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision. In so doing, the court used as its basis its earlier ruling in Sparks v. Boggs (1960), when itfound that a candidate's promise to take only $1 a year in pay, and to distribute the remainder of his salary to charity, constituted a violation of theCorrupt Practices Act. The court did find some appeal in Brown's statement that "[i]f carried to its logical extreme . . . any promise by a candidate to increase the efficiency and thus lower the cost of government might likewise be considered as an attempt to buy votes"; however, it was the opinion of thecourt that it was bound by its earlier ruling in Sparks.
Free Speech or Buying Votes?
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion for the Court, in which all justices but Rehnquist concurred. While conceding that it is legitimate for a state to make laws protecting the integrity of its electoral process, Brennan said thatwhere abridgement of free speech is concerned, legitimacy is not enough: thestate interest must be "compelling," and the prohibition must not unduly limit protected forms of expression.
Section 121.055 was made to prevent the buying of votes, Brennan noted, but such voter bribery normally goes on in secret, whereas Brown and Creech made their promise openly. As for the possibility that the law had been enacted inorder to maintain a level playing field by ensuring that the financial ability to forego the salary did not become a prerequisite for election (thus limiting candidacy to the independently wealthy), Brennan did not find this an adequate justification for abridging the right to free speech. In other words, "The state's fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the state with a compelling justification for limiting speech."
The Right to Be Wrong
Furthermore, Brennan stated, Section 121.055 was not even justified on the basis of the assertion that it would prevent the use of factual misstatements in a political campaign. (In this case, since the salary was "fixed by law," Brown and Creech were factually as well as legally in error, because they didnot have the power to change their salaries.) Freedom of expression must have"breathing space" in order to flourish, and to void the appellants' victoryin the election "would be inconsistent with the atmosphere of robust political debate required by the First Amendment." In American campaigns, candidatessay a lot of things, and trying to force them by law to always be correct would do more harm than good.
Besides, said Brennan, to all appearances the promise was made in good faith,and the two candidates did not seem to realize that they were acting in error. In addition, they retracted their statement promptly.
Judgment and a Lone Dissenter
For the reasons given, the Court voted 8-1 to hold with the finding of the Kentucky state court, and found that Section 121.055 did indeed limit free speech in violation of the First Amendment. The lone dissenter was Justice Rehnquist, who nonetheless did agree that the Corrupt Practices Act constituted animpermissible limitation on free speech. His dissent revolved, rather, aroundthe method by which the Court reached this determination. He would have relied, he said, on the Court's ruling in Mills v. Alabama (1966), and "Isee no need to rely on other precedents which do not involve state efforts toregulate the electoral process."
Related Cases
Carl Brown
Respondent
Earl Hartlage
Petitioner's Claim
That the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibited candidates for public office in that state from promising any material benefit to voters if theywere elected, was a violation of the First Amendment's protection of free speech.
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Warren E.Burger, Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William H. Rehnquist
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
20 January 1982
Decision
That the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act constituted a limitation of free speech as guaranteed under the First Amendment.
Significance
Brown v. Hartlage reinforced the subordination of state election lawsto constitutionally protected freedoms, particularly the right to free speechguaranteed in the First Amendment.
On 15 August 1979, during a general election for the office of Jefferson County (Kentucky) commissioner, "C" District, candidates Carl Brown and Bill Creech held a press conference on television. During the conference, Brown and Creech cited the high expenses incurred by the administration of the incumbent,Earl Hartlage. Creech promised county taxpayers that if elected, he and Brown (who were both of the same political party) would lower their salaries voluntarily.
Soon afterward, the two learned that this statement was in violation of Section 121.055 of the Revised Statutes of Kentucky. Referred to as the Corrupt Practices Act, the law stated that "No candidate for nomination or election toany state, county, city or district office shall expend, pay, promise, loan or become pecuniarily liable in any way for money or other thing of value, either directly or indirectly, to any person in consideration of the vote or financial or moral support of that person." Upon becoming aware of this, Brown and Creech issued a joint statement declaring that they rescinded their promise in accordance with the law, "and instead pledge to seek corrective legislation in the next session of the General Assembly to correct this silly provision of State Law."
In the election on 6 November 1979, Creech was defeated, but Brown defeated the incumbent, Hartlage, by more than 10,000 votes. Hartlage filed suit in theJefferson County Circuit Court, declaring that because of Brown's violationof the Corrupt Practices Act, the election results should be nullified.
The trial court found that, because the salaries had been "fixed by law," Brown's promise was in violation of the act. But, the court reasoned, given thefact that Brown had retracted his statement, that his running mate had been defeated, and that the people had spoken overwhelmingly in their vote for Brown over Hartlage, the election results should be allowed to stand. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision. In so doing, the court used as its basis its earlier ruling in Sparks v. Boggs (1960), when itfound that a candidate's promise to take only $1 a year in pay, and to distribute the remainder of his salary to charity, constituted a violation of theCorrupt Practices Act. The court did find some appeal in Brown's statement that "[i]f carried to its logical extreme . . . any promise by a candidate to increase the efficiency and thus lower the cost of government might likewise be considered as an attempt to buy votes"; however, it was the opinion of thecourt that it was bound by its earlier ruling in Sparks.
Free Speech or Buying Votes?
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion for the Court, in which all justices but Rehnquist concurred. While conceding that it is legitimate for a state to make laws protecting the integrity of its electoral process, Brennan said thatwhere abridgement of free speech is concerned, legitimacy is not enough: thestate interest must be "compelling," and the prohibition must not unduly limit protected forms of expression.
Section 121.055 was made to prevent the buying of votes, Brennan noted, but such voter bribery normally goes on in secret, whereas Brown and Creech made their promise openly. As for the possibility that the law had been enacted inorder to maintain a level playing field by ensuring that the financial ability to forego the salary did not become a prerequisite for election (thus limiting candidacy to the independently wealthy), Brennan did not find this an adequate justification for abridging the right to free speech. In other words, "The state's fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the state with a compelling justification for limiting speech."
The Right to Be Wrong
Furthermore, Brennan stated, Section 121.055 was not even justified on the basis of the assertion that it would prevent the use of factual misstatements in a political campaign. (In this case, since the salary was "fixed by law," Brown and Creech were factually as well as legally in error, because they didnot have the power to change their salaries.) Freedom of expression must have"breathing space" in order to flourish, and to void the appellants' victoryin the election "would be inconsistent with the atmosphere of robust political debate required by the First Amendment." In American campaigns, candidatessay a lot of things, and trying to force them by law to always be correct would do more harm than good.
Besides, said Brennan, to all appearances the promise was made in good faith,and the two candidates did not seem to realize that they were acting in error. In addition, they retracted their statement promptly.
Judgment and a Lone Dissenter
For the reasons given, the Court voted 8-1 to hold with the finding of the Kentucky state court, and found that Section 121.055 did indeed limit free speech in violation of the First Amendment. The lone dissenter was Justice Rehnquist, who nonetheless did agree that the Corrupt Practices Act constituted animpermissible limitation on free speech. His dissent revolved, rather, aroundthe method by which the Court reached this determination. He would have relied, he said, on the Court's ruling in Mills v. Alabama (1966), and "Isee no need to rely on other precedents which do not involve state efforts toregulate the electoral process."
Related Cases
- Sparks v. Boggs, 339 S.W.2d. 480 (1960).
- Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
Further Readings
- Murphy, Walter F. et al., American Constitutional Interpretation, 2nd ed. Westbury, NY: Foundation Press, 1995.
User Comments Add a comment…