Appellant
Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States
Appellee
Mike Synar, Member of Congress
Appellant's Claim
That a provision of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Reduction Program of 1985, giving budget-cutting authority--an executive function--to the comptroller general--a legislative branch employee--did not violate the principle of separation of powers.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Lloyd M. Cutler
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Alan B. Morrison
Justices for the Court
William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger (writing for the Court), Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
7 July 1986
Decision
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court struck down the contested provision.
Significance
Bowsher v. Synar, with its fine distinctions between the functions ofdifferent branches of the government, helped redefine the doctrine of separation of powers for the modern age.
In 1985, Congress passed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit ReductionAct, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which set a cap on the amount of deficit spending Congress could undertake between the years 1986 and 1991. Any resulting cuts were to be implemented by the comptroller general, a legislative branch employee who can be removed from the job only by joint resolution of both houses of Congress.
Immediately after the act was signed into law, Representative Mike Synar and11 other members of Congress filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court forthe District of Columbia asking the court to declare the new law unconstitutional. A three-judge panel of the district court struck down the reporting provisions of the law, citing the role of the comptroller general in implementing the cuts as a violation of the constitutionally imposed separation of powers. The comptroller general then appealed this decision directly to the U.S.Supreme Court.
By a vote of 7 - 2, a majority of the justices agreed with the district court's decision. The act assigned responsibilities to the comptroller general that were executive in nature. But because the comptroller general was subject to removal by Congress, Congress had essentially retained these responsibilities for itself, thus assuming a duty that properly belonged to the executive branch of government.
The Court Refines the Meaning of Separation of Powers
After the Articles of Confederation had created the United States of Americain 1777, they were found to be unworkable--in part because they concentratedall federal power in a single governmental body. This prototype Congress wasnot subject to the checks and balances of either an executive or a judiciary,and the founders feared that it might come to resemble the monarchy that they had so recently fought with for their independence. Consequently, when theConfederation Congress called for a Constitutional Convention to draft a newfoundation document, the framers of the Constitution based their plan on a three-party (tripartite) government. While the people had the power to elect representatives (originally only to the House; state legislatures elected Senators), all legislation passed by Congress could be vetoed by the president. With the development of the doctrine of judicial review, it became clear that the judiciary would have the final authority in determining the constitutionality of legislative and executive branch actions.
The separation of powers was never meant to be absolute. As James Madison wrote in No. 47 of The Federalist Papers in 1788, although the control ofthe whole of one branch would not be vested in the same entities which controlled the whole of another branch, the three departments would inevitably share some power. The "blending" that Madison wrote about became more and more pronounced as federal government evolved, but in Bowsher, the Court wascalled upon to redraw boundaries which had become blurred. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger did so:
Fortunately, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act contained a fallback provision--one which conformed to the job description outlined in the Court's opinion. Inthe event that the comptroller general could not carry out his reporting duties under the act, deficit reduction proposals would be submitted to the president by means of a joint resolution of both houses of Congress. Rather than invalidating the statutory provisions giving Congress the power to remove thecomptroller general, the Court recommended that Congress merely adhere to thealternative it had provided for itself.
Related Cases
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, signed into law by President Ronald Reagan on 12 December 1985, is better know as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, so named for its Senate cosponsors Phil Gramm, Warren Rudman, and Ernest "Fritz" Hollings. For years both political parties, but particularly Republicans, had expressed concern over the growing federal budget deficit.The act, whose purpose was to eliminate the deficit, represented a compromise agreement between the two parties.
Accordingly, the act established a "maximum deficit amount" for federal spending. Starting in 1986 and continuing to 1991, the size of that maximum wouldgradually taper down to zero. If the deficit exceeded its maximum as established for a given year, the act called for across-the-board cuts in spending, half of which would come from defense programs, the other half from non-defense programs. The determination of those budget reductions would be made separately by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), a unit of the executive branch, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), a part of the legislative branch. Each of these agencies would present their findings to the comptrollergeneral, who would make recommendations to the president.
Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States
Appellee
Mike Synar, Member of Congress
Appellant's Claim
That a provision of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Reduction Program of 1985, giving budget-cutting authority--an executive function--to the comptroller general--a legislative branch employee--did not violate the principle of separation of powers.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Lloyd M. Cutler
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Alan B. Morrison
Justices for the Court
William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger (writing for the Court), Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
7 July 1986
Decision
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court struck down the contested provision.
Significance
Bowsher v. Synar, with its fine distinctions between the functions ofdifferent branches of the government, helped redefine the doctrine of separation of powers for the modern age.
In 1985, Congress passed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit ReductionAct, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which set a cap on the amount of deficit spending Congress could undertake between the years 1986 and 1991. Any resulting cuts were to be implemented by the comptroller general, a legislative branch employee who can be removed from the job only by joint resolution of both houses of Congress.
Immediately after the act was signed into law, Representative Mike Synar and11 other members of Congress filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court forthe District of Columbia asking the court to declare the new law unconstitutional. A three-judge panel of the district court struck down the reporting provisions of the law, citing the role of the comptroller general in implementing the cuts as a violation of the constitutionally imposed separation of powers. The comptroller general then appealed this decision directly to the U.S.Supreme Court.
By a vote of 7 - 2, a majority of the justices agreed with the district court's decision. The act assigned responsibilities to the comptroller general that were executive in nature. But because the comptroller general was subject to removal by Congress, Congress had essentially retained these responsibilities for itself, thus assuming a duty that properly belonged to the executive branch of government.
The Court Refines the Meaning of Separation of Powers
After the Articles of Confederation had created the United States of Americain 1777, they were found to be unworkable--in part because they concentratedall federal power in a single governmental body. This prototype Congress wasnot subject to the checks and balances of either an executive or a judiciary,and the founders feared that it might come to resemble the monarchy that they had so recently fought with for their independence. Consequently, when theConfederation Congress called for a Constitutional Convention to draft a newfoundation document, the framers of the Constitution based their plan on a three-party (tripartite) government. While the people had the power to elect representatives (originally only to the House; state legislatures elected Senators), all legislation passed by Congress could be vetoed by the president. With the development of the doctrine of judicial review, it became clear that the judiciary would have the final authority in determining the constitutionality of legislative and executive branch actions.
The separation of powers was never meant to be absolute. As James Madison wrote in No. 47 of The Federalist Papers in 1788, although the control ofthe whole of one branch would not be vested in the same entities which controlled the whole of another branch, the three departments would inevitably share some power. The "blending" that Madison wrote about became more and more pronounced as federal government evolved, but in Bowsher, the Court wascalled upon to redraw boundaries which had become blurred. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger did so:
Appellants suggest that the duties assigned to the Comptroller in the Act are essentially ministerial and mechanical so that their performance does not constitute "execution of the law" in a meaningful sense. On the contrary, we view these functions as plainlyentailing execution of the law in constitutional terms. Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of"execution" of the law . . . Congress of course initially determined the content of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act; and undoubtedly the content of the Act determines the nature of the executive duty. However. . . once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment onlyindirectly--by passing new legislation.
Fortunately, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act contained a fallback provision--one which conformed to the job description outlined in the Court's opinion. Inthe event that the comptroller general could not carry out his reporting duties under the act, deficit reduction proposals would be submitted to the president by means of a joint resolution of both houses of Congress. Rather than invalidating the statutory provisions giving Congress the power to remove thecomptroller general, the Court recommended that Congress merely adhere to thealternative it had provided for itself.
Related Cases
- Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
- Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
- Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, signed into law by President Ronald Reagan on 12 December 1985, is better know as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, so named for its Senate cosponsors Phil Gramm, Warren Rudman, and Ernest "Fritz" Hollings. For years both political parties, but particularly Republicans, had expressed concern over the growing federal budget deficit.The act, whose purpose was to eliminate the deficit, represented a compromise agreement between the two parties.
Accordingly, the act established a "maximum deficit amount" for federal spending. Starting in 1986 and continuing to 1991, the size of that maximum wouldgradually taper down to zero. If the deficit exceeded its maximum as established for a given year, the act called for across-the-board cuts in spending, half of which would come from defense programs, the other half from non-defense programs. The determination of those budget reductions would be made separately by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), a unit of the executive branch, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), a part of the legislative branch. Each of these agencies would present their findings to the comptrollergeneral, who would make recommendations to the president.
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