Petitioner
Local Number 93, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C.L.C.,et al.
Respondent
City of Cleveland, on behalf of local officials
Petitioenrs' Claim
That the city of Cleveland and various local officials discriminated on the basis of race and national origin in the hiring, assignment, and promotion offirefighters within the Cleveland Fire Department.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Edward R. Stege, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
John D. Maddox
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), ThurgoodMarshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., John Paul Stevens
Justices Dissenting
Warren E. Burger, William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 February 1986
Decision
A court-approved settlement between the city of Cleveland and a group of minority firefighters which required a specific number of promotions for minorityfirefighters was declared as fair and reasonable to non-minority firefighters, even if it benefited individuals who had not been actual victims of the city's race discrimination.
Significance
The court-approved affirmative action settlement was found to be fair and reasonable since the agreement was a voluntary one between the minority firefighters and the city and because the promotions did not harm the non-minority firefighters.
During the 1980s, after the city of Cleveland had been sued for racial discrimination several times and had lost, an organization of African American andHispanic firefighters, called the Vanguards, brought suit against the city inthe federal district court. They alleged that the city had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act through racial discrimination in the hiring, assigning, and promoting of firefighters. Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Actform the legislative basis for equal employment opportunity laws and affirmative action programs. In a court-approved settlement called a "consent decree," the city agreed to give half of all promotions to minority firefighters. The majority-dominated union, Local 93 of the International Association of Firefighters, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appeals court agreed with the decision, finding that the decree was "fair andreasonable to non-minority firefighters."
The union asked the Supreme Court to review the case, also known as taking the case on certiorari. The court did so, and on 2 July 1986, also agreed with the lower court's ruling. Justice Brennan was joined in his opinion byJustices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Brennan wrote that, due to the voluntary nature of a consent decree in which both parties agree to the remedy proposed, Title VII did not apply in this case. In addition,although the union did not agree to the consent degree, it was not harmed byit. Justices William Rehnquist and Warren Burger disagreed, stating that theconsent decree did fall under Title VII since it was court-ordered, whetheror not it was voluntary. In addition, they felt that people benefiting from the decree needed to prove that they were victims of discrimination. Justice White's dissent also stated a need for individuals benefiting from the decreeto prove past discrimination.
In an interview with Nation's Business, a lawyer with the Mountain States Legal Foundation of Denver which had entered the case on the side of theunion, stated: "The Court seems to be setting up a sort of continuum, distinguishing between [affirmative action] programs that involve hiring, promotionsor layoffs." In this case, the Court seemed to feel more comfortable with anemployer's affirmative action program which dealt with promotions because non-minority employees were not necessarily harmed by the program.
Related Cases
Local Number 93, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C.L.C.,et al.
Respondent
City of Cleveland, on behalf of local officials
Petitioenrs' Claim
That the city of Cleveland and various local officials discriminated on the basis of race and national origin in the hiring, assignment, and promotion offirefighters within the Cleveland Fire Department.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Edward R. Stege, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
John D. Maddox
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), ThurgoodMarshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., John Paul Stevens
Justices Dissenting
Warren E. Burger, William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 February 1986
Decision
A court-approved settlement between the city of Cleveland and a group of minority firefighters which required a specific number of promotions for minorityfirefighters was declared as fair and reasonable to non-minority firefighters, even if it benefited individuals who had not been actual victims of the city's race discrimination.
Significance
The court-approved affirmative action settlement was found to be fair and reasonable since the agreement was a voluntary one between the minority firefighters and the city and because the promotions did not harm the non-minority firefighters.
During the 1980s, after the city of Cleveland had been sued for racial discrimination several times and had lost, an organization of African American andHispanic firefighters, called the Vanguards, brought suit against the city inthe federal district court. They alleged that the city had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act through racial discrimination in the hiring, assigning, and promoting of firefighters. Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Actform the legislative basis for equal employment opportunity laws and affirmative action programs. In a court-approved settlement called a "consent decree," the city agreed to give half of all promotions to minority firefighters. The majority-dominated union, Local 93 of the International Association of Firefighters, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appeals court agreed with the decision, finding that the decree was "fair andreasonable to non-minority firefighters."
The union asked the Supreme Court to review the case, also known as taking the case on certiorari. The court did so, and on 2 July 1986, also agreed with the lower court's ruling. Justice Brennan was joined in his opinion byJustices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Brennan wrote that, due to the voluntary nature of a consent decree in which both parties agree to the remedy proposed, Title VII did not apply in this case. In addition,although the union did not agree to the consent degree, it was not harmed byit. Justices William Rehnquist and Warren Burger disagreed, stating that theconsent decree did fall under Title VII since it was court-ordered, whetheror not it was voluntary. In addition, they felt that people benefiting from the decree needed to prove that they were victims of discrimination. Justice White's dissent also stated a need for individuals benefiting from the decreeto prove past discrimination.
In an interview with Nation's Business, a lawyer with the Mountain States Legal Foundation of Denver which had entered the case on the side of theunion, stated: "The Court seems to be setting up a sort of continuum, distinguishing between [affirmative action] programs that involve hiring, promotionsor layoffs." In this case, the Court seemed to feel more comfortable with anemployer's affirmative action program which dealt with promotions because non-minority employees were not necessarily harmed by the program.
Related Cases
- Firefighters Local Union No. 1794 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
- Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
- Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
- Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
- United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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