AFL-CIO C.L.C.v. City of Cleveland Local Number International Association of Firefighters (93,)

The court-approved affirmative action settlement was found to be fair and reasonable since the agreement was a voluntary one between the minority firefighters and the city and because the promotions did not harm the non-minority firefighters.

During the 1980s, after the city of Cleveland had been sued for racial discrimination several times and had lost, an organization of African American and Hispanic firefighters, called the Vanguards, brought suit against the city in the federal district court. They alleged that the city had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act through racial discrimination in the hiring, assigning, and promoting of firefighters. Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act form the legislative basis for equal employment opportunity laws and affirmative action programs. In a court-approved settlement called a "consent decree," the city agreed to give half of all promotions to minority firefighters. The majority-dominated union, Local 93 of the International Association of Firefighters, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appeals court agreed with the decision, finding that the decree was "fair and reasonable to non-minority firefighters."

The union asked the Supreme Court to review the case, also known as taking the case on certiorari. The court did so, and on 2 July 1986, also agreed with the lower court's ruling. Justice Brennan was joined in his opinion by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Brennan wrote that, due to the voluntary nature of a consent decree in which both parties agree to the remedy proposed, Title VII did not apply in this case. In addition, although the union did not agree to the consent degree, it was not harmed by it. Justices William Rehnquist and Warren Burger disagreed, stating that the consent decree did fall under Title VII since it was court-ordered, whether or not it was voluntary. In addition, they felt that people benefiting from the decree needed to prove that they were victims of discrimination. Justice White's dissent also stated a need for individuals benefiting from the decree to prove past discrimination.

In an interview with Nation's Business, a lawyer with the Mountain States Legal Foundation of Denver which had entered the case on the side of the union, stated: "The Court seems to be setting up a sort of continuum, distinguishing between [affirmative action] programs that involve hiring, promotions or layoffs." In this case, the Court seemed to feel more comfortable with an employer's affirmative action program which dealt with promotions because non-minority employees were not necessarily harmed by the program.