Petitioner
William James Rummel
Respondent
Estelle, Corrections Director for the State of Texas
Petitioner's Claim
That Article 63 of the Penal Code of the state of Texas, which mandated thata person convicted of three felonies would receive a life sentence as a recidivist criminal, violated Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment protections againstcruel and unusual punishment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Scott J. Atlas
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Douglas M. Becker
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
18 March 1980
Decision
Upheld the state of Texas and affirmed the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, finding that Article 63 of the Texas Penal Code didnot violate the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment of criminals.
Significance
Established that a severe penalty for repeat offenders was not a violation ofthe protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
Three-Time Loser
Texas resident William James Rummel plead guilty to a charge of fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 in goods or services in 1964. The penalty for this offense, classified as a felony under Texas law, was two to ten yearsimprisonment. Rummel received a sentence of three years in prison which he served without incident. Upon release from confinement, Rummel's run-ins with the law continued. In 1969 he pled guilty to passing a bad check in the amountof $28.26, a crime punishable by two to five years imprisonment, and received a four year prison sentence. Finally, in 1973, Rummel faced prosecution onthe charge of obtaining $120.75 through false pretences. This crime qualifiedas a "felony theft" under Texas law, and was punishable by two to ten yearsimprisonment. The prosecutors of the case decided to proceed against Rummel using the state's so-called recidivist statute, Article 63 of the Texas StatePenal Code. Under Article 63, criminals with three felony convictions of anytype are subjected to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Rummel decided on a jury trial, but was convicted and sentenced to life in prison on 26 April 1973 by the trial court.
Cruel and Unusual?
Following his conviction and sentencing, Rummel attempted to appeal his caseto the Texas Court of Appeals. The court rejected his appeal, however, and Rummel subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to theU.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Rummel claimed in hispetition that a life sentence was so out of proportion to the damage done byhis crimes, which were nonviolent and involved a total property value of $229.01, that it violated Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment of criminals. The district court rejected Rummel'sconstitutional claims, pointing out that he would be eligible for parole inapproximately 12 years, regardless of the initial length of his sentence. Rummel then brought his case before a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for theFourth Circuit. The circuit court overruled the district court, ruling thatRummel's punishment was "grossly disproportionate" to his crimes. Following this ruling, the court of appeals reheard the case, vacating the opinion of the circuit court panel's decision and reaffirming their earlier decision and agreeing with a dissenting circuit court panel judge that "no neutral principle of adjudication permits a federal court to hold that in a given situation individual crimes are too trivial in relation to the punishment imposed." Thecourt of appeals also affirmed the district court's denial of Rummel's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In reaching its conclusions, the courtof appeals relied heavily on the probability that Rummel's sentence would actually turn out to be considerably less than life, due to the probability ofhis parole after an approximately 12-year period. Significantly, six membersof the court of appeals dissented in the final decision, noting that Rummel had no guarantee of parole and therefore the constitutionality of his sentenceshould be determined on its face, and not on the basis of perceived probabilities. With such deep disagreement within the court of appeals, the case wassent to the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard arguments on 7 January 1980.
The Nature of Proportionality
The Supreme Court upheld the finding of the court of appeals, ruling that Article 63 of the Texas State Penal Code did not violate constitutional prohibitions against the cruel and unusual punishment of criminals. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that most sentences struck down for lack ofproportionality to the offense committed had been in capital cases. Of noncapital sentences challenged for constitutionality, those of Weems v. UnitedStates (1910) and Graham v. West Virginia (1912) were among the very few to be struck down. In Weems, the Court invalidated the sentence of a man convicted of falsifying a public document. This sentence includeda 12-year prison term, the wearing of ankle and wrist chains, hard labor, andcontinual surveillance by prison authorities. Rummel had cited Weemsas a precedent for his own case, and the court of appeals had accepted his argument that the length of his sentence had been the most disproportionate portion of Weems's punishment. The Supreme Court rejected the comparison, however, with Justice Rehnquist observing that the Court's opinion in Weems"consistently referred jointly to the length of imprisonment and its 'accessories' or 'accompaniments.'" At no time in his case had Rummelclaimed to be mistreated by Texas penal authorities. In Graham, the Court had decided that West Virginia's recidivist statute was constitutional in the case of a man convicted three times of stealing horses. The Court alsocompared Texas penal codes to those of other states and found that they did not vary appreciably in the length or severity of the sentences mandated for Rummel's crimes. Finally, the Court agreed with the district court that Rummel's sentence could not reasonably be viewed as a life sentence, given the probability of his parole within approximately 12 years. In the final analysis, the Court held that the constitutionality of criminal sentencing should be questioned on thoroughly objective grounds, such as the severity of a sentence.The assessment of the length of sentencing for various crimes was deemed completely subjective, and, as such, properly a matter for legislative decision.Dissenting justices observed that noncapital sentences should be analyzed onthe same basis as capital cases and that the possibility of parole should notbe considered in assessing the proportionality of the length of sentencing.
Impact
The ruling made it exceedingly difficult to argue the proportionality of sentencing in noncapital cases. The Court subsequently showed flexibility on thisissue, however, ruling in Solem v. Helm, (1983) that a recidivist statute in South Dakota which called for mandatory life sentencing without possibility of parole for repeat felons was unconstitutional. The Court has sincefurther complicated its position regarding mandatory felony sentencing, ruling in Harmelin v. Michigan, (1991) that the state of Michigan's statutemandating life sentencing without possibility of parole for first-time felony drug offenders was constitutional.
Related Cases
Legal Malpractice
Legal malpractice occurs when a lawyer fails to honor the interests of his orher client or commits an ethical or procedural transgression that results ininjury to the client.
Most claims of legal malpractice can be placed into one of four categories: negligent court-related mistakes by the lawyer, such as the failure to file documents on time; negligence or misconduct in the professional relationship with the client, such as mishandling of client funds or representation of interests that are adverse to the client; misconduct related to arrangements withthe client, such as the overcharging of fees; and transgressions identified by parties other than the client. This last category consists of errors that are based on the manner in which the attorney represented the client, and includes such claims as defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,malicious prosecution, filing of court documents in bad faith, and abuse ofprocess. Such claims generally are not as successful as claims based on fees,negligent mistakes, and negligent dealings with the client.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Vol. 7. Minneapolis, MN: West Publishing, 1998.
William James Rummel
Respondent
Estelle, Corrections Director for the State of Texas
Petitioner's Claim
That Article 63 of the Penal Code of the state of Texas, which mandated thata person convicted of three felonies would receive a life sentence as a recidivist criminal, violated Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment protections againstcruel and unusual punishment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Scott J. Atlas
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Douglas M. Becker
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
18 March 1980
Decision
Upheld the state of Texas and affirmed the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, finding that Article 63 of the Texas Penal Code didnot violate the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment of criminals.
Significance
Established that a severe penalty for repeat offenders was not a violation ofthe protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
Three-Time Loser
Texas resident William James Rummel plead guilty to a charge of fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 in goods or services in 1964. The penalty for this offense, classified as a felony under Texas law, was two to ten yearsimprisonment. Rummel received a sentence of three years in prison which he served without incident. Upon release from confinement, Rummel's run-ins with the law continued. In 1969 he pled guilty to passing a bad check in the amountof $28.26, a crime punishable by two to five years imprisonment, and received a four year prison sentence. Finally, in 1973, Rummel faced prosecution onthe charge of obtaining $120.75 through false pretences. This crime qualifiedas a "felony theft" under Texas law, and was punishable by two to ten yearsimprisonment. The prosecutors of the case decided to proceed against Rummel using the state's so-called recidivist statute, Article 63 of the Texas StatePenal Code. Under Article 63, criminals with three felony convictions of anytype are subjected to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Rummel decided on a jury trial, but was convicted and sentenced to life in prison on 26 April 1973 by the trial court.
Cruel and Unusual?
Following his conviction and sentencing, Rummel attempted to appeal his caseto the Texas Court of Appeals. The court rejected his appeal, however, and Rummel subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to theU.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Rummel claimed in hispetition that a life sentence was so out of proportion to the damage done byhis crimes, which were nonviolent and involved a total property value of $229.01, that it violated Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment of criminals. The district court rejected Rummel'sconstitutional claims, pointing out that he would be eligible for parole inapproximately 12 years, regardless of the initial length of his sentence. Rummel then brought his case before a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for theFourth Circuit. The circuit court overruled the district court, ruling thatRummel's punishment was "grossly disproportionate" to his crimes. Following this ruling, the court of appeals reheard the case, vacating the opinion of the circuit court panel's decision and reaffirming their earlier decision and agreeing with a dissenting circuit court panel judge that "no neutral principle of adjudication permits a federal court to hold that in a given situation individual crimes are too trivial in relation to the punishment imposed." Thecourt of appeals also affirmed the district court's denial of Rummel's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In reaching its conclusions, the courtof appeals relied heavily on the probability that Rummel's sentence would actually turn out to be considerably less than life, due to the probability ofhis parole after an approximately 12-year period. Significantly, six membersof the court of appeals dissented in the final decision, noting that Rummel had no guarantee of parole and therefore the constitutionality of his sentenceshould be determined on its face, and not on the basis of perceived probabilities. With such deep disagreement within the court of appeals, the case wassent to the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard arguments on 7 January 1980.
The Nature of Proportionality
The Supreme Court upheld the finding of the court of appeals, ruling that Article 63 of the Texas State Penal Code did not violate constitutional prohibitions against the cruel and unusual punishment of criminals. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that most sentences struck down for lack ofproportionality to the offense committed had been in capital cases. Of noncapital sentences challenged for constitutionality, those of Weems v. UnitedStates (1910) and Graham v. West Virginia (1912) were among the very few to be struck down. In Weems, the Court invalidated the sentence of a man convicted of falsifying a public document. This sentence includeda 12-year prison term, the wearing of ankle and wrist chains, hard labor, andcontinual surveillance by prison authorities. Rummel had cited Weemsas a precedent for his own case, and the court of appeals had accepted his argument that the length of his sentence had been the most disproportionate portion of Weems's punishment. The Supreme Court rejected the comparison, however, with Justice Rehnquist observing that the Court's opinion in Weems"consistently referred jointly to the length of imprisonment and its 'accessories' or 'accompaniments.'" At no time in his case had Rummelclaimed to be mistreated by Texas penal authorities. In Graham, the Court had decided that West Virginia's recidivist statute was constitutional in the case of a man convicted three times of stealing horses. The Court alsocompared Texas penal codes to those of other states and found that they did not vary appreciably in the length or severity of the sentences mandated for Rummel's crimes. Finally, the Court agreed with the district court that Rummel's sentence could not reasonably be viewed as a life sentence, given the probability of his parole within approximately 12 years. In the final analysis, the Court held that the constitutionality of criminal sentencing should be questioned on thoroughly objective grounds, such as the severity of a sentence.The assessment of the length of sentencing for various crimes was deemed completely subjective, and, as such, properly a matter for legislative decision.Dissenting justices observed that noncapital sentences should be analyzed onthe same basis as capital cases and that the possibility of parole should notbe considered in assessing the proportionality of the length of sentencing.
Impact
The ruling made it exceedingly difficult to argue the proportionality of sentencing in noncapital cases. The Court subsequently showed flexibility on thisissue, however, ruling in Solem v. Helm, (1983) that a recidivist statute in South Dakota which called for mandatory life sentencing without possibility of parole for repeat felons was unconstitutional. The Court has sincefurther complicated its position regarding mandatory felony sentencing, ruling in Harmelin v. Michigan, (1991) that the state of Michigan's statutemandating life sentencing without possibility of parole for first-time felony drug offenders was constitutional.
Related Cases
- Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 367 (1910).
- Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
- Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
Legal Malpractice
Legal malpractice occurs when a lawyer fails to honor the interests of his orher client or commits an ethical or procedural transgression that results ininjury to the client.
Most claims of legal malpractice can be placed into one of four categories: negligent court-related mistakes by the lawyer, such as the failure to file documents on time; negligence or misconduct in the professional relationship with the client, such as mishandling of client funds or representation of interests that are adverse to the client; misconduct related to arrangements withthe client, such as the overcharging of fees; and transgressions identified by parties other than the client. This last category consists of errors that are based on the manner in which the attorney represented the client, and includes such claims as defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,malicious prosecution, filing of court documents in bad faith, and abuse ofprocess. Such claims generally are not as successful as claims based on fees,negligent mistakes, and negligent dealings with the client.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Vol. 7. Minneapolis, MN: West Publishing, 1998.
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Guide to the Supreme Court ofthe United States. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1997.
User Comments Add a comment…