Rummel v. Estelle

The Supreme Court upheld the finding of the court of appeals, ruling that Article 63 of the Texas State Penal Code did not violate constitutional prohibitions against the cruel and unusual punishment of criminals. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that most sentences struck down for lack of proportionality to the offense committed had been in capital cases. Of noncapital sentences challenged for constitutionality, those of Weems v. United States (1910) and Graham v. West Virginia (1912) were among the very few to be struck down. In Weems, the Court invalidated the sentence of a man convicted of falsifying a public document. This sentence included a 12-year prison term, the wearing of ankle and wrist chains, hard labor, and continual surveillance by prison authorities. Rummel had cited Weems as a precedent for his own case, and the court of appeals had accepted his argument that the length of his sentence had been the most disproportionate portion of Weems's punishment. The Supreme Court rejected the comparison, however, with Justice Rehnquist observing that the Court's opinion in Weems "consistently referred jointly to the length of imprisonment and its 'accessories' or 'accompaniments.'" At no time in his case had Rummel claimed to be mistreated by Texas penal authorities. In Graham, the Court had decided that West Virginia's recidivist statute was constitutional in the case of a man convicted three times of stealing horses. The Court also compared Texas penal codes to those of other states and found that they did not vary appreciably in the length or severity of the sentences mandated for Rummel's crimes. Finally, the Court agreed with the district court that Rummel's sentence could not reasonably be viewed as a life sentence, given the probability of his parole within approximately 12 years. In the final analysis, the Court held that the constitutionality of criminal sentencing should be questioned on thoroughly objective grounds, such as the severity of a sentence. The assessment of the length of sentencing for various crimes was deemed completely subjective, and, as such, properly a matter for legislative decision. Dissenting justices observed that noncapital sentences should be analyzed on the same basis as capital cases and that the possibility of parole should not be considered in assessing the proportionality of the length of sentencing.