Petitioner
Pedro J. Rosario, et al.
Respondent
Nelson Rockefeller, Governor of the State of New York, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That New York State's law requiring voters to enroll in a party thirty days before a general election to vote in the following year's primary was unconstitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Burt Neuborne
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
A. Seth Greenwald
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
21 March 1973
Decision
That the New York law did not discriminate against the petitioners, and was thus constitutional.
Significance
The case set a limit on what qualified as a "group" of people who could not be discriminated against in state regulation of voting. The Supreme Court determined that people who could have enrolled, but did not, did not constitute agroup.
States' Rights
In an era when voters' rights were increasingly underwritten by the federal courts, Rosario v. Rockefeller reaffirmed states' rights to set election laws in the interest of guaranteeing the integrity of the electoral process. After a United States district court struck down as unconstitutional a NewYork state law requiring voters to register as party members almost a year inadvance in order to vote in a primary, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and upheld the law, declaring that the deadline was justified by a compelling state interest. The case was important in setting a limit on the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause, which protects groups of people from discrimination. The Supreme Court declined to consider voters who had not registered in advance of the deadline a "group" of people who could claim discrimination.
Party Raiding
The deadline in question was New York's deadline for voting in party primaries. Only enrolled members of a particular political party were allowed to votein New York's party primaries, a system known as a "closed" system of primary elections. The law stated that voters must enroll in a party by a deadline30 days in advance of the previous year's general election. The voter could then vote in the party primary taking place after the following year's generalelection. The reason for the law was to prevent party "raiding," in which voters from one party enroll in the opposite party in order to have an influence on their opposing party's primary. The New York State deadline was justified on the grounds that it prevented such raiding, because the voter who wantedto join the opposing party would be put in the absurd position of enrollingin an opponent's party before voting for her own party's candidate in the general election. The Court declared that "it would be the rare politician who could successfully urge his constituents to vote for him or his party in the upcoming general election, while at the same time urging a cross-over enrollment for the purpose of upsetting the opposite party's primary."
Such raiding, the Supreme Court declared, was a negative enough result to justify the state's passing of a deadline to prevent it. Furthermore, the deadline seemed to the court to be effective. However, the petitioners argued thatthe deadline violated their rights under the Constitution's Equal ProtectionClause, since they were effectively disenfranchised by the deadline. In theirarguments, counsel for the respondents referred to several Supreme Court cases in which the Court had struck down statutes that disenfranchised particular groups of people, including Carrington v. Rash and Dunn v. Blumstein.
Groups' Rights
The Supreme Court saw a significant difference between the cases listed and the one before it. In each case, wrote Justice Stewart in the opinion, the Court had struck down statutes that made an entire group of people ineligible tovote, where there was nothing the people in that group could have done to become eligible. People who had not registered by a particular deadline, the Court asserted, did not constitute such a group, because they had it in their power to change their status. They were not absolutely disenfranchised by thedeadline.
The remaining issue was simply whether the deadline presented "an unconstitutionally onerous burden" on the petitioners' exercise of their voting rights.While the deadline was indeed lengthy, the Supreme Court declared that it wasnot onerous, and that its length was justified by the necessity of preventing party raiding. "It is clear that the preservation of the integrity of the electoral process," wrote Stewart, "is a legitimate and valid state goal." NewYork's deadline for voting in primaries was an integral part of its scheme for achieving that goal; as such, it was constitutional.
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined Justice Powell, who wrote a dissenting opinion. New York's deadline, Powell wrote, was too severe. It prevented the voter from responding to a new issue or changing party philosophies.A less drastic deadline, he argued, would achieve the state's goal and allowthe voter the full exercise of the voting rights so fundamental to democracy.
Related Cases
Pedro J. Rosario, et al.
Respondent
Nelson Rockefeller, Governor of the State of New York, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That New York State's law requiring voters to enroll in a party thirty days before a general election to vote in the following year's primary was unconstitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Burt Neuborne
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
A. Seth Greenwald
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
21 March 1973
Decision
That the New York law did not discriminate against the petitioners, and was thus constitutional.
Significance
The case set a limit on what qualified as a "group" of people who could not be discriminated against in state regulation of voting. The Supreme Court determined that people who could have enrolled, but did not, did not constitute agroup.
States' Rights
In an era when voters' rights were increasingly underwritten by the federal courts, Rosario v. Rockefeller reaffirmed states' rights to set election laws in the interest of guaranteeing the integrity of the electoral process. After a United States district court struck down as unconstitutional a NewYork state law requiring voters to register as party members almost a year inadvance in order to vote in a primary, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and upheld the law, declaring that the deadline was justified by a compelling state interest. The case was important in setting a limit on the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause, which protects groups of people from discrimination. The Supreme Court declined to consider voters who had not registered in advance of the deadline a "group" of people who could claim discrimination.
Party Raiding
The deadline in question was New York's deadline for voting in party primaries. Only enrolled members of a particular political party were allowed to votein New York's party primaries, a system known as a "closed" system of primary elections. The law stated that voters must enroll in a party by a deadline30 days in advance of the previous year's general election. The voter could then vote in the party primary taking place after the following year's generalelection. The reason for the law was to prevent party "raiding," in which voters from one party enroll in the opposite party in order to have an influence on their opposing party's primary. The New York State deadline was justified on the grounds that it prevented such raiding, because the voter who wantedto join the opposing party would be put in the absurd position of enrollingin an opponent's party before voting for her own party's candidate in the general election. The Court declared that "it would be the rare politician who could successfully urge his constituents to vote for him or his party in the upcoming general election, while at the same time urging a cross-over enrollment for the purpose of upsetting the opposite party's primary."
Such raiding, the Supreme Court declared, was a negative enough result to justify the state's passing of a deadline to prevent it. Furthermore, the deadline seemed to the court to be effective. However, the petitioners argued thatthe deadline violated their rights under the Constitution's Equal ProtectionClause, since they were effectively disenfranchised by the deadline. In theirarguments, counsel for the respondents referred to several Supreme Court cases in which the Court had struck down statutes that disenfranchised particular groups of people, including Carrington v. Rash and Dunn v. Blumstein.
Groups' Rights
The Supreme Court saw a significant difference between the cases listed and the one before it. In each case, wrote Justice Stewart in the opinion, the Court had struck down statutes that made an entire group of people ineligible tovote, where there was nothing the people in that group could have done to become eligible. People who had not registered by a particular deadline, the Court asserted, did not constitute such a group, because they had it in their power to change their status. They were not absolutely disenfranchised by thedeadline.
The remaining issue was simply whether the deadline presented "an unconstitutionally onerous burden" on the petitioners' exercise of their voting rights.While the deadline was indeed lengthy, the Supreme Court declared that it wasnot onerous, and that its length was justified by the necessity of preventing party raiding. "It is clear that the preservation of the integrity of the electoral process," wrote Stewart, "is a legitimate and valid state goal." NewYork's deadline for voting in primaries was an integral part of its scheme for achieving that goal; as such, it was constitutional.
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined Justice Powell, who wrote a dissenting opinion. New York's deadline, Powell wrote, was too severe. It prevented the voter from responding to a new issue or changing party philosophies.A less drastic deadline, he argued, would achieve the state's goal and allowthe voter the full exercise of the voting rights so fundamental to democracy.
Related Cases
- NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
- Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
- Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
- Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
- Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
- Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1996.
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