Martinez v. Bynum

As the sole member of the Supreme Court in dissent, Justice Marshall believed that Section 21.031(d) denied some children primary education arbitrarily and was, therefore, unconstitutional on its face under the Equal Protection Clause. Marshall maintained that Texas Education Code subjectively interpreted the motive for school-aged children in the care of the petitioner residing in Texas. A justifiable state interest was, thus, not served. Marshall's dissent turned on a point the majority opinion upheld: Texas statute "employed a traditional residence requirement in a uniform fashion" that was even more "generous" because it permitted some nonresidents to receive free education. Justice Marshall concluded that the Court incorrectly equated the Texas statute with a residence requirement. Although the state might reserve its educational resources for its residents, there was no reasonable support for the rationale that the state might close its schools for those who were not residents who domiciled in the state of Texas. There was a decided difference between the concept of "residence" and "domicile." Under the Texas law, "residence may be temporary or permanent," but generally, residence required conditions more than simple "accommodation." According to the Texas Supreme Court ruling in Snyder v. Pitts (1951), "the element of intent to make it a permanent home is not necessary to the establishment of a second residence away from the domicile." Further, Justice Marshall argued the point that the state did not apply that test uniformly. Section 21.031(d) denied free public education to any child who intended to leave the district some time in the future. However, the statute also allowed tuition-free education to children who would stay in the district only for six months or less (whether or not parents were residents of Texas) if they were in the district seeking temporary medical care. On the other hand, the state excluded from free public education a child like Morales who was born in Texas, a legal U.S. citizen, entering the district at the age of seven with the intent of remaining in his school district for at least ten years, until the end of his education. Thus, Marshall reasoned, the Texas statute was not sufficiently, narrowly tailored to achieve the state's claimed interest in preserving educational and financial resources for only state residents.