Petitioner
Oralia Martinez
Respondent
Raymond L. Bynum
Petitioner's Claim
The Texas Education Code 21.031(d) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it denied tuition-free public schooling to minors who were living away from a "parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of him" for the sole purpose of attending "public, free schools"in the state of Texas.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Edward J. Tuddenham
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Richard L. Arnett
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington D.C.
Date of Decision
2 May 1983
Decision
The Supreme Court held that Texas Education Code did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. States were permitted by the Constitution to extend the availability of tuition-free education only to bona fide residents.
Significance
In affirming the decisions of lower courts, the Court upheld the notion of astate's right to administer internal affairs which affected all U.S. citizensliving within a state's jurisdiction. Opponents of this ruling maintained that the ethnic background of their students was the "hidden" criteria by whichTexas statute determined access to free education. Nonetheless, the Court'sopinion made it possible for states to embark on legislative change which would not always recognize the problems of non-citizens if a state could demonstrate that legislation served a justifiable state interest.
Even though his parents were Mexican citizens who resided in Reynosa, Mexico,Roberto Morales was born in McAllen, Texas, and therefore a United States citizen by birth. At the age of seven, he left Reynosa in 1977 to live with hissister who was married and lived in McAllen. The sole purpose for his returnwas to gain access to tuition-free education by attending school in the McAllen Independent School District. Although his sister, Oralia Martinez, was his custodian, she was not and did not ever intend to be his legal guardian. Because, according to the Sections 21.031(b) and (c) of the Texas Education Code [hereafter referred to as Section 21.031(d)] a child was entitled to a tuition-free education only if "his parent, guardian, or person having lawful control of him" resided in the school district, Mrs. Martinez did not qualify asa person who had "lawful control" of Roberto. The McAllen Independent SchoolDistrict denied Morales's application for admission in the fall of 1977.
In December of 1977, Oralia Martinez and four other adult custodians of school-age children filed suit in the District Court for the Southern District ofTexas against the Texas Commissioner of Education, the Texas Education Agency, four local school districts, and local school officials in each adult's respective school districts. Petitioners claimed that Section 21.031(d) violatedthe Constitution, including the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Their main claims were that the traditional definition of bona fide residency was not applicable, and that statutory provisions were violative. Granting educational benefits only to children of Texas residents and children whose custodial guardians had official, legal guardianship was inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clauseof the Fourteenth Amendment.
Petitioners asked for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. In 1978, apreliminary injunction was denied by the district court. That court's findings characterized the admissions policy of the (sued) school boards as being more than liberal in accepting children into their schools. Even if their parents or legal guardians did not live in the school district children were granted admission if the reason for living apart from birth/legal parents was notstrictly for the purpose of attending a particular school. In response to the court's decision, petitioners narrowed the scope of their petition to claimthat Section 21.031(d) was unconstitutional on its face. Again, the districtcourt adjudicated in favor of the respondents. On appeal, the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Considering of the importance of theissues presented by this case, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to consider thecase on certiorari.
An 8-1 Decision
A majority of eight justices affirmed the decision of the lower courts and ruled that Section 21.031(d) contained bona fide residence requirementswhich satisfied constitutional standards. The justices characterized the Texas Education Code residence requirement as narrowly defined, uniformly applicable, and appropriately designed to assure that only state residents enjoyed services provided by the state of Texas. Such a requirement did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court emphasized that the uniform admissions policy enforced by Texas school districts (respondents) specifically defined bona fide residence requirements for the purpose of determining eligibility of access to free public education.
In explaining their ruling, the written majority opinion cited Vladis v. Kline (1973), a case wherein the state statute contained unconstitutionalenrollment criteria which created an unappealable assumption of nonresidencyfor state university students. Unlike Section 21.031(d) which stipulated criteria to which a parent or guardian had to adhere, the state of Connecticut denied residence status to all students who, before they applied for admission,had legal addresses outside of the state regardless of reason. Conversely, the Court concluded that because new or transient residents to Texas were notautomatically rendered ineligible, the Texas Education code, did not affect the right of interstate travel. The code simply required that a person shouldestablish residence before asking for the services that were limited to residents.
The justices for the majority believed school districts were justified in requiring that parents of school-aged children must live in the school districtwhere a child would attend school, with intention to stay there, in order tosatisfy the basic residence criteria. The Court accepted the respondents' argument that without resident requirements, the proper planning and operation of primary and secondary schools would significantly suffer. An important constitutional criteria was served--the state had authored reasonable legislationbecause it supported a justifiable interest to preserve state educational financial funds for Texas residents. Indeed, the justices felt that Section 21.031(d) was far more "generous" in granting benefits not only for residents, but for all children whose reason for living in a district was not exclusivelylimited to attending a school. A child such as Roberto Morales could attendpublic school in Texas without paying tuition, if his parents or legal guardians had a bona fide intention of remaining in the school district indefinitely. But moreover, the statute also granted free education to children who parents did not intend to remain in the school district indefinitely if the child was not living in the district only to attend a school (e.g., proximity to needed medical care).
Marshall Dissents
As the sole member of the Supreme Court in dissent, Justice Marshall believedthat Section 21.031(d) denied some children primary education arbitrarily and was, therefore, unconstitutional on its face under the Equal Protection Clause. Marshall maintained that Texas Education Code subjectively interpreted the motive for school-aged children in the care of the petitioner residing inTexas. A justifiable state interest was, thus, not served. Marshall's dissentturned on a point the majority opinion upheld: Texas statute "employed a traditional residence requirement in a uniform fashion" that was even more "generous" because it permitted some nonresidents to receive free education. Justice Marshall concluded that the Court incorrectly equated the Texas statute with a residence requirement. Although the state might reserve its educationalresources for its residents, there was no reasonable support for the rationale that the state might close its schools for those who were not residents whodomiciled in the state of Texas. There was a decided difference between theconcept of "residence" and "domicile." Under the Texas law, "residence may betemporary or permanent," but generally, residence required conditions more than simple "accommodation." According to the Texas Supreme Court ruling in Snyder v. Pitts (1951), "the element of intent to make it a permanent home is not necessary to the establishment of a second residence away from thedomicile." Further, Justice Marshall argued the point that the state did notapply that test uniformly. Section 21.031(d) denied free public education toany child who intended to leave the district some time in the future. However, the statute also allowed tuition-free education to children who would stayin the district only for six months or less (whether or not parents were residents of Texas) if they were in the district seeking temporary medical care.On the other hand, the state excluded from free public education a child likeMorales who was born in Texas, a legal U.S. citizen, entering the district at the age of seven with the intent of remaining in his school district for atleast ten years, until the end of his education. Thus, Marshall reasoned, the Texas statute was not sufficiently, narrowly tailored to achieve the state's claimed interest in preserving educational and financial resources for onlystate residents.
Impact
In rendering their decision, the U.S. Supreme Court chose to consider the residence of a child's parents or legal guardians as justifiable criteria for determining eligibility and, therefore, access to free public education. The justices did not accept the broader claim of the petitioner that the child waseligible to free public education, regardless of residence of parents, because the student was a legal U.S. citizen who intended to indefinitely reside inthe respective school district. Neither did the Court consider that if public school funding/appropriations were commonly funded through property tax receipts within individual school districts, then the rationale of domicile mayhave been (as Justice Marshall contended) a more dubious criteria than considering "residence" as defined in the Texas Supreme Court ruling in Snyder v. Pitts. As such, the majority justices returned to a tradition of jurisprudence (more common in the nineteenth century) which tended to privilege andrecognize the sovereignty of individual states with respect to internal matters such as the education of its residents.
The district court, the court of appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Texas statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, as petitioner Oralia Martinez claimed. They found that the statute was narrowly tailored, carefully designed, and justified by the state's interest to preserve financialfunds for residents closely related to the state. But the dissenting opinionof Justice Marshall challenged the constitutionality of the statute and justification of the bona fide residence requirements. His opinion could support the changes that were necessary regarding the rights of the school-agechildren in the field of the tuition-free public primary education.
Related Cases
Oralia Martinez
Respondent
Raymond L. Bynum
Petitioner's Claim
The Texas Education Code 21.031(d) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it denied tuition-free public schooling to minors who were living away from a "parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of him" for the sole purpose of attending "public, free schools"in the state of Texas.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Edward J. Tuddenham
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Richard L. Arnett
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington D.C.
Date of Decision
2 May 1983
Decision
The Supreme Court held that Texas Education Code did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. States were permitted by the Constitution to extend the availability of tuition-free education only to bona fide residents.
Significance
In affirming the decisions of lower courts, the Court upheld the notion of astate's right to administer internal affairs which affected all U.S. citizensliving within a state's jurisdiction. Opponents of this ruling maintained that the ethnic background of their students was the "hidden" criteria by whichTexas statute determined access to free education. Nonetheless, the Court'sopinion made it possible for states to embark on legislative change which would not always recognize the problems of non-citizens if a state could demonstrate that legislation served a justifiable state interest.
Even though his parents were Mexican citizens who resided in Reynosa, Mexico,Roberto Morales was born in McAllen, Texas, and therefore a United States citizen by birth. At the age of seven, he left Reynosa in 1977 to live with hissister who was married and lived in McAllen. The sole purpose for his returnwas to gain access to tuition-free education by attending school in the McAllen Independent School District. Although his sister, Oralia Martinez, was his custodian, she was not and did not ever intend to be his legal guardian. Because, according to the Sections 21.031(b) and (c) of the Texas Education Code [hereafter referred to as Section 21.031(d)] a child was entitled to a tuition-free education only if "his parent, guardian, or person having lawful control of him" resided in the school district, Mrs. Martinez did not qualify asa person who had "lawful control" of Roberto. The McAllen Independent SchoolDistrict denied Morales's application for admission in the fall of 1977.
In December of 1977, Oralia Martinez and four other adult custodians of school-age children filed suit in the District Court for the Southern District ofTexas against the Texas Commissioner of Education, the Texas Education Agency, four local school districts, and local school officials in each adult's respective school districts. Petitioners claimed that Section 21.031(d) violatedthe Constitution, including the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Their main claims were that the traditional definition of bona fide residency was not applicable, and that statutory provisions were violative. Granting educational benefits only to children of Texas residents and children whose custodial guardians had official, legal guardianship was inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clauseof the Fourteenth Amendment.
Petitioners asked for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. In 1978, apreliminary injunction was denied by the district court. That court's findings characterized the admissions policy of the (sued) school boards as being more than liberal in accepting children into their schools. Even if their parents or legal guardians did not live in the school district children were granted admission if the reason for living apart from birth/legal parents was notstrictly for the purpose of attending a particular school. In response to the court's decision, petitioners narrowed the scope of their petition to claimthat Section 21.031(d) was unconstitutional on its face. Again, the districtcourt adjudicated in favor of the respondents. On appeal, the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Considering of the importance of theissues presented by this case, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to consider thecase on certiorari.
An 8-1 Decision
A majority of eight justices affirmed the decision of the lower courts and ruled that Section 21.031(d) contained bona fide residence requirementswhich satisfied constitutional standards. The justices characterized the Texas Education Code residence requirement as narrowly defined, uniformly applicable, and appropriately designed to assure that only state residents enjoyed services provided by the state of Texas. Such a requirement did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court emphasized that the uniform admissions policy enforced by Texas school districts (respondents) specifically defined bona fide residence requirements for the purpose of determining eligibility of access to free public education.
In explaining their ruling, the written majority opinion cited Vladis v. Kline (1973), a case wherein the state statute contained unconstitutionalenrollment criteria which created an unappealable assumption of nonresidencyfor state university students. Unlike Section 21.031(d) which stipulated criteria to which a parent or guardian had to adhere, the state of Connecticut denied residence status to all students who, before they applied for admission,had legal addresses outside of the state regardless of reason. Conversely, the Court concluded that because new or transient residents to Texas were notautomatically rendered ineligible, the Texas Education code, did not affect the right of interstate travel. The code simply required that a person shouldestablish residence before asking for the services that were limited to residents.
The justices for the majority believed school districts were justified in requiring that parents of school-aged children must live in the school districtwhere a child would attend school, with intention to stay there, in order tosatisfy the basic residence criteria. The Court accepted the respondents' argument that without resident requirements, the proper planning and operation of primary and secondary schools would significantly suffer. An important constitutional criteria was served--the state had authored reasonable legislationbecause it supported a justifiable interest to preserve state educational financial funds for Texas residents. Indeed, the justices felt that Section 21.031(d) was far more "generous" in granting benefits not only for residents, but for all children whose reason for living in a district was not exclusivelylimited to attending a school. A child such as Roberto Morales could attendpublic school in Texas without paying tuition, if his parents or legal guardians had a bona fide intention of remaining in the school district indefinitely. But moreover, the statute also granted free education to children who parents did not intend to remain in the school district indefinitely if the child was not living in the district only to attend a school (e.g., proximity to needed medical care).
Marshall Dissents
As the sole member of the Supreme Court in dissent, Justice Marshall believedthat Section 21.031(d) denied some children primary education arbitrarily and was, therefore, unconstitutional on its face under the Equal Protection Clause. Marshall maintained that Texas Education Code subjectively interpreted the motive for school-aged children in the care of the petitioner residing inTexas. A justifiable state interest was, thus, not served. Marshall's dissentturned on a point the majority opinion upheld: Texas statute "employed a traditional residence requirement in a uniform fashion" that was even more "generous" because it permitted some nonresidents to receive free education. Justice Marshall concluded that the Court incorrectly equated the Texas statute with a residence requirement. Although the state might reserve its educationalresources for its residents, there was no reasonable support for the rationale that the state might close its schools for those who were not residents whodomiciled in the state of Texas. There was a decided difference between theconcept of "residence" and "domicile." Under the Texas law, "residence may betemporary or permanent," but generally, residence required conditions more than simple "accommodation." According to the Texas Supreme Court ruling in Snyder v. Pitts (1951), "the element of intent to make it a permanent home is not necessary to the establishment of a second residence away from thedomicile." Further, Justice Marshall argued the point that the state did notapply that test uniformly. Section 21.031(d) denied free public education toany child who intended to leave the district some time in the future. However, the statute also allowed tuition-free education to children who would stayin the district only for six months or less (whether or not parents were residents of Texas) if they were in the district seeking temporary medical care.On the other hand, the state excluded from free public education a child likeMorales who was born in Texas, a legal U.S. citizen, entering the district at the age of seven with the intent of remaining in his school district for atleast ten years, until the end of his education. Thus, Marshall reasoned, the Texas statute was not sufficiently, narrowly tailored to achieve the state's claimed interest in preserving educational and financial resources for onlystate residents.
Impact
In rendering their decision, the U.S. Supreme Court chose to consider the residence of a child's parents or legal guardians as justifiable criteria for determining eligibility and, therefore, access to free public education. The justices did not accept the broader claim of the petitioner that the child waseligible to free public education, regardless of residence of parents, because the student was a legal U.S. citizen who intended to indefinitely reside inthe respective school district. Neither did the Court consider that if public school funding/appropriations were commonly funded through property tax receipts within individual school districts, then the rationale of domicile mayhave been (as Justice Marshall contended) a more dubious criteria than considering "residence" as defined in the Texas Supreme Court ruling in Snyder v. Pitts. As such, the majority justices returned to a tradition of jurisprudence (more common in the nineteenth century) which tended to privilege andrecognize the sovereignty of individual states with respect to internal matters such as the education of its residents.
The district court, the court of appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Texas statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, as petitioner Oralia Martinez claimed. They found that the statute was narrowly tailored, carefully designed, and justified by the state's interest to preserve financialfunds for residents closely related to the state. But the dissenting opinionof Justice Marshall challenged the constitutionality of the statute and justification of the bona fide residence requirements. His opinion could support the changes that were necessary regarding the rights of the school-agechildren in the field of the tuition-free public primary education.
Related Cases
- Inhabitants of Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 43 Me. 406 (1857).
- Dwyer v. Matson, 163 F.2d 299 (CA10 1947).
- Snyder v. Pitts, 150 Tex.407 (1951).
- Whitney v. State, 472 S. W. 2d 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
- Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
- Brownsville Independent School District v. Gamboa, 498 S. W. 2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
- San Antonio Independent School District, et al. Appellants v. DemetrioP. Rodriguez, et al. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
- Vladis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
- Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
- Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
- Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 F. Supp. 212 (1979).
- Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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