Inc. Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court. It found that the resolution was unconstitutional on its face under federal law because it banned all First Amendment activities in the airport. However, unlike the lower courts, the Supreme Court did not decide the issue of whether the airport was a public or nonpublic forum. Jews for Jesus claimed that the airport was a public forum, requiring the Supreme Court to strictly scrutinize the regulation of speech. The airport argued that the it was a nonpublic forum to which access may be reasonably restricted. In response, the Supreme Court acknowledged its ruling in Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn. (1993) that a less restrictive standard applies in First Amendment cases in which the expressive activity takes place in a nonpublic forum. However, because the resolution imposed an absolute ban on all First Amendment activities, the Court concluded that the resolution was unconstitutional, regardless of whether the airport was a public or nonpublic forum. Thus, the Court did not decide the forum issue because the decision was not necessary to the Court's ruling on the issue of constitutionality.

Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor concluded that the resolution was facially unconstitutional because it violated the overbreadth doctrine of the First Amendment. Justice O'Connor explained that under the overbreadth doctrine, a person whose own speech or conduct is not protected by the Constitution may challenge a statute on its face if the statute also threatens to compromise the constitutionally protected activities of other persons not before the court. In addition, a party whose speech may not be constitutionally prohibited may also challenge a statute as overbroad if the speech of others would be chilled. According to West's Words and Phrases, the overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the general rule that a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others. The goal of the doctrine is to prevent the chilling effect of overbroad statutes. A chilling effect occurs when individuals restrict their expressive activities rather than risk being prosecuted under such statutes.

An overbroad statute that encompasses both protected and unprotected speech and conduct will normally be struck down as facially invalid. However, as stated by the Supreme Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973), to invalidate a statute on its face, the overbreadth must be "substantial." A realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court must be present for a statute to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds. The Supreme Court determined that the airport's resolution was substantially overbroad because it banned all First Amendment activities in the central terminal area, rather than merely regulating expressive activity that might create problems such as congestion or the disruption of the activities of airport users. Justice O'Connor stated,

On its face, the resolution at issue in this case reaches the universe of expressive activity, and, by prohibiting all protected expression, purports to create a virtual `First Amendment Free Zone' at [the airport].

Justice O'Connor went on to say that by prohibiting all First Amendment activities, the resolution "prohibits even talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing." Justice O'Connor concluded that "[u]nder such a sweeping ban, virtually every individual who enters [the airport] may be found to have violated the resolution by engaging in some First Amendment activity." She stated that it was "obvious that such a ban cannot be justified even if [the airport] were a nonpublic forum because no conceivable governmental interest would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech."