Petitioners
Board of Airport Commissioners of The City of Los Angeles, et al.
Respondents
Jews for Jesus, Inc., et al.
Petitioners' Claim
That a resolution adopted by airport commissioners, banning all First Amendment activities within the central terminal area at Los Angeles International Airport, does not violate the First Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
James R. Kapel
Chief Lawyer for Respondents
Jay Alan Sekulow
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
15 June 1987
Decision
The resolution violates the First Amendment.
Significance
The ruling invalidated a city airport's resolution banning all First Amendment activities in the central terminal. The Supreme Court decided that the resolution was substantially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment because its express language prohibited even talking and reading or the wearing ofcampaign buttons or symbolic clothing. The resolution was invalid, regardlessof whether the airport was a public or nonpublic forum.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states:
In 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners of the city of Los Angeles adopted a resolution, which provided that "the Central Terminal Area at Los AngelesInternational Airport is not open for First Amendment activities by any individual and/or entity." The resolution also warned that
In 1984, a minister with the religious group, Jews for Jesus, was stopped byan airport peace officer while distributing religious literature on a walkwayin the central terminal. The minister was shown a copy of the resolution, told that his activities violated the resolution, and instructed to leave the facility. The minister was also warned that his refusal to leave would resultin legal action by the city.
Jews for Jesus and its minister filed an action in the district court for theCentral District of California claiming that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under both the California and U.S. Constitutions because it banned all speech in a public forum. They also claimed that the resolution was applied to Jews for Jesus in a discriminatory manner and that it was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The district court ruled only on the first claim. The district court first found that the central terminal area was a traditional public forum under federal law, and then concluded that the resolutionwas facially unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that "an airport complex is a traditional public forum," and held that the resolution was unconstitutional on its face under the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court granted the airport commissioners' petition for a writ of certiorariand ordered the court of appeals to forward the case to the Supreme Court for its review.
Resolution Unconstitutional
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court. It found that the resolution was unconstitutional on its face under federal law because it banned all First Amendment activities in the airport. However, unlike the lower courts, the Supreme Court did not decide the issue ofwhether the airport was a public or nonpublic forum. Jews for Jesus claimed that the airport was a public forum, requiring the Supreme Court to strictly scrutinize the regulation of speech. The airport argued that the it was a nonpublic forum to which access may be reasonably restricted. In response, the Supreme Court acknowledged its ruling in Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn. (1993) that a less restrictive standard applies in First Amendment cases in which the expressive activity takes place in a nonpublic forum. However, because the resolution imposed an absolute ban on all First Amendment activities, the Court concluded that the resolution was unconstitutional, regardless of whether the airport was a public or nonpublic forum. Thus, the Court did not decide the forum issue because the decision was not necessaryto the Court's ruling on the issue of constitutionality.
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor concluded that the resolution was facially unconstitutional because it violated the overbreadth doctrineof the First Amendment. Justice O'Connor explained that under the overbreadth doctrine, a person whose own speech or conduct is not protected by the Constitution may challenge a statute on its face if the statute also threatens tocompromise the constitutionally protected activities of other persons not before the court. In addition, a party whose speech may not be constitutionallyprohibited may also challenge a statute as overbroad if the speech of otherswould be chilled. According to West's Words and Phrases, the overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the general rule that a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others. The goal of the doctrine is to prevent the chilling effect of overbroad statutes. A chilling effectoccurs when individuals restrict their expressive activities rather than risk being prosecuted under such statutes.
An overbroad statute that encompasses both protected and unprotected speech and conduct will normally be struck down as facially invalid. However, as stated by the Supreme Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973), to invalidatea statute on its face, the overbreadth must be "substantial." A realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court must be present for a statute to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds. The Supreme Court determined that the airport's resolution was substantially overbroad because itbanned all First Amendment activities in the central terminal area, rather than merely regulating expressive activity that might create problems such as congestion or the disruption of the activities of airport users. Justice O'Connor stated,
Justice O'Connor went on to say that by prohibiting all First Amendment activities, the resolution "prohibits even talking and reading, or the wearing ofcampaign buttons or symbolic clothing." Justice O'Connor concluded that "[u]nder such a sweeping ban, virtually every individual who enters [the airport]may be found to have violated the resolution by engaging in some First Amendment activity." She stated that it was "obvious that such a ban cannot be justified even if [the airport] were a nonpublic forum because no conceivable governmental interest would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech."
No Narrowing Interpretation Possible
The Supreme Court also chose not to give the California state courts an opportunity to limit the scope of the resolution before ruling on its constitutionality. The Court concluded that the express words of the resolution left no room to narrow its scope in a way that would avoid the federal constitutionalquestions.
In answer to the airport's claim that the statute was not substantially overbroad because it applied only to expressive activity unrelated to airport purposes, Justice O'Connor called the line between airport-related speech and nonairport-related speech "murky" and concluded that the vagueness of such a limiting construction would leave its enforcement open to abuse by airport officials.
Public Forum Issue Postponed
In a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White disagreed with the Court's decision to postpone a ruling on the issue of whetherthe airport was a public forum. Justice White also pointed out that the Court's failure to decide the issue did not mean that a majority of the Court agreed with the lower courts' conclusion that the airport was a traditional public forum.
Impact
The controversy over distribution of religious and political literature on government property continued into the 1990s. In 1992, the Supreme Court ruledin a 5-4 decision that an airport terminal operated by a public authority isa nonpublic forum, and that a ban on solicitation need only satisfy a reasonableness standard International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee. The Krishna Consciousness case followed a 1990 Supreme Court decision by a plurality of the Court that a sidewalk on U.S. Post Office property was not a public forum United States v. Kokinda. In 1997, the city of Los Angeles enacted another ordinance banning all solicitations at city airports. The International Society of Krishna Consciousness of California and theCommittee for Human Rights in Iran sued the city, alleging the ban violated the First Amendment and the California Constitution.
Attempts to further define the protections of the First Amendment also continued in Congress. In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which required the government to show a compelling interest to justify any substantial restriction on religion, a traditional test that some members of Congress feared had been replaced by less restrictive standards. However, in 1997, The Supreme Court declared the act unconstitutional as applied to thestates in Boerne v. Flores.
Related Cases
Board of Airport Commissioners of The City of Los Angeles, et al.
Respondents
Jews for Jesus, Inc., et al.
Petitioners' Claim
That a resolution adopted by airport commissioners, banning all First Amendment activities within the central terminal area at Los Angeles International Airport, does not violate the First Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
James R. Kapel
Chief Lawyer for Respondents
Jay Alan Sekulow
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
15 June 1987
Decision
The resolution violates the First Amendment.
Significance
The ruling invalidated a city airport's resolution banning all First Amendment activities in the central terminal. The Supreme Court decided that the resolution was substantially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment because its express language prohibited even talking and reading or the wearing ofcampaign buttons or symbolic clothing. The resolution was invalid, regardlessof whether the airport was a public or nonpublic forum.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; orthe right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.In the 1980s, religious organizations used commercial airports as a forum for the distribution of literature,the solicitation of funds, proselytizing new members, and other similar activities. Airport authorities, concerned with congestion and the disruption of airport business, enacted rules attempting to limit such activity. Religious groups challenged these rules under the First Amendment.
In 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners of the city of Los Angeles adopted a resolution, which provided that "the Central Terminal Area at Los AngelesInternational Airport is not open for First Amendment activities by any individual and/or entity." The resolution also warned that
if any individual or entity engages in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport, the City Attorney . . . isdirected to institute appropriate litigation against such individual and/or entity to ensure compliance with this Policy.
In 1984, a minister with the religious group, Jews for Jesus, was stopped byan airport peace officer while distributing religious literature on a walkwayin the central terminal. The minister was shown a copy of the resolution, told that his activities violated the resolution, and instructed to leave the facility. The minister was also warned that his refusal to leave would resultin legal action by the city.
Jews for Jesus and its minister filed an action in the district court for theCentral District of California claiming that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under both the California and U.S. Constitutions because it banned all speech in a public forum. They also claimed that the resolution was applied to Jews for Jesus in a discriminatory manner and that it was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The district court ruled only on the first claim. The district court first found that the central terminal area was a traditional public forum under federal law, and then concluded that the resolutionwas facially unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that "an airport complex is a traditional public forum," and held that the resolution was unconstitutional on its face under the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court granted the airport commissioners' petition for a writ of certiorariand ordered the court of appeals to forward the case to the Supreme Court for its review.
Resolution Unconstitutional
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court. It found that the resolution was unconstitutional on its face under federal law because it banned all First Amendment activities in the airport. However, unlike the lower courts, the Supreme Court did not decide the issue ofwhether the airport was a public or nonpublic forum. Jews for Jesus claimed that the airport was a public forum, requiring the Supreme Court to strictly scrutinize the regulation of speech. The airport argued that the it was a nonpublic forum to which access may be reasonably restricted. In response, the Supreme Court acknowledged its ruling in Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn. (1993) that a less restrictive standard applies in First Amendment cases in which the expressive activity takes place in a nonpublic forum. However, because the resolution imposed an absolute ban on all First Amendment activities, the Court concluded that the resolution was unconstitutional, regardless of whether the airport was a public or nonpublic forum. Thus, the Court did not decide the forum issue because the decision was not necessaryto the Court's ruling on the issue of constitutionality.
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor concluded that the resolution was facially unconstitutional because it violated the overbreadth doctrineof the First Amendment. Justice O'Connor explained that under the overbreadth doctrine, a person whose own speech or conduct is not protected by the Constitution may challenge a statute on its face if the statute also threatens tocompromise the constitutionally protected activities of other persons not before the court. In addition, a party whose speech may not be constitutionallyprohibited may also challenge a statute as overbroad if the speech of otherswould be chilled. According to West's Words and Phrases, the overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the general rule that a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others. The goal of the doctrine is to prevent the chilling effect of overbroad statutes. A chilling effectoccurs when individuals restrict their expressive activities rather than risk being prosecuted under such statutes.
An overbroad statute that encompasses both protected and unprotected speech and conduct will normally be struck down as facially invalid. However, as stated by the Supreme Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973), to invalidatea statute on its face, the overbreadth must be "substantial." A realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court must be present for a statute to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds. The Supreme Court determined that the airport's resolution was substantially overbroad because itbanned all First Amendment activities in the central terminal area, rather than merely regulating expressive activity that might create problems such as congestion or the disruption of the activities of airport users. Justice O'Connor stated,
On its face, the resolution at issue in this case reaches the universe of expressive activity, and, by prohibiting all protected expression, purports to create a virtual `First Amendment Free Zone' at [the airport].
Justice O'Connor went on to say that by prohibiting all First Amendment activities, the resolution "prohibits even talking and reading, or the wearing ofcampaign buttons or symbolic clothing." Justice O'Connor concluded that "[u]nder such a sweeping ban, virtually every individual who enters [the airport]may be found to have violated the resolution by engaging in some First Amendment activity." She stated that it was "obvious that such a ban cannot be justified even if [the airport] were a nonpublic forum because no conceivable governmental interest would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech."
No Narrowing Interpretation Possible
The Supreme Court also chose not to give the California state courts an opportunity to limit the scope of the resolution before ruling on its constitutionality. The Court concluded that the express words of the resolution left no room to narrow its scope in a way that would avoid the federal constitutionalquestions.
In answer to the airport's claim that the statute was not substantially overbroad because it applied only to expressive activity unrelated to airport purposes, Justice O'Connor called the line between airport-related speech and nonairport-related speech "murky" and concluded that the vagueness of such a limiting construction would leave its enforcement open to abuse by airport officials.
Public Forum Issue Postponed
In a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White disagreed with the Court's decision to postpone a ruling on the issue of whetherthe airport was a public forum. Justice White also pointed out that the Court's failure to decide the issue did not mean that a majority of the Court agreed with the lower courts' conclusion that the airport was a traditional public forum.
Impact
The controversy over distribution of religious and political literature on government property continued into the 1990s. In 1992, the Supreme Court ruledin a 5-4 decision that an airport terminal operated by a public authority isa nonpublic forum, and that a ban on solicitation need only satisfy a reasonableness standard International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee. The Krishna Consciousness case followed a 1990 Supreme Court decision by a plurality of the Court that a sidewalk on U.S. Post Office property was not a public forum United States v. Kokinda. In 1997, the city of Los Angeles enacted another ordinance banning all solicitations at city airports. The International Society of Krishna Consciousness of California and theCommittee for Human Rights in Iran sued the city, alleging the ban violated the First Amendment and the California Constitution.
Attempts to further define the protections of the First Amendment also continued in Congress. In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which required the government to show a compelling interest to justify any substantial restriction on religion, a traditional test that some members of Congress feared had been replaced by less restrictive standards. However, in 1997, The Supreme Court declared the act unconstitutional as applied to thestates in Boerne v. Flores.
Related Cases
- Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
- Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
- Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
- United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
- International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
- Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Further Readings
- Laycock, D. "Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status ofReligious Speech by Private Speakers," 81 Northwestern University Law Review 1, 48 (1986).
- New York Times, March 4, 1998.
- Words and Phrases. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1981.
User Comments Add a comment…