Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee

The issue before the Court was whether PECFA violated NCPAC's First Amendment rights of free speech and free association. In arguments before the Supreme Court, the PACs claimed their expenditures were independent of the political parties or candidates, hence beyond the intended prohibitions of 9012(f). They asserted that typical contributions to their organizations were quite modest in size, predominately representing the common citizen. The plaintiffs argued that actions by the PACs did not constitute free speech, but simply "speech by proxy" which should not receive full First Amendment protection. "Speech by proxy" means that one person receives from another authority to speak on their behalf. Hence, the leaders of PACs were speaking for all their contributors. They also argued the high expenditures of the two PACs could breed political corruption, or at least the appearance of corruption. As evidence they pointed to high level appointments in the Reagan administration of persons previously associated with PACs.

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that 9012(f) was not constitutionally valid. First, writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist fell back on the earlier Buckley ruling by again noting the expense of promoting political views in a mass-media society. In this regard, the independent PACs constitute valuable tools expanding the individual's voice. To limit PACs' spending would inhibit free speech protected under the First Amendment. Secondly, freedom of association rights were also relevant in this case due to the PACs, reliance on public contributions. The Court argued that Buckley protected freedom of association of "large numbers of individuals of modest means" to join together and amplify their voices. Rehnquist stated,

that the contributors obviously like the message they are hearing from these organizations and want to add their voices to that message; otherwise they would not part with their money.

Section 9012(f) violated their freedom of association guaranteed under the First Amendment. Thirdly, the majority found section 9012(f) to be "substantially overbroad" by applying to all groups, no matter of what size, thereby limiting smaller, less formal political groups. Lastly, using the Court-established principle that preventing corruption is the only constitutionally permissible government interest in regulating campaign spending, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not clearly explain the type of corruption feared. The possible appearance of corruption was not sufficient in this case to warrant concern. Rehnquist asserted that simple distrust does not constitute corruption. In conclusion, the Court held that the PACs' independent expenditures are entitled to First Amendment protection because they are designed to promote political views, not specific political campaigns.