Appellant
Federal Election Commission
Appellee
National Conservative Political Action Committee et al.
Appellant's Claim
That the National Conservative Political Action Committee violated the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act by exceeding the $1,000 spending limit to support the election of a presidential candidate.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Charles N. Steele
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Robert R. Sparks, Jr.
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), John Paul Stevens
Justices Dissenting
Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
18 March 1985
Decision
Upheld district court finding that expenditures prohibited by the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act were protected by the First Amendment and couldnot be restricted by the government.
Significance
The U.S. Supreme Court found political spending restrictions in the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act "substantially overbroad," inappropriately applying to small informal groups as well as highly organized national organizations. The Court did not consider a general fear of corruption sufficient to justify government restrictions. The Court found that political action committees are valuable tools for the common citizen to promote their political views in an era of mass media communications. Therefore, committee expenditures for presidential campaigns deserved First Amendment protection.
Political Contributions
In 1971 Congress passed two campaign finance reform laws, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (FECA) and the Presidential Election Campaign Finance Act (PECFA), to address spiraling campaign costs. The acts set limits on campaign spending, required disclosure of contributors, and established a public funding system. Amendments in 1974 created the Federal Election Commission(FEC) to enforce provisions of both acts.
The Supreme Court ruled in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) that parts of FECAwere unconstitutional. The Court upheld limitations on contributions by individuals to political organizations but ruled that spending restrictions by FECA on political committees were unconstitutional if the committees operated independently of candidates or the candidates' election committees. By findingthat such limits infringed on freedom of speech, the Court wrote, "[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money." The opinion equated free speech with the spending of money to promote political views. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote,
Amendments to FECA in 1979 exempted from campaign spending limits certain monies given to parties rather than individual candidates. The money, called "soft money" in this case, could only be used for specific purposes, such as volunteer activities, voter registration efforts, and for campaign materials. This money can not go directly to specific candidates or to the candidates' election committees.
As an unexpected outcome of these campaign finance reforms in the 1970s, political action committees, more commonly called PACs, burst on the national scene. PACs are formed by various corporations, labor groups, and other specialinterests to influence elections and lobby Congress and the administration for favors. PACs operate independently of political parties or candidate election committees. Given the Supreme Court rulings and "soft money" amendments, PACs quickly seized the opportunity to influence elections while legally avoiding spending limitations. Some special interest PACs are called "ideological"PACs because they primarily promote specific ideas or beliefs. With the riseof the New Right political movement, two ideological PACs, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) and Fund for a Conservative Majority (FCM), rapidly gained prominence promoting conservative political doctrine.
Extensive Spending
Anticipating PAC activity, the FEC and Common Cause, a long-time proponent ofcampaign finance reform, challenged the extensive spending by independent organizations with reference to provisions of PECFA. They filed suit in 1980 seeking to affirm the constitutionality of section 9012(f) of PECFA. The section stipulates that independent PACs could not spend more than $1,000 to support the election of a presidential candidate. The case quickly proceeded to theSupreme Court who reached a deadlock on the constitutional question. The deadlock left independent spending unaffected for the 1980 political campaign. As a result, NCPAC pioneered PAC independent spending strategies designed to defeat liberal Democrats in the 1980 elections. In 1980 NCPAC spent more than$7 million and FCM more than $2 million on Ronald Reagan's election campaignin an effort to gain control of the White House for the conservative Republicans.
In May of 1983, the Democratic party and the Democratic National Committee became alarmed by NCPAC's and FCM's intent to spend even more monies to gain President Reagan's re-election in 1984. Consequently, they filed suit to determine the legality of the two PACs' activities. Shortly afterwards, FEC joinedthe Democrats in the suit.
The plaintiffs initially filed suit accusing NCPAC of violating PECFA with the Federal District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The suit focused on the spending of the PACs. The three-judge panel found 9012(f) not constitutionally valid on grounds that any limitation on spending by the PACs would violate First Amendment rights of free speech and free association. Theplaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.
Unconstitutional Political Spending Limitations
The issue before the Court was whether PECFA violated NCPAC's First Amendmentrights of free speech and free association. In arguments before the SupremeCourt, the PACs claimed their expenditures were independent of the politicalparties or candidates, hence beyond the intended prohibitions of 9012(f). They asserted that typical contributions to their organizations were quite modest in size, predominately representing the common citizen. The plaintiffs argued that actions by the PACs did not constitute free speech, but simply "speech by proxy" which should not receive full First Amendment protection. "Speechby proxy" means that one person receives from another authority to speak ontheir behalf. Hence, the leaders of PACs were speaking for all their contributors. They also argued the high expenditures of the two PACs could breed political corruption, or at least the appearance of corruption. As evidence theypointed to high level appointments in the Reagan administration of persons previously associated with PACs.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that 9012(f) was not constitutionally valid. First, writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist fell back on the earlier Buckley ruling by again noting the expenseof promoting political views in a mass-media society. In this regard, the independent PACs constitute valuable tools expanding the individual's voice. Tolimit PACs' spending would inhibit free speech protected under the First Amendment. Secondly, freedom of association rights were also relevant in this case due to the PACs, reliance on public contributions. The Court argued that Buckley protected freedom of association of "large numbers of individuals of modest means" to join together and amplify their voices. Rehnquist stated,
No Right to Spend
In dissent joined by Justice Marshall, Justice White agreed with FEC that spending large sums of money breeds political corruption and threatens the integrity of political campaigns. White noted the informal but close relationshipbetween ideological PACs and the political parties in a world of "tacit [unspoken] understandings and implied agreements." Also, White asserted politicalequality is undermined by the accumulations of wealth by the PACs. Therefore,government restrictions should enhance the voice of the individual citizen by limiting PAC expenditures. In direct opposition to Rehnquist, White criticized equating expenditures of money with actual free speech. White wrote, "theFirst Amendment protects the right to speak, not the right to spend." Individual citizens who contribute to PACs do not actually have the opportunity tovoice their political views since the actual decisions on spending are made by only the few PAC leaders. Contributors to political committees were no moreengaging in speech than those who contributed directly to political candidates for which there exist limitations. Hence, any limitations would pose onlyminor interference with First Amendment rights. White feared candidates wouldincreasingly feel pressure to please the PAC spenders rather than the voters.
Impact
Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee opened the door wider to extensive campaign spending and the continued political influence of PACs. Many believe the campaign finance system creates distrust and cynicism in the public and undermines concepts of integrityand fairness. To many, government seems increasingly remote from their influence and a tool of the rich and powerful special interest groups. However, reform is a strongly partisan issue as Republicans have demonstrated a greaterability than Democrats to raise large sums of funds, thus gaining a seeminglygreater advantage in elections. President Clinton, recognizing this disadvantage of the Democrats, undertook extraordinary efforts to raise campaign funds for his 1996 re-election. The various tactics drew considerable debate.
Facts regarding the dangers of PACs are not clear, complicating reform efforts. Studies show that life spans of individual PACS are brief, particularly the conservative citizen PACs. FEC v. NCPAC came at the time of maximuminfluence exerted by NCPAC and FCM. As quickly as 1986, NCPAC came into debtand by the early 1990s exerted only a minor influence in campaigns. Corporateand labor PACs, proven more stable due to a more definite, cohesive supporter base, largely replaced "ideological" PACs. Extensive reform proposals include public financing for Congressional elections, and limitations on PAC "softmoney" contributions and independent spending. Congressional efforts at reform died again in early 1998. Reforms passed in the 1990s tended to focus moreon disclosure of activities to the public rather than actual regulation of activities. Despite strong disagreements over the role and influence of PACs,they persist in the American political scene and continue to enjoy protectionunder the First Amendment.
Related Cases
Political Action Committees
Politicians finance their election campaigns with their own money and donations. As of 1998, individuals are limited by law to donating $1,000 per candidate per election, and $25,000 to all candidates per year. Primary, general, and run-off elections count separately for application of the limit.
Political action committees, or PACs, collect and pool money from individualsfor donations to candidates above the individual limits. Individuals may contribute $5,000 per year to a PAC. PACs are limited to donating $5,000 per candidate per election, and an unlimited total amount per year.
The Federal Election Commission, which oversees campaign contributions and enforces the legal limits, places PACs into four categories: corporate, labor,trade-health-membership, and nonconnected. Nonconnected PACs are unaffiliatedwith any other organization, and usually are formed to raise contributions for candidates supporting a particular issue or political ideology. The otherPACs are affiliated with an existing organization, such as a manufacturer orlabor union, which funds the operation of the PAC and decides how to contribute the money it collects.
Sources
Clawson, Dan, Alan Neustadtl, and Mark Weller, Dollars and Votes: How Business Campaign Contributions Subvert Democracy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998.
Clawson, Dan, Alan Neustadtl, and Mark Weller, Money Talks: Corporate PACsand Political Influence. New York: BasicBooks, 1992.
Federal Election Commission
Appellee
National Conservative Political Action Committee et al.
Appellant's Claim
That the National Conservative Political Action Committee violated the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act by exceeding the $1,000 spending limit to support the election of a presidential candidate.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Charles N. Steele
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Robert R. Sparks, Jr.
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), John Paul Stevens
Justices Dissenting
Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
18 March 1985
Decision
Upheld district court finding that expenditures prohibited by the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act were protected by the First Amendment and couldnot be restricted by the government.
Significance
The U.S. Supreme Court found political spending restrictions in the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act "substantially overbroad," inappropriately applying to small informal groups as well as highly organized national organizations. The Court did not consider a general fear of corruption sufficient to justify government restrictions. The Court found that political action committees are valuable tools for the common citizen to promote their political views in an era of mass media communications. Therefore, committee expenditures for presidential campaigns deserved First Amendment protection.
Political Contributions
In 1971 Congress passed two campaign finance reform laws, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (FECA) and the Presidential Election Campaign Finance Act (PECFA), to address spiraling campaign costs. The acts set limits on campaign spending, required disclosure of contributors, and established a public funding system. Amendments in 1974 created the Federal Election Commission(FEC) to enforce provisions of both acts.
The Supreme Court ruled in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) that parts of FECAwere unconstitutional. The Court upheld limitations on contributions by individuals to political organizations but ruled that spending restrictions by FECA on political committees were unconstitutional if the committees operated independently of candidates or the candidates' election committees. By findingthat such limits infringed on freedom of speech, the Court wrote, "[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money." The opinion equated free speech with the spending of money to promote political views. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote,
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,and the size of the audience reached.In essence, this ruling legalized independent expenditures. Similarly the Court, in First NationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978), noted that spending to express political views "is the type of speech indispensable to decision making in a democracy."
Amendments to FECA in 1979 exempted from campaign spending limits certain monies given to parties rather than individual candidates. The money, called "soft money" in this case, could only be used for specific purposes, such as volunteer activities, voter registration efforts, and for campaign materials. This money can not go directly to specific candidates or to the candidates' election committees.
As an unexpected outcome of these campaign finance reforms in the 1970s, political action committees, more commonly called PACs, burst on the national scene. PACs are formed by various corporations, labor groups, and other specialinterests to influence elections and lobby Congress and the administration for favors. PACs operate independently of political parties or candidate election committees. Given the Supreme Court rulings and "soft money" amendments, PACs quickly seized the opportunity to influence elections while legally avoiding spending limitations. Some special interest PACs are called "ideological"PACs because they primarily promote specific ideas or beliefs. With the riseof the New Right political movement, two ideological PACs, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) and Fund for a Conservative Majority (FCM), rapidly gained prominence promoting conservative political doctrine.
Extensive Spending
Anticipating PAC activity, the FEC and Common Cause, a long-time proponent ofcampaign finance reform, challenged the extensive spending by independent organizations with reference to provisions of PECFA. They filed suit in 1980 seeking to affirm the constitutionality of section 9012(f) of PECFA. The section stipulates that independent PACs could not spend more than $1,000 to support the election of a presidential candidate. The case quickly proceeded to theSupreme Court who reached a deadlock on the constitutional question. The deadlock left independent spending unaffected for the 1980 political campaign. As a result, NCPAC pioneered PAC independent spending strategies designed to defeat liberal Democrats in the 1980 elections. In 1980 NCPAC spent more than$7 million and FCM more than $2 million on Ronald Reagan's election campaignin an effort to gain control of the White House for the conservative Republicans.
In May of 1983, the Democratic party and the Democratic National Committee became alarmed by NCPAC's and FCM's intent to spend even more monies to gain President Reagan's re-election in 1984. Consequently, they filed suit to determine the legality of the two PACs' activities. Shortly afterwards, FEC joinedthe Democrats in the suit.
The plaintiffs initially filed suit accusing NCPAC of violating PECFA with the Federal District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The suit focused on the spending of the PACs. The three-judge panel found 9012(f) not constitutionally valid on grounds that any limitation on spending by the PACs would violate First Amendment rights of free speech and free association. Theplaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.
Unconstitutional Political Spending Limitations
The issue before the Court was whether PECFA violated NCPAC's First Amendmentrights of free speech and free association. In arguments before the SupremeCourt, the PACs claimed their expenditures were independent of the politicalparties or candidates, hence beyond the intended prohibitions of 9012(f). They asserted that typical contributions to their organizations were quite modest in size, predominately representing the common citizen. The plaintiffs argued that actions by the PACs did not constitute free speech, but simply "speech by proxy" which should not receive full First Amendment protection. "Speechby proxy" means that one person receives from another authority to speak ontheir behalf. Hence, the leaders of PACs were speaking for all their contributors. They also argued the high expenditures of the two PACs could breed political corruption, or at least the appearance of corruption. As evidence theypointed to high level appointments in the Reagan administration of persons previously associated with PACs.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that 9012(f) was not constitutionally valid. First, writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist fell back on the earlier Buckley ruling by again noting the expenseof promoting political views in a mass-media society. In this regard, the independent PACs constitute valuable tools expanding the individual's voice. Tolimit PACs' spending would inhibit free speech protected under the First Amendment. Secondly, freedom of association rights were also relevant in this case due to the PACs, reliance on public contributions. The Court argued that Buckley protected freedom of association of "large numbers of individuals of modest means" to join together and amplify their voices. Rehnquist stated,
that the contributors obviously like the message they are hearing from these organizations and want to add their voices to that message; otherwise they would not part with their money.Section 9012(f) violated their freedom of association guaranteed under the First Amendment. Thirdly, the majority found section 9012(f) to be "substantially overbroad" byapplying to all groups, no matter of what size, thereby limiting smaller, less formal political groups. Lastly, using the Court-established principle thatpreventing corruption is the only constitutionally permissible government interest in regulating campaign spending, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not clearly explain the type of corruption feared. The possible appearanceof corruption was not sufficient in this case to warrant concern. Rehnquist asserted that simple distrust does not constitute corruption. In conclusion, the Court held that the PACs' independent expenditures are entitled to First Amendment protection because they are designed to promote political views, notspecific political campaigns.
No Right to Spend
In dissent joined by Justice Marshall, Justice White agreed with FEC that spending large sums of money breeds political corruption and threatens the integrity of political campaigns. White noted the informal but close relationshipbetween ideological PACs and the political parties in a world of "tacit [unspoken] understandings and implied agreements." Also, White asserted politicalequality is undermined by the accumulations of wealth by the PACs. Therefore,government restrictions should enhance the voice of the individual citizen by limiting PAC expenditures. In direct opposition to Rehnquist, White criticized equating expenditures of money with actual free speech. White wrote, "theFirst Amendment protects the right to speak, not the right to spend." Individual citizens who contribute to PACs do not actually have the opportunity tovoice their political views since the actual decisions on spending are made by only the few PAC leaders. Contributors to political committees were no moreengaging in speech than those who contributed directly to political candidates for which there exist limitations. Hence, any limitations would pose onlyminor interference with First Amendment rights. White feared candidates wouldincreasingly feel pressure to please the PAC spenders rather than the voters.
Impact
Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee opened the door wider to extensive campaign spending and the continued political influence of PACs. Many believe the campaign finance system creates distrust and cynicism in the public and undermines concepts of integrityand fairness. To many, government seems increasingly remote from their influence and a tool of the rich and powerful special interest groups. However, reform is a strongly partisan issue as Republicans have demonstrated a greaterability than Democrats to raise large sums of funds, thus gaining a seeminglygreater advantage in elections. President Clinton, recognizing this disadvantage of the Democrats, undertook extraordinary efforts to raise campaign funds for his 1996 re-election. The various tactics drew considerable debate.
Facts regarding the dangers of PACs are not clear, complicating reform efforts. Studies show that life spans of individual PACS are brief, particularly the conservative citizen PACs. FEC v. NCPAC came at the time of maximuminfluence exerted by NCPAC and FCM. As quickly as 1986, NCPAC came into debtand by the early 1990s exerted only a minor influence in campaigns. Corporateand labor PACs, proven more stable due to a more definite, cohesive supporter base, largely replaced "ideological" PACs. Extensive reform proposals include public financing for Congressional elections, and limitations on PAC "softmoney" contributions and independent spending. Congressional efforts at reform died again in early 1998. Reforms passed in the 1990s tended to focus moreon disclosure of activities to the public rather than actual regulation of activities. Despite strong disagreements over the role and influence of PACs,they persist in the American political scene and continue to enjoy protectionunder the First Amendment.
Related Cases
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
- First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
- Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
- Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
- Federal Election Commission v. National Rifle Association Victory Fund, (1994).
Political Action Committees
Politicians finance their election campaigns with their own money and donations. As of 1998, individuals are limited by law to donating $1,000 per candidate per election, and $25,000 to all candidates per year. Primary, general, and run-off elections count separately for application of the limit.
Political action committees, or PACs, collect and pool money from individualsfor donations to candidates above the individual limits. Individuals may contribute $5,000 per year to a PAC. PACs are limited to donating $5,000 per candidate per election, and an unlimited total amount per year.
The Federal Election Commission, which oversees campaign contributions and enforces the legal limits, places PACs into four categories: corporate, labor,trade-health-membership, and nonconnected. Nonconnected PACs are unaffiliatedwith any other organization, and usually are formed to raise contributions for candidates supporting a particular issue or political ideology. The otherPACs are affiliated with an existing organization, such as a manufacturer orlabor union, which funds the operation of the PAC and decides how to contribute the money it collects.
Sources
Clawson, Dan, Alan Neustadtl, and Mark Weller, Dollars and Votes: How Business Campaign Contributions Subvert Democracy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998.
Clawson, Dan, Alan Neustadtl, and Mark Weller, Money Talks: Corporate PACsand Political Influence. New York: BasicBooks, 1992.
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