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Block v. Hirsh - Further Readings

Appellant
Block
Appellee
Hirsh
Appellant's Claim
That the appellant should be allowed to remain in his apartment by reversinga lower court decision invalidating a rent control law as unconstitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Jesse C. Adkins
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
William G. Johnson
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, John Hessin Clarke, William Rufus Day, Oliver Wendell Holmes (writing for the Court), Mahlon Pitney
Justices Dissenting
Joseph McKenna, James Clark McReynolds, Willis Van Devanter, Edward DouglassWhite
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
18 April 1921
Decision
The Court reversed the earlier decision. The rent control law was constitutionally valid, and Block could remain in his apartment at the old rent.
Significance
The Court held that the federal government's power to wage war justifies otherwise illegal actions taken by local governments during wartime emergencies.
Congress normally bases regulatory measures on one of the powers given in Article I, section 8, of the Constitution--usually either the power to raise taxes or the power to regulate interstate commerce. During the early years of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court scrutinized federal and state regulations to ensure that these did not destroy an individual's rights to due process of law and liberty of contract. The Court sometimes invalidated laws because these did not directly relate to the taxation or commerce clauses.
The Supreme Court has been much less scrupulous about the constitutionality of regulations under congressional war powers. The Constitution gives Congressthe power to declare war and to raise and support armies. Agreeing that Congress may do whatever is necessary to win a war, the Court has upheld new anddrastic forms of regulation during wartime.
In October of 1919, Congress imposed rent control on the District of Columbia, under a law expiring in two years. If a tenant continued to pay the formerrent, he could not be evicted when his lease ran out. An appointed commissioncould raise rents to provide landlords a "reasonable" return on their investment. By giving 30 days notice in writing, a landlord could regain an apartment needed for his own use.
Congress based the rent control law on its police powers as the local government in the district. The war, it declared, had created an emergency situation. Rental conditions in the district endangered public health, burdened publicofficials, and embarrassed the federal government.
Hirsh Needs a Home
A certain Hirsh (the records do not mention his or his tenant's first name) purchased an apartment building on F Street in Washington, where Block occupied the cellar and ground floor. Hirsh claimed that he wanted Block's apartmentfor his own use; however, he did not give Block 30 days notice as the law provided.
Instead, Hirsh challenged the constitutionality of the entire rent control law. The act was unconstitutional because it took away Hirsh's property and putit under Block's control. Thus the law took private property for public andnot for private use. By taking private property without compensation, it deprived its owner of due process of law, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals invalidated the rent control law and held that Hirsh was entitled to occupancy. Block appealed to the Supreme Court, where the United States appeared as amicus curiae to defend the rent control law.
The Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and upheld the law by 5-4. Justice Holmes wrote the majority decision supported by Justices Day, Pitney, Brandeis, and Clarke. Justice McKenna wrote a scathing dissent, supported by Chief Justice White and Justices Van Devanter, and McReynolds.
War Justifies Unlimited Governmental Powers
For the majority, Justice Holmes asserted that the congressional declarationof a housing emergency simply stated "a publicly notorious and almost world-wide fact." The only question was whether Congress could "meet [this emergency] in the way in which it has been met by most of the civilized countries of the world."
Under wartime circumstances, matters of purely private concern may become matters of public interest, thereby giving government regulatory powers it wouldnot possess in peace time. These police powers can apply to real property and rents. Both eminent domain and zoning regulations show that tangible property is not "exempt from the legislative modification required from time to time in civilized life." If governments can limit the height of buildings, theycan limit the amount of rent.
Housing is a necessary of life. Allthe elements of a public interest justifying some degree of public control are present. The only matter that seems to us open to debate is whether the statute goes too far.
And that was a matter which the courts woulddetermine as cases arose.
The law provided for a "reasonable" rent, Holmes noted. Therefore, Holmes ruled, the law does no more than deprive the landlord of unjust profits from crowded conditions. In this, it goes no further than "the more debatable usury laws." The end justified the means used, and rent controls have been adopted for the same purpose all over the world.
Even in Wartime, Any Violation of the Constitution Is Evil
Justice McKenna's dissent responded both to this decision and to Holmes' decision in the companion case Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman (1921), approving rent control in New York City. McKenna's dissent presented an impassioneddefense of the traditional and constitutional limits on arbitrary governmentpower. Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, states cannot take propertywithout due process of law. And Article I, section 10, specifically states that "No State shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts."
The grounds of dissent, said McKenna, are these "explicit provisions of the Constitution of the United States." Their application is so plain that no further argument is needed. Whatever the excuse, including the supposed demands of war, a violation of the Constitution "is an evil--an evil in the circumstance of violation, of greater evil because of its example and malign instruction."
These violations of the Constitution will, moreover, do nothing to advance public health or the operations of the federal government. He sought to answerthe question of why these provisions were needed.
The answer is,to supply homes to the homeless . . . If the statute keeps a tenant in, it keeps a tenant out . . . Its only basis is that tenants are more numerous thanlandlords.

Housing is scarce, it was said, and therefore it could be taken from those who had it.
If such an exercise of government be legal, what exercise of government is illegal? Houses are a necessary of life, but other thingsare as necessary. May they too be taken from the direction of their owners and disposed of by the Government?

In controlling rents, the majority had argued that Congress simply imitated the laws of other countries. Have conditions in the United States and in the rest of the world, come to the point that they
are not amenable topassing palliatives, so that socialism, or some form of socialism, is the only permanent corrective or accommodation? It is indeed strange that this court, in effect, is called to make way for it and, through the instrument of a Constitution based on personal rights . . . to declare legal a power exerted for their destruction.

McKenna's dissent was eloquent, but Holmes's decision for the majority set lasting precedents. The Court, in fact, held invalid an attempt to continue rent control in the District until Chasleton Corp. v. Sinclair (1924). Inthis case, Justice Holmes declared that the emergency that had justified the1919 law no longer existed. When war returned, however, Congress in 1942 setup an office to fix the prices of all residential rents and most other goods. Once again the Supreme Court placed no limits on governmental power in wartime.
Related Cases

  • Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921).
  • Chasleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
  • Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).

Congressional Police Power
Congressional police power refers to the federal government's constitutionally defined jurisdiction in maintaining domestic order. Under the Constitutionthe federal government is limited in their ability to police the states. Thepower to regulate interstate commerce is the only provision that permits thefederal government to intervene in matters of domestic order outside of federally defined crimes such as treason, kidnapping, and crimes involving drugs.Under the Tenth Amendment, the states are reserved the right to construct andenforce criminal law. However, the federal government has stretched the power to regulate interstate commerce to expand their police power.
The alleged mishandling of the Waco and Ruby Ridge incidents federal law enforcement agents, which were highly publicized, have stimulated debate over thejurisdiction of congressional police power. In United States v. Lopez(1995) the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government does not have a police power to define or enforce a state criminal code.
Sources
CATO Institute for Policy Analysis, no. 216, 10 October 1994.

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