Petitioners
Ed Brown, et al.
Respondent
State of Mississippi
Petitioners' Claim
That their confessions to crimes they had committed, obtained during and after torture at the hands of police officers and the general citizenry, were invalid in court.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioners
Earl Brewer, J. Morgan Stevens
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
W. D. Conn, W. H. Maynard
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Charles Evans Hughes (writing for the Court), James Clark McReynolds, Owen Josephus Roberts, HarlanFiske Stone, George Sutherland, Willis Van Devanter
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
17 February 1936
Decision
Upheld the petitioners' claim and overturned the decisions of the trial courtand Mississippi Supreme Court, ruling that the use of coerced confessions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Significance
Brown v. Mississippi marked the development of the test of voluntariness as the means used by the Court to evaluate the constitutionality of criminal confessions. The ruling was the first of a series of cases heard over thenext three decades through which the Court restricted the means available tolaw enforcement personnel seeking to obtain confessions from criminal suspects. This series of cases culminated in the Court's landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), which mandated that suspects be made aware of their constitutional rights before being questioned by police.
True Confessions
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that no suspect "shall becompelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This statutory protection of the rights of the individual creates legal problems for authorities seeking to use confessions as evidence in court. Traditionally, theSupreme Court applied the common law test of voluntariness to determine the legality of criminal confessions in federal cases. This test required that a confession be "an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker" to be legally admissible, and denied the use in court of any confession that wascoerced from a suspect by the authorities. The states, however, were free todevelop their own rules regarding the legality of confessions.
Although the states were free to make their own rules regulating criminal procedure, they were limited by their need to adhere to the Constitution's guarantee of Due Process as set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment. Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), confirmed the ability of federal judiciary to invalidate state criminal procedures if they were judged to "offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
A Travesty of Justice
On 30 March 1934 Raymond Stewart, a white farmer from Mississippi, was murdered. His body was discovered at approximately 1:00 p.m. that same day. Law enforcement authorities thought they knew the perpetrator, and arrested a Mr. Ellington, a local man of African descent. They also detained Ed Brown and Henry Shields, two other African American men who would become petitioners in this case. Ellington was taken to the scene of the murder and asked to confess to the crime, but he professed his innocence. Upon hearing this, a group of white men who had gathered at the crime scene joined the police to encourage Ellington to confess. They threw a rope over a nearby tree limb, made a noose,seized Ellington, and hung him until his neck bore distinct rope marks that lasted for several days. After being let down Ellington still refused to confess, whereupon he was hung once again. When Ellington continued to maintain his innocence after his second hanging, he was savagely whipped by Deputy Sheriff Dial. Ellington still would not confess, and the mob allowed him to returnhome. Brown and Shields were taken to the county jail and detained overnight.
The following morning Dial and several white citizens returned to Ellington'shome and arrested him. They then took him to the county jail after first making a detour through Alabama. While in Alabama, Dial and his colleagues whipped Ellington yet again, whereupon he agreed at last to confess to whatever his tormentors accused him.
On the night of 1 April 1934 deputy Dial and a number of white citizens returned to the county jail. Shields and Brown were forced to disrobe and lie overchairs. They were then beaten with a leather strap bearing metal buckles. During the beating deputy Dial made the men understand that, if they would confess involvement in Stewart's murder, the whipping would stop. Eventually bothmen confessed, and agreed to every detail of the scenario for the murder concocted by the local police and the mob.
Wasting no time, the authorities convened a grand jury comprising two sheriffs and eight white citizens to hear the "free and voluntary" confessions of Brown, Ellington, and Shields to the murder of Stewart. The suspects duly confessed. Although the accused still bore many visible marks of their ordeals andmany of those present had knowledge of their treatment, three of the men watching this charade agreed to testify to the voluntary nature of the confessions in the upcoming trial.
On 4 April 1934 the grand jury indicted Brown, Ellington, and Shields for themurder of Stewart. The suspects were arraigned later in the day, but their guilty pleas were not accepted by the trial court. It was also determined at the arraignment that the suspects had not had access to legal counsel, which was duly appointed for them. Their trial was set for the following morning.
The trial lasted just two days, during which the prosecution offered no evidence of the guilt of the suspects other than their confessions. There was no attempt to disguise the manner in which those confessions were obtained. Deputy Dial even admitted participating in beating Ellington, and offered that thebeating was "[n]ot too much for a negro; not as much as I would have done ifit were left to me." On 6 April 1934, all three defendants found guilty of Stewart's murder and sentenced to death.
The petitioners then appealed their case to the Mississippi Supreme Court, which upheld their conviction and sentencing on the grounds that: "exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution" [quoting from Snyder v. Massachusetts]. Moreover, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the petitioner'scourt-appointed counsel, by not moving to exclude the confessions from the trial, had simply made a legal error that could not be rectified. Two state supreme court justices dissented from this ruling, however, and the U.S. SupremeCourt agreed to hear the case on certiorari.
Due Process
The Court heard arguments in the case on 10 January 1936, and ruled unanimously in favor of the petitioners, reversing their convictions and removing their sentences. The basis for the decision lay in the Due Process Clause of theFourteenth Amendment which states that "state action, whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions." Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Hughes rejected both arguments advanced by the Mississippi Supreme Court. With regard to the state's first contention, that federal courts had no jurisdiction in state criminal proceedings, Hughes responded that "the freedom of the state in establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by due process of law." Hughes also noted the special circumstances of this case with bitinglanguage: "Because a state may dispense with a jury trial, it does not followthat it may substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may notbe substituted for the witness stand." Hughes did not refute the right of states to ignore constitutional provisions against self-incrimination in theircriminal procedures. The Court then dismissed the state's second contention,that an error by counsel had resulted in the failure to exclude the confessions from the trial. "It is a contention that proceeds upon a misconception ofthe nature of the petitioners' complaint. That complaint is not of the commission of mere error, but of a wrong so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and sentence null and void."
Impact
Brown v. Mississippi established the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary to regulate state criminal law procedures when these violate constitutional guarantees of due process. The case was one of the first in a long line that gradually restricted the means available to law enforcement authorities seeking to obtain confessions and evidentiary statements from criminal suspects.
Related Cases
Ed Brown, et al.
Respondent
State of Mississippi
Petitioners' Claim
That their confessions to crimes they had committed, obtained during and after torture at the hands of police officers and the general citizenry, were invalid in court.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioners
Earl Brewer, J. Morgan Stevens
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
W. D. Conn, W. H. Maynard
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Charles Evans Hughes (writing for the Court), James Clark McReynolds, Owen Josephus Roberts, HarlanFiske Stone, George Sutherland, Willis Van Devanter
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
17 February 1936
Decision
Upheld the petitioners' claim and overturned the decisions of the trial courtand Mississippi Supreme Court, ruling that the use of coerced confessions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Significance
Brown v. Mississippi marked the development of the test of voluntariness as the means used by the Court to evaluate the constitutionality of criminal confessions. The ruling was the first of a series of cases heard over thenext three decades through which the Court restricted the means available tolaw enforcement personnel seeking to obtain confessions from criminal suspects. This series of cases culminated in the Court's landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), which mandated that suspects be made aware of their constitutional rights before being questioned by police.
True Confessions
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that no suspect "shall becompelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This statutory protection of the rights of the individual creates legal problems for authorities seeking to use confessions as evidence in court. Traditionally, theSupreme Court applied the common law test of voluntariness to determine the legality of criminal confessions in federal cases. This test required that a confession be "an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker" to be legally admissible, and denied the use in court of any confession that wascoerced from a suspect by the authorities. The states, however, were free todevelop their own rules regarding the legality of confessions.
Although the states were free to make their own rules regulating criminal procedure, they were limited by their need to adhere to the Constitution's guarantee of Due Process as set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment. Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), confirmed the ability of federal judiciary to invalidate state criminal procedures if they were judged to "offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
A Travesty of Justice
On 30 March 1934 Raymond Stewart, a white farmer from Mississippi, was murdered. His body was discovered at approximately 1:00 p.m. that same day. Law enforcement authorities thought they knew the perpetrator, and arrested a Mr. Ellington, a local man of African descent. They also detained Ed Brown and Henry Shields, two other African American men who would become petitioners in this case. Ellington was taken to the scene of the murder and asked to confess to the crime, but he professed his innocence. Upon hearing this, a group of white men who had gathered at the crime scene joined the police to encourage Ellington to confess. They threw a rope over a nearby tree limb, made a noose,seized Ellington, and hung him until his neck bore distinct rope marks that lasted for several days. After being let down Ellington still refused to confess, whereupon he was hung once again. When Ellington continued to maintain his innocence after his second hanging, he was savagely whipped by Deputy Sheriff Dial. Ellington still would not confess, and the mob allowed him to returnhome. Brown and Shields were taken to the county jail and detained overnight.
The following morning Dial and several white citizens returned to Ellington'shome and arrested him. They then took him to the county jail after first making a detour through Alabama. While in Alabama, Dial and his colleagues whipped Ellington yet again, whereupon he agreed at last to confess to whatever his tormentors accused him.
On the night of 1 April 1934 deputy Dial and a number of white citizens returned to the county jail. Shields and Brown were forced to disrobe and lie overchairs. They were then beaten with a leather strap bearing metal buckles. During the beating deputy Dial made the men understand that, if they would confess involvement in Stewart's murder, the whipping would stop. Eventually bothmen confessed, and agreed to every detail of the scenario for the murder concocted by the local police and the mob.
Wasting no time, the authorities convened a grand jury comprising two sheriffs and eight white citizens to hear the "free and voluntary" confessions of Brown, Ellington, and Shields to the murder of Stewart. The suspects duly confessed. Although the accused still bore many visible marks of their ordeals andmany of those present had knowledge of their treatment, three of the men watching this charade agreed to testify to the voluntary nature of the confessions in the upcoming trial.
On 4 April 1934 the grand jury indicted Brown, Ellington, and Shields for themurder of Stewart. The suspects were arraigned later in the day, but their guilty pleas were not accepted by the trial court. It was also determined at the arraignment that the suspects had not had access to legal counsel, which was duly appointed for them. Their trial was set for the following morning.
The trial lasted just two days, during which the prosecution offered no evidence of the guilt of the suspects other than their confessions. There was no attempt to disguise the manner in which those confessions were obtained. Deputy Dial even admitted participating in beating Ellington, and offered that thebeating was "[n]ot too much for a negro; not as much as I would have done ifit were left to me." On 6 April 1934, all three defendants found guilty of Stewart's murder and sentenced to death.
The petitioners then appealed their case to the Mississippi Supreme Court, which upheld their conviction and sentencing on the grounds that: "exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution" [quoting from Snyder v. Massachusetts]. Moreover, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the petitioner'scourt-appointed counsel, by not moving to exclude the confessions from the trial, had simply made a legal error that could not be rectified. Two state supreme court justices dissented from this ruling, however, and the U.S. SupremeCourt agreed to hear the case on certiorari.
Due Process
The Court heard arguments in the case on 10 January 1936, and ruled unanimously in favor of the petitioners, reversing their convictions and removing their sentences. The basis for the decision lay in the Due Process Clause of theFourteenth Amendment which states that "state action, whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions." Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Hughes rejected both arguments advanced by the Mississippi Supreme Court. With regard to the state's first contention, that federal courts had no jurisdiction in state criminal proceedings, Hughes responded that "the freedom of the state in establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by due process of law." Hughes also noted the special circumstances of this case with bitinglanguage: "Because a state may dispense with a jury trial, it does not followthat it may substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may notbe substituted for the witness stand." Hughes did not refute the right of states to ignore constitutional provisions against self-incrimination in theircriminal procedures. The Court then dismissed the state's second contention,that an error by counsel had resulted in the failure to exclude the confessions from the trial. "It is a contention that proceeds upon a misconception ofthe nature of the petitioners' complaint. That complaint is not of the commission of mere error, but of a wrong so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and sentence null and void."
Impact
Brown v. Mississippi established the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary to regulate state criminal law procedures when these violate constitutional guarantees of due process. The case was one of the first in a long line that gradually restricted the means available to law enforcement authorities seeking to obtain confessions and evidentiary statements from criminal suspects.
Related Cases
- Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
- McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
- Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
- Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1990.
- Elliott, Stephen P., ed. A Reference Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court. New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986.
- Hall, Kermit L., ed. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of theUnited States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
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