Appellants
Zell Miller, et al., Lucious Abrams, Jr., et al., and United States
Appellees
Davida Johnson, et al.
Appellants' Claim
The state of Georgia's redistricting plan enacted in 1991 violated the EqualProtection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when the Eleventh District was created. The appellants claimed that the redistricting plan was based upon racial factors and did not serve any compelling governmental interest.
Chief Lawyer for Appellants
David F. Walbert
Chief Lawyer for Appellees
A. Lee Parks
Justices for the Court
Anthony M. Kennedy (writing for the Court), Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
29 June 1995
Decision
The Supreme Court determined that the Georgia redistricting plan violated theEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as tested by the decision in Shaw v. Reno (1993). The redistricting of Georgia with the creation of the Eleventh District was done predominantly on a racial basis.
Significance
In the case Miller v. Johnson the U.S. Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a redistricting plan for the state of Georgia. The questionthey addressed was whether the reapportionment of congressional redistricts was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They had to determine if this was a case of discriminatory racial gerrymandering that segregated voters based purely upon race and did not support any compelling interest for the state or local governments. Upon investigation, the Court ruled that the redistricting boundaries were highly unusual and violatedthe rights of majority and minority voters.
A Case of Racial Gerrymandering
Between 1980 and 1990 the state of Georgia had only one congressional district that had a black majority. Due to the results of the decennial census for 1990 it was determined that the black voters of Georgia were entitled to an additional eleventh congressional seat. This prompted the Georgia General Assembly to redraw congressional district boundaries and prepare a reapportionmentplan. Designated as a covered jurisdiction by the Voting Rights Act of 1965,Georgia was required to submit the reapportionment plan to the U.S. attorneygeneral for pre-clearance before enactment to ensure that the proposed changes did not deny or abridge citizens' rights to vote based on race.
In October of 1991 the first plan for reapportionment was submitted for approval. It included two majority-minority congressional districts, and a third district that was comprised of 35 percent black voters. The Justice Departmentdenied approval of the plan on the grounds that it had created only two majority-minority districts and did not acknowledge certain minority populationsby aligning them in majority-black districts.
The General Assembly rewrote the plan, increasing the black populations in three districts--the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh. The Justice Department deniedpre-clearance a second time, citing an alternate plan for creating three majority-minority districts. The plan, called "max-black," had been drafted by the American Civil Liberties Union for the Georgia General Assembly's black caucus. It involved several trades of black populations in Macon and Savannah,which would convert the districts into three majority-minority districts.
In order to comply with the Justice Department's recommendations, Georgia redrew the reapportionment plan a third time, utilizing the "max-black" plan fora benchmark. The resulting plan split 26 counties, and the Eleventh Districtconnected the black neighborhoods of metro Atlanta with the poor black districts of coastal Georgia located 260 miles away. This third district alone split eight counties and five municipalities and covered a territory of approximately 6,784 square miles. The end result of the plan, however, included the three majority-minority districts recommended by the Justice Department. In April of 1992 the reapportionment plan was granted pre-clearance; elections were held under the new redistricting the following November, in which each of the three new districts elected a black candidate.
Five white voters from the Eleventh District filed a claim in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. They alleged that the redistricting plan was a "racial gerrymander" by which voters had been separated intodistricts on the basis of race alone. This was a violation of their equal protection rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and interpreted by the precedents set in Shaw v. Reno (1993). Athree-judge panel was convened, and the majority ruled in favor of the five appellees. It was held that Shaw required close scrutiny of a redistricting plan if it had the overwhelming appearance of a process decided by racial factors. The panel also held that the Georgia plan did not require three majority-minority districts in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Upon appeal Miller v. Johnson came before the Supreme Court in April of 1995.
Points of Affirmation and Dissension
The Supreme Court affirmed and upheld the decision of the lower court. The justices confirmed that the Georgia redistricting plan violated the FourteenthAmendment's Equal Protection Clause. The majority expressed three primary points in their decision. First, the proceedings showed that race was the primary criterion in creating the districts. The district boundaries were of such abizarre nature that this was the only reasoning that could be applied to theplan. Justice Kennedy, entering the opinion of the Court, wrote that the "central mandate [of the Equal Protection Clause] is race neutrality in governmental decision making." The Georgia General Assembly made racial factors the only consideration in the redrawing of district boundaries.
The second point to which the Court turned was the precedent established in Shaw v. Reno (1993). This required close scrutiny of any redistrictingprocess that had the appearance of being motivated by race. Under close scrutiny Miller v. Johnson could not establish any compelling governmentalinterest being served by the new districting. In reviewing the proceedings, the majority justices determined that the State of Georgia, under the directive of the Justice Department, deliberately created congressional districts that would bring the black population into a few single districts, in particularthe Eleventh, maximizing the black minority vote. The only compelling interest the Supreme Court could sanction was a state's compliance with the VotingAct of 1965 in order to correct past discrimination and injustices; the stateof Georgia did not argue that the redistricting plan was an attempt to remedy any past injuries due to racial discrimination.
Four justices argued a dissenting opinion of the Court's decision. Ruth BaderGinsburg, entering the opinion of the minority, expressed the view that thestate of Georgia did not use racial factors as the overriding determinant inthe redistricting plan. She pointed to the design of the Eleventh District asa reflection of "traditional districting factors," such as maintaining political subdivisions, and the comparison of average areas and sizes of politicalsubdivisions. Additional political considerations were used in creating theboundaries and the new district. Ginsburg also cited that the plan adopted bythe Georgia General Assembly was not the "max-black" plan advocated by the Attorney General. The redistricting plan, while influenced by the "max-black"plan, had significant differences, and took political and social factors intoconsideration.
Ginsburg, on behalf of the dissenting justices, stated that the Court's adoption of the standard of "close scrutiny" established in Shaw v. Reno opened the way for more federal litigation of reapportionment processes. If a plaintiff could plausibly claim that other considerations had less emphasis than race in a reapportionment of districts, then a federal case could be mounted. Ginsburg found this "neither necessary nor proper." Redistricting was a legislative process that should be left to the states and local governments except in extreme instances.
Impact
Miller v. Johnson was a serious examination of a state's ability to draw legislative boundaries that not only complied with the requirements of theVoting Rights Act of 1965 but also remained racially neutral in the creationof voting districts. The conclusion of the Supreme Court was that while racemay be a significant factor in the reapportionment of voting districts, it cannot be the overwhelming factor, or the only factor, for that will ultimately violate the rights of voters that are guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even as late as 1996, the Court heard cases about redistricting and politicalparticipation (Shaw v. Hunt). The U.S. political system is still uneven in providing equal voting power to all of its eligible voters. Miller v. Johnson has been an attempt by the Supreme Court to protect the rightsof all while maintaining a race-neutral atmosphere.
Related Cases
Zell Miller, et al., Lucious Abrams, Jr., et al., and United States
Appellees
Davida Johnson, et al.
Appellants' Claim
The state of Georgia's redistricting plan enacted in 1991 violated the EqualProtection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when the Eleventh District was created. The appellants claimed that the redistricting plan was based upon racial factors and did not serve any compelling governmental interest.
Chief Lawyer for Appellants
David F. Walbert
Chief Lawyer for Appellees
A. Lee Parks
Justices for the Court
Anthony M. Kennedy (writing for the Court), Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
29 June 1995
Decision
The Supreme Court determined that the Georgia redistricting plan violated theEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as tested by the decision in Shaw v. Reno (1993). The redistricting of Georgia with the creation of the Eleventh District was done predominantly on a racial basis.
Significance
In the case Miller v. Johnson the U.S. Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a redistricting plan for the state of Georgia. The questionthey addressed was whether the reapportionment of congressional redistricts was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They had to determine if this was a case of discriminatory racial gerrymandering that segregated voters based purely upon race and did not support any compelling interest for the state or local governments. Upon investigation, the Court ruled that the redistricting boundaries were highly unusual and violatedthe rights of majority and minority voters.
A Case of Racial Gerrymandering
Between 1980 and 1990 the state of Georgia had only one congressional district that had a black majority. Due to the results of the decennial census for 1990 it was determined that the black voters of Georgia were entitled to an additional eleventh congressional seat. This prompted the Georgia General Assembly to redraw congressional district boundaries and prepare a reapportionmentplan. Designated as a covered jurisdiction by the Voting Rights Act of 1965,Georgia was required to submit the reapportionment plan to the U.S. attorneygeneral for pre-clearance before enactment to ensure that the proposed changes did not deny or abridge citizens' rights to vote based on race.
In October of 1991 the first plan for reapportionment was submitted for approval. It included two majority-minority congressional districts, and a third district that was comprised of 35 percent black voters. The Justice Departmentdenied approval of the plan on the grounds that it had created only two majority-minority districts and did not acknowledge certain minority populationsby aligning them in majority-black districts.
The General Assembly rewrote the plan, increasing the black populations in three districts--the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh. The Justice Department deniedpre-clearance a second time, citing an alternate plan for creating three majority-minority districts. The plan, called "max-black," had been drafted by the American Civil Liberties Union for the Georgia General Assembly's black caucus. It involved several trades of black populations in Macon and Savannah,which would convert the districts into three majority-minority districts.
In order to comply with the Justice Department's recommendations, Georgia redrew the reapportionment plan a third time, utilizing the "max-black" plan fora benchmark. The resulting plan split 26 counties, and the Eleventh Districtconnected the black neighborhoods of metro Atlanta with the poor black districts of coastal Georgia located 260 miles away. This third district alone split eight counties and five municipalities and covered a territory of approximately 6,784 square miles. The end result of the plan, however, included the three majority-minority districts recommended by the Justice Department. In April of 1992 the reapportionment plan was granted pre-clearance; elections were held under the new redistricting the following November, in which each of the three new districts elected a black candidate.
Five white voters from the Eleventh District filed a claim in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. They alleged that the redistricting plan was a "racial gerrymander" by which voters had been separated intodistricts on the basis of race alone. This was a violation of their equal protection rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and interpreted by the precedents set in Shaw v. Reno (1993). Athree-judge panel was convened, and the majority ruled in favor of the five appellees. It was held that Shaw required close scrutiny of a redistricting plan if it had the overwhelming appearance of a process decided by racial factors. The panel also held that the Georgia plan did not require three majority-minority districts in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Upon appeal Miller v. Johnson came before the Supreme Court in April of 1995.
Points of Affirmation and Dissension
The Supreme Court affirmed and upheld the decision of the lower court. The justices confirmed that the Georgia redistricting plan violated the FourteenthAmendment's Equal Protection Clause. The majority expressed three primary points in their decision. First, the proceedings showed that race was the primary criterion in creating the districts. The district boundaries were of such abizarre nature that this was the only reasoning that could be applied to theplan. Justice Kennedy, entering the opinion of the Court, wrote that the "central mandate [of the Equal Protection Clause] is race neutrality in governmental decision making." The Georgia General Assembly made racial factors the only consideration in the redrawing of district boundaries.
The second point to which the Court turned was the precedent established in Shaw v. Reno (1993). This required close scrutiny of any redistrictingprocess that had the appearance of being motivated by race. Under close scrutiny Miller v. Johnson could not establish any compelling governmentalinterest being served by the new districting. In reviewing the proceedings, the majority justices determined that the State of Georgia, under the directive of the Justice Department, deliberately created congressional districts that would bring the black population into a few single districts, in particularthe Eleventh, maximizing the black minority vote. The only compelling interest the Supreme Court could sanction was a state's compliance with the VotingAct of 1965 in order to correct past discrimination and injustices; the stateof Georgia did not argue that the redistricting plan was an attempt to remedy any past injuries due to racial discrimination.
Four justices argued a dissenting opinion of the Court's decision. Ruth BaderGinsburg, entering the opinion of the minority, expressed the view that thestate of Georgia did not use racial factors as the overriding determinant inthe redistricting plan. She pointed to the design of the Eleventh District asa reflection of "traditional districting factors," such as maintaining political subdivisions, and the comparison of average areas and sizes of politicalsubdivisions. Additional political considerations were used in creating theboundaries and the new district. Ginsburg also cited that the plan adopted bythe Georgia General Assembly was not the "max-black" plan advocated by the Attorney General. The redistricting plan, while influenced by the "max-black"plan, had significant differences, and took political and social factors intoconsideration.
Ginsburg, on behalf of the dissenting justices, stated that the Court's adoption of the standard of "close scrutiny" established in Shaw v. Reno opened the way for more federal litigation of reapportionment processes. If a plaintiff could plausibly claim that other considerations had less emphasis than race in a reapportionment of districts, then a federal case could be mounted. Ginsburg found this "neither necessary nor proper." Redistricting was a legislative process that should be left to the states and local governments except in extreme instances.
Impact
Miller v. Johnson was a serious examination of a state's ability to draw legislative boundaries that not only complied with the requirements of theVoting Rights Act of 1965 but also remained racially neutral in the creationof voting districts. The conclusion of the Supreme Court was that while racemay be a significant factor in the reapportionment of voting districts, it cannot be the overwhelming factor, or the only factor, for that will ultimately violate the rights of voters that are guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even as late as 1996, the Court heard cases about redistricting and politicalparticipation (Shaw v. Hunt). The U.S. political system is still uneven in providing equal voting power to all of its eligible voters. Miller v. Johnson has been an attempt by the Supreme Court to protect the rightsof all while maintaining a race-neutral atmosphere.
Related Cases
- Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
- Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1995).
- Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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