Miller v. Johnson

The Supreme Court affirmed and upheld the decision of the lower court. The justices confirmed that the Georgia redistricting plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The majority expressed three primary points in their decision. First, the proceedings showed that race was the primary criterion in creating the districts. The district boundaries were of such a bizarre nature that this was the only reasoning that could be applied to the plan. Justice Kennedy, entering the opinion of the Court, wrote that the "central mandate [of the Equal Protection Clause] is race neutrality in governmental decision making." The Georgia General Assembly made racial factors the only consideration in the redrawing of district boundaries.

The second point to which the Court turned was the precedent established in Shaw v. Reno (1993). This required close scrutiny of any redistricting process that had the appearance of being motivated by race. Under close scrutiny Miller v. Johnson could not establish any compelling governmental interest being served by the new districting. In reviewing the proceedings, the majority justices determined that the State of Georgia, under the directive of the Justice Department, deliberately created congressional districts that would bring the black population into a few single districts, in particular the Eleventh, maximizing the black minority vote. The only compelling interest the Supreme Court could sanction was a state's compliance with the Voting Act of 1965 in order to correct past discrimination and injustices; the state of Georgia did not argue that the redistricting plan was an attempt to remedy any past injuries due to racial discrimination.

Four justices argued a dissenting opinion of the Court's decision. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, entering the opinion of the minority, expressed the view that the state of Georgia did not use racial factors as the overriding determinant in the redistricting plan. She pointed to the design of the Eleventh District as a reflection of "traditional districting factors," such as maintaining political subdivisions, and the comparison of average areas and sizes of political subdivisions. Additional political considerations were used in creating the boundaries and the new district. Ginsburg also cited that the plan adopted by the Georgia General Assembly was not the "max-black" plan advocated by the Attorney General. The redistricting plan, while influenced by the "max-black" plan, had significant differences, and took political and social factors into consideration.

Ginsburg, on behalf of the dissenting justices, stated that the Court's adoption of the standard of "close scrutiny" established in Shaw v. Reno opened the way for more federal litigation of reapportionment processes. If a plaintiff could plausibly claim that other considerations had less emphasis than race in a reapportionment of districts, then a federal case could be mounted. Ginsburg found this "neither necessary nor proper." Redistricting was a legislative process that should be left to the states and local governments except in extreme instances.