Petitioner
Susan J. Davis, et al.
Respondent
Irwin C. Bandemer, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That Indiana's 1981 legislative redistricting plan did not unconstitutionallydiscriminate against Democratic legislators in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
William M. Evans
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Theodore R. Boehm
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Byron R. White (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist
Justices Dissenting
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
30 June 1986
Decision
Upheld the state of Indiana's legislative redistricting plan, concluding thatalthough the defendant's claim that the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause could be decided by the Court, the plan itself did not discriminate against Democratic legislators.
Significance
The ruling made clear that the Supreme Court can decide challenges to legislative redistricting plans which are alleged to discriminate against certain political groups, as opposed to racial, religious, or other similar groups. Thus, for the first time the Supreme Court held that political gerrymandering can violate the Constitution. However, the test adopted by a plurality of the Court makes such challenges to redistricting plans extremely difficult to prove.
Following the 1980 U.S. census, the Indiana legislature began the task of redrawing the districts from which its members are elected. This process, knownas reapportionment or redistricting, was required under Indiana law every tenyears, following the census. The Indiana legislature consists of a house ofrepresentatives and a senate. The 50 senators are elected from 50 separate districts. However, the 100 representatives are elected from less than 100 separate districts; thus, some districts, based on their population, elected twoor three representatives. In early 1981, the Indiana legislature adopted a redistricting plan providing for 61 districts which elected only one representative, nine districts which elected two representatives, and seven districts which elected three representatives. At the time this redistricting plan was adopted, a majority of both branches of the legislature were members of the Republican party, as was the governor, who approved the plan.
In early 1982, a number of legislators who were members of the Democratic party filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against various state officials involved in adopting the redistrictingplan. The Democrats claimed that the Republican legislature and governor hadpurposefully drawn the districts in such a way as to disadvantage the Democrats in future elections, a process known as political gerrymandering. Gerrymandering generally is the practice of drawing legislative districts in such a way as to favor or disfavor a certain group. This practice was named after Massachusetts governor and Constitutional Convention representative Elbridge Gerry, who first used the practice in 1812. The Indiana Democrats contended thatthe state's 1981 redistricting constituted political gerrymandering designedto disfavor Democratic candidates by concentrating voters who traditionallyvoted Democratic to a few districts. They argued that this gerrymandering violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which in part provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Prior to any action being taken in the case, Indiana conducted elections pursuant to the redistricting plan in November of 1982. Although the Democratic house of representative candidates received 51.9 percent of the vote throughout the state, only 43 Democrats were elected to the 100 seats available.
The case was heard by a three-judge panel of the district court. After reviewing the statistics from the 1982 elections, and hearing testimony from a number of Republican legislators about their motives in drawing the districts, the district court concluded that the redistricting plan constituted a political gerrymander. The district court also concluded that this gerrymander violated the equal protection rights of Democratic candidates and voters. The stateofficials appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. Although a majority of the Court agreed that the district court's decision should be reversed, there was no majority agreement on the reason. Justice O'Connor, writing anopinion which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, thought the case should be reversed because it presented a political question which could not be resolved by the federal courts. Justice White, writing an opinion which was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, concludedthat the Court could resolve the issue, but agreed that reversal was appropriate because the Indiana Democrats did not show that their equal protection rights were violated. Finally, Justice Powell, writing for himself and JusticeStevens, concluded that the district court should be affirmed because the Indiana Democrats had established an equal protection violation.
A Political Question?
The first question before the Supreme Court was whether the Court properly could resolve the issue of whether the Indiana redistricting plan constituted apolitical gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Lutherv. Borden (1849), the Supreme Court first adopted what is now known as the political question doctrine. Under this doctrine a federal court, including the Supreme Court, cannot decide a case if it presents a political question. Examples of such political questions occur where the issue is committed bythe Constitution to another branch of government, deciding the issue involvesthe Court in making an initial policy determination more suited to the legislative branch, or deciding the issue would otherwise hamper the interrelationship of the three separate, but equal, branches of the government.
Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Court should refuse to decide the case because "challenges to the manner in which an apportionment has been carried out--by the very parties that are responsible for this process--present a political question in the truest sense of the term." However, a majority of the justices disagreed. Justice White, writing the opinion of the Court on this issue, concluded that political gerrymandering did not involve a political question. He noted that the Court had previously decided racial gerrymandering cases, and that the standards involved in political gerrymandering cases did notsignificantly differ from those involved in racial gerrymandering cases.
An Agreeable Test, Inconsistent Results
Having decided that the political gerrymandering issue was not a political question, the six justices in the majority on this point then considered whether the Indiana redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause. Initially, all six justices agreed on the test to be used in analyzing political gerrymandering claims. In his opinion, Justice White found that political parties or other persons bringing a political gerrymandering claim must, to establish that the redistricting violates the Fourteenth Amendment, "prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actualdiscriminatory effect on that group." Justice Powell began his dissenting opinion by agreeing with this test.
Nevertheless, the six justices split sharply on the actual application of this test, both in general and to the facts of the case. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, concluded that the Indiana Democrats had failed to show that the redistricting plan had an actual discriminatory effect on Democrats. He stated that the purpose behind the drawing of thelines should not be reached unless the Democrats first showed that they had "been unconstitutionally denied [their] chance to effectively influence the political process." Reasoning that "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections," Justice White concluded that the simple fact that the Indiana Democrats' representation in the legislature was notdirectly proportional to the percentage of votes they received was insufficient to establish a discriminatory effect. He also concluded that the undisputed fact that the Republican lawmakers in Indiana intended to disadvantage theDemocrats was irrelevant unless the Democrats could show that they were actually disadvantaged, which they could not.
Justice Powell, joined in his opinion by Justice Stevens, vigorously disagreed with Justice White's analysis. In his view, the political gerrymandering inquiry "properly focuses on whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate ends."He believed that a court should look at actual elections conducted under theplan, the shape of the districts, and the actual goals of the legislators adopting the plan. Examining these factors, Justice Powell would have upheld thedistrict court's decision, most notably because there was substantial evidence that the Indiana legislators intended to disadvantage Democratic candidates; furthermore, the 1982 election results showed that the Democratic candidates had been disadvantaged.
Impact
At first glance, the Court's decision in Davis appeared to be a victory for opponents of political gerrymandering; for the first time, the SupremeCourt explicitly held that political gerrymandering can, in certain circumstances, intrude on the equal protection rights of a disadvantaged political group. However, the practical effect has been much different. Although not adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court, most lower federal courts consideringpolitical gerrymandering claims have applied Justice White's approach, whichhas been very difficult to meet. Further, although a majority of the Court did conclude that it can decide political gerrymandering cases, it has remainedreluctant to do so. Indeed, although the Court continues to decide claims ofracial gerrymandering, since Davis it has refused to consider a number of cases raising claims of political gerrymandering. Thus, in a practical sense, the decision has done little to curb the continued use of political gerrymandering.
Related Cases
Susan J. Davis, et al.
Respondent
Irwin C. Bandemer, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That Indiana's 1981 legislative redistricting plan did not unconstitutionallydiscriminate against Democratic legislators in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
William M. Evans
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Theodore R. Boehm
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Byron R. White (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist
Justices Dissenting
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
30 June 1986
Decision
Upheld the state of Indiana's legislative redistricting plan, concluding thatalthough the defendant's claim that the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause could be decided by the Court, the plan itself did not discriminate against Democratic legislators.
Significance
The ruling made clear that the Supreme Court can decide challenges to legislative redistricting plans which are alleged to discriminate against certain political groups, as opposed to racial, religious, or other similar groups. Thus, for the first time the Supreme Court held that political gerrymandering can violate the Constitution. However, the test adopted by a plurality of the Court makes such challenges to redistricting plans extremely difficult to prove.
Following the 1980 U.S. census, the Indiana legislature began the task of redrawing the districts from which its members are elected. This process, knownas reapportionment or redistricting, was required under Indiana law every tenyears, following the census. The Indiana legislature consists of a house ofrepresentatives and a senate. The 50 senators are elected from 50 separate districts. However, the 100 representatives are elected from less than 100 separate districts; thus, some districts, based on their population, elected twoor three representatives. In early 1981, the Indiana legislature adopted a redistricting plan providing for 61 districts which elected only one representative, nine districts which elected two representatives, and seven districts which elected three representatives. At the time this redistricting plan was adopted, a majority of both branches of the legislature were members of the Republican party, as was the governor, who approved the plan.
In early 1982, a number of legislators who were members of the Democratic party filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against various state officials involved in adopting the redistrictingplan. The Democrats claimed that the Republican legislature and governor hadpurposefully drawn the districts in such a way as to disadvantage the Democrats in future elections, a process known as political gerrymandering. Gerrymandering generally is the practice of drawing legislative districts in such a way as to favor or disfavor a certain group. This practice was named after Massachusetts governor and Constitutional Convention representative Elbridge Gerry, who first used the practice in 1812. The Indiana Democrats contended thatthe state's 1981 redistricting constituted political gerrymandering designedto disfavor Democratic candidates by concentrating voters who traditionallyvoted Democratic to a few districts. They argued that this gerrymandering violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which in part provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Prior to any action being taken in the case, Indiana conducted elections pursuant to the redistricting plan in November of 1982. Although the Democratic house of representative candidates received 51.9 percent of the vote throughout the state, only 43 Democrats were elected to the 100 seats available.
The case was heard by a three-judge panel of the district court. After reviewing the statistics from the 1982 elections, and hearing testimony from a number of Republican legislators about their motives in drawing the districts, the district court concluded that the redistricting plan constituted a political gerrymander. The district court also concluded that this gerrymander violated the equal protection rights of Democratic candidates and voters. The stateofficials appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. Although a majority of the Court agreed that the district court's decision should be reversed, there was no majority agreement on the reason. Justice O'Connor, writing anopinion which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, thought the case should be reversed because it presented a political question which could not be resolved by the federal courts. Justice White, writing an opinion which was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, concludedthat the Court could resolve the issue, but agreed that reversal was appropriate because the Indiana Democrats did not show that their equal protection rights were violated. Finally, Justice Powell, writing for himself and JusticeStevens, concluded that the district court should be affirmed because the Indiana Democrats had established an equal protection violation.
A Political Question?
The first question before the Supreme Court was whether the Court properly could resolve the issue of whether the Indiana redistricting plan constituted apolitical gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Lutherv. Borden (1849), the Supreme Court first adopted what is now known as the political question doctrine. Under this doctrine a federal court, including the Supreme Court, cannot decide a case if it presents a political question. Examples of such political questions occur where the issue is committed bythe Constitution to another branch of government, deciding the issue involvesthe Court in making an initial policy determination more suited to the legislative branch, or deciding the issue would otherwise hamper the interrelationship of the three separate, but equal, branches of the government.
Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Court should refuse to decide the case because "challenges to the manner in which an apportionment has been carried out--by the very parties that are responsible for this process--present a political question in the truest sense of the term." However, a majority of the justices disagreed. Justice White, writing the opinion of the Court on this issue, concluded that political gerrymandering did not involve a political question. He noted that the Court had previously decided racial gerrymandering cases, and that the standards involved in political gerrymandering cases did notsignificantly differ from those involved in racial gerrymandering cases.
An Agreeable Test, Inconsistent Results
Having decided that the political gerrymandering issue was not a political question, the six justices in the majority on this point then considered whether the Indiana redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause. Initially, all six justices agreed on the test to be used in analyzing political gerrymandering claims. In his opinion, Justice White found that political parties or other persons bringing a political gerrymandering claim must, to establish that the redistricting violates the Fourteenth Amendment, "prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actualdiscriminatory effect on that group." Justice Powell began his dissenting opinion by agreeing with this test.
Nevertheless, the six justices split sharply on the actual application of this test, both in general and to the facts of the case. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, concluded that the Indiana Democrats had failed to show that the redistricting plan had an actual discriminatory effect on Democrats. He stated that the purpose behind the drawing of thelines should not be reached unless the Democrats first showed that they had "been unconstitutionally denied [their] chance to effectively influence the political process." Reasoning that "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections," Justice White concluded that the simple fact that the Indiana Democrats' representation in the legislature was notdirectly proportional to the percentage of votes they received was insufficient to establish a discriminatory effect. He also concluded that the undisputed fact that the Republican lawmakers in Indiana intended to disadvantage theDemocrats was irrelevant unless the Democrats could show that they were actually disadvantaged, which they could not.
Justice Powell, joined in his opinion by Justice Stevens, vigorously disagreed with Justice White's analysis. In his view, the political gerrymandering inquiry "properly focuses on whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate ends."He believed that a court should look at actual elections conducted under theplan, the shape of the districts, and the actual goals of the legislators adopting the plan. Examining these factors, Justice Powell would have upheld thedistrict court's decision, most notably because there was substantial evidence that the Indiana legislators intended to disadvantage Democratic candidates; furthermore, the 1982 election results showed that the Democratic candidates had been disadvantaged.
Impact
At first glance, the Court's decision in Davis appeared to be a victory for opponents of political gerrymandering; for the first time, the SupremeCourt explicitly held that political gerrymandering can, in certain circumstances, intrude on the equal protection rights of a disadvantaged political group. However, the practical effect has been much different. Although not adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court, most lower federal courts consideringpolitical gerrymandering claims have applied Justice White's approach, whichhas been very difficult to meet. Further, although a majority of the Court did conclude that it can decide political gerrymandering cases, it has remainedreluctant to do so. Indeed, although the Court continues to decide claims ofracial gerrymandering, since Davis it has refused to consider a number of cases raising claims of political gerrymandering. Thus, in a practical sense, the decision has done little to curb the continued use of political gerrymandering.
Related Cases
- Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
- Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
- Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
- Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
- Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
- Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
- Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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