Petitioner
Brenda Patterson
Respondent
McLean Credit Union
Petitioner's Claim
That the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibits racial discrimination in the "making and enforcing" of contracts, covers problems arising from conditions of employment, such as harassment and failure to promote.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
Julius LeVonne Chambers, Penda D. Hair
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
Roger S. Kaplan, H. Lee Davis, Jr.
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Anthony M. Kennedy (writing for the Court), Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
15 June 1989
Decision
That the Civil Right Act of 1866 does not prohibit racial discrimination in conditions of employment beyond the formation of the employment contract.
Significance
By taking a narrow reading of the Civil Rights Act, the Court left many minority employees with no redress for harassment and other forms of discrimination in employment. The public and political response to the decision helped lead to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which reversed this decision.
Immediately following the Civil War, Congress passed a number of laws and constitutional amendments designed to guarantee the newly-freed slaves the samerights and privileges enjoyed by white Americans. Although discrimination bythe states was prevented by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, there was still widespread discrimination against African Americans by private citizens. For example, whites would not sell land to African Americans, and African Americans were beaten or killed for refusing to work for theirformer white slave-owners or for showing "insubordination" to whites. Among the laws passed by Congress was the Civil Rights Act of 1866. One provision ofthis act, commonly referred to as "section 1981," provided that all citizens, regardless of race, "shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." Lyman Trumball, who was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time, expressed the sentiment ofa large part of the population when he described the act as "the most important measure . . . since the adoption of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery." Although initially limiting the law by implying that section 1981 only prohibits discrimination by the government, the Supreme Court later explicitly held that section 1981 covers discrimination by private persons. Inthe case Runyon v. McCrary, decided in 1976, the Court concluded thatsection 1981 prohibits purely private discrimination.
Brenda Patterson's case against the McLean Credit Union began as a fairly typical civil rights suit, but went on the become a rallying point for civil rights advocates. Patterson, an African American bank teller employed by the McLean Credit Union, filed a suit against the credit union in 1985. Alleging that she was subjected to a pattern of harassment during her ten years of employment, mostly by her supervisor, Patterson sought to recover under section 1981. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the credit union, concluding that because on the job harassment does not relate to the "making" or "enforcing" of a contract, it does not fall under section 1981. Patterson appealedher case to the court of appeals, which agreed with the trial court. Patterson then sought to appeal her case to the U.S. Supreme Court through a procedure known as a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Court granted thepetition, and the parties argued the case before the Court on 29 February 1988.
Court Reconsiders Whether Section 1981 Prohibits Any Private Discrimination
After hearing oral arguments on the issue of whether section 1981 prohibits on the job harassment, however, Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy concluded that the Court should reconsider its earlier decision that section 1981 covers private discrimination. As Charles Fried, U.S. solicitor general at the time, recalled in his book Order and Law: "In the spring of 1988 the civil-rights community was shocked when, instead of decidingthe Patterson case, the Court ordered reargument on whether Runyonv. McCrary, the 1976 case that proclaimed the extension of Section 1981to discrimination in private contracting, should be overruled." The four other justices strongly criticized this decision, including Justice Stevens, whohad himself questioned whether Runyon was correctly decided. The decision to reconsider Runyon galvanized the civil-rights community. By thetime the Court heard reargument in the case, the NAACP had entered the caseon behalf of Patterson, and briefs supporting Patterson's case had been filedby the American Bar Association, 47 state attorney generals, 66 U.S. Senators, and Solicitor General Fried on behalf of the Reagan administration.
Civil-rights advocates received a partial victory when the Court issued its decision on 15 June 1989. All nine justices agreed that the Runyon decision should not be overturned. Even those justices who thought that Runyon had been incorrectly decided concluded that the decision must be allowedto stand under the doctrine known as "stare decisis." This doctrine provides that previous decisions should not be overturned frequently because to do so would cause uncertainty in the law and would not be fair to other litigants. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, "reaffirm[ed] that [section] 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts."
As tremendous as the victory was for civil rights advocates, however, their defeat was equally as devastating. Addressing the initial issue presented in the case, a majority of the justices held that section 1981 does not prohibitracial harassment suffered by employees. The justices reasoned that section 1981 prohibits only discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts,and that discrimination which occurs after a person has been hired does notrelate to either the "making" or "enforcement" of a contract. Recognizing, however, the limitation that its decision would place on civil rights claims, the Court reminded Congress that it could amend the law to cover the type of harassment suffered by Patterson:
Patterson Overturned
The effect of the Court's decision was profound. Although another civil rights law known as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does prohibit racialharassment by employers, that law applies only to companies with 15 or moreemployees, leaving over 11 million employees unprotected from racial harassment at the time of the Patterson decision. Following the decision, hundreds of claims of racial harassment were dismissed by courts. In 1991, Congress dealt with the problem by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991. One section of this act explicitly overturned the Patterson decision by adding anew provision to section 1981. This new provision clearly provides that section 1981 prohibits all aspects of discrimination in contractual relationships, including harassment. Although Brenda Patterson lost her case, the civil rights advocates fighting for her cause were able to assure, through passage ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1991, that the harassment she suffered is now prohibited by section 1981.
Related Cases
Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended a number of existing civil rights laws concerned with employment discrimination claims by including provisions for recovery of damages, jury trials, and obtaining relief from on-the-job violations. Previously, only traditional awards of back pay, job reinstatement, and attorney's fees were allowed. Amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the American With Disabilities Act of 1990, the 1991 act provides thepotential to also award compensatory (future monetary loss, emotional pain and suffering) and punitive (awards in excess of actual damages as punishment)damages. In addition, a person alleging intentional discrimination may request a jury trial to determine liability. Previously, a judge could decide key issues.
The act allows employees to sue for damages experienced through discrimination in hiring, promotion, dismissal, and other terms of employment. In order toprotect from expensive lawsuits, employers were encouraged to carefully review their existing policies and practices, and to train supervisors so that hiring, daily management, and termination decisions are nondiscriminatory. Also, the burden of proof shifted from the aggrieved worker to the employer. Theemployer must justify the challenged employment practice by proving its consistency with a business necessity.
Sources
Naidoff, Caren E.I. "Understanding the Civil Rights Act of 1991," Management Review, April 1992.
Brenda Patterson
Respondent
McLean Credit Union
Petitioner's Claim
That the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibits racial discrimination in the "making and enforcing" of contracts, covers problems arising from conditions of employment, such as harassment and failure to promote.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
Julius LeVonne Chambers, Penda D. Hair
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
Roger S. Kaplan, H. Lee Davis, Jr.
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Anthony M. Kennedy (writing for the Court), Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
15 June 1989
Decision
That the Civil Right Act of 1866 does not prohibit racial discrimination in conditions of employment beyond the formation of the employment contract.
Significance
By taking a narrow reading of the Civil Rights Act, the Court left many minority employees with no redress for harassment and other forms of discrimination in employment. The public and political response to the decision helped lead to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which reversed this decision.
Immediately following the Civil War, Congress passed a number of laws and constitutional amendments designed to guarantee the newly-freed slaves the samerights and privileges enjoyed by white Americans. Although discrimination bythe states was prevented by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, there was still widespread discrimination against African Americans by private citizens. For example, whites would not sell land to African Americans, and African Americans were beaten or killed for refusing to work for theirformer white slave-owners or for showing "insubordination" to whites. Among the laws passed by Congress was the Civil Rights Act of 1866. One provision ofthis act, commonly referred to as "section 1981," provided that all citizens, regardless of race, "shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." Lyman Trumball, who was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time, expressed the sentiment ofa large part of the population when he described the act as "the most important measure . . . since the adoption of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery." Although initially limiting the law by implying that section 1981 only prohibits discrimination by the government, the Supreme Court later explicitly held that section 1981 covers discrimination by private persons. Inthe case Runyon v. McCrary, decided in 1976, the Court concluded thatsection 1981 prohibits purely private discrimination.
Brenda Patterson's case against the McLean Credit Union began as a fairly typical civil rights suit, but went on the become a rallying point for civil rights advocates. Patterson, an African American bank teller employed by the McLean Credit Union, filed a suit against the credit union in 1985. Alleging that she was subjected to a pattern of harassment during her ten years of employment, mostly by her supervisor, Patterson sought to recover under section 1981. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the credit union, concluding that because on the job harassment does not relate to the "making" or "enforcing" of a contract, it does not fall under section 1981. Patterson appealedher case to the court of appeals, which agreed with the trial court. Patterson then sought to appeal her case to the U.S. Supreme Court through a procedure known as a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Court granted thepetition, and the parties argued the case before the Court on 29 February 1988.
Court Reconsiders Whether Section 1981 Prohibits Any Private Discrimination
After hearing oral arguments on the issue of whether section 1981 prohibits on the job harassment, however, Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy concluded that the Court should reconsider its earlier decision that section 1981 covers private discrimination. As Charles Fried, U.S. solicitor general at the time, recalled in his book Order and Law: "In the spring of 1988 the civil-rights community was shocked when, instead of decidingthe Patterson case, the Court ordered reargument on whether Runyonv. McCrary, the 1976 case that proclaimed the extension of Section 1981to discrimination in private contracting, should be overruled." The four other justices strongly criticized this decision, including Justice Stevens, whohad himself questioned whether Runyon was correctly decided. The decision to reconsider Runyon galvanized the civil-rights community. By thetime the Court heard reargument in the case, the NAACP had entered the caseon behalf of Patterson, and briefs supporting Patterson's case had been filedby the American Bar Association, 47 state attorney generals, 66 U.S. Senators, and Solicitor General Fried on behalf of the Reagan administration.
Civil-rights advocates received a partial victory when the Court issued its decision on 15 June 1989. All nine justices agreed that the Runyon decision should not be overturned. Even those justices who thought that Runyon had been incorrectly decided concluded that the decision must be allowedto stand under the doctrine known as "stare decisis." This doctrine provides that previous decisions should not be overturned frequently because to do so would cause uncertainty in the law and would not be fair to other litigants. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, "reaffirm[ed] that [section] 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts."
As tremendous as the victory was for civil rights advocates, however, their defeat was equally as devastating. Addressing the initial issue presented in the case, a majority of the justices held that section 1981 does not prohibitracial harassment suffered by employees. The justices reasoned that section 1981 prohibits only discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts,and that discrimination which occurs after a person has been hired does notrelate to either the "making" or "enforcement" of a contract. Recognizing, however, the limitation that its decision would place on civil rights claims, the Court reminded Congress that it could amend the law to cover the type of harassment suffered by Patterson:
The law now reflects society's consensus that discrimination based on the color of one's skin is a profound wrong of tragic dimension. Neither our words nor our decisions should be interpreted as signaling one inch of retreat from Congress' policy to forbid discrimination in the private, as well as in the public, sphere. Nevertheless, in the area of private discrimination . . . our role is limited to interpreting what Congress may do and has done. The statute before us, which is only a partof Congress' extensive civil rights legislation, does not cover the acts ofharassment alleged here.
Patterson Overturned
The effect of the Court's decision was profound. Although another civil rights law known as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does prohibit racialharassment by employers, that law applies only to companies with 15 or moreemployees, leaving over 11 million employees unprotected from racial harassment at the time of the Patterson decision. Following the decision, hundreds of claims of racial harassment were dismissed by courts. In 1991, Congress dealt with the problem by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991. One section of this act explicitly overturned the Patterson decision by adding anew provision to section 1981. This new provision clearly provides that section 1981 prohibits all aspects of discrimination in contractual relationships, including harassment. Although Brenda Patterson lost her case, the civil rights advocates fighting for her cause were able to assure, through passage ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1991, that the harassment she suffered is now prohibited by section 1981.
Related Cases
- Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
- Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
- Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
- Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended a number of existing civil rights laws concerned with employment discrimination claims by including provisions for recovery of damages, jury trials, and obtaining relief from on-the-job violations. Previously, only traditional awards of back pay, job reinstatement, and attorney's fees were allowed. Amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the American With Disabilities Act of 1990, the 1991 act provides thepotential to also award compensatory (future monetary loss, emotional pain and suffering) and punitive (awards in excess of actual damages as punishment)damages. In addition, a person alleging intentional discrimination may request a jury trial to determine liability. Previously, a judge could decide key issues.
The act allows employees to sue for damages experienced through discrimination in hiring, promotion, dismissal, and other terms of employment. In order toprotect from expensive lawsuits, employers were encouraged to carefully review their existing policies and practices, and to train supervisors so that hiring, daily management, and termination decisions are nondiscriminatory. Also, the burden of proof shifted from the aggrieved worker to the employer. Theemployer must justify the challenged employment practice by proving its consistency with a business necessity.
Sources
Naidoff, Caren E.I. "Understanding the Civil Rights Act of 1991," Management Review, April 1992.
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