Petitioner
Joseph Lee Jones
Respondent
Alfred H. Mayer Co., a housing development company
Petitioner's Claim
That the respondent's refusal to sell him a home strictly because he was black was in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Samuel H. Liberman
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Israel Treiman
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Abe Fortas, Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart (writing for the Court), Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
John Marshall Harlan II, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
17 June 1968
Decision
That the petitioner was entitled to redress under the civil rights law in question.
Significance
That the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which protected black citizens from several different forms of discrimination, applied not only to actions taken by thegovernment or sanctioned by the government, but to actions taken by privateindividuals as well.
The Alfred H. Mayer Company was developing a subdivision called Paddock Woodsin the suburbs of St. Louis, Missouri. The plaintiffs went to look at a house, and some time later contacted the developers again and inquired about theprice and the possibility of buying. At that time they were informed that thecompany had a general policy of not selling to blacks, which Joseph Lee Jones, one of the potential buyers, was. On 2 September 1965 the plaintiffs filedsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, seeking injunctive and declarative relief. A large part of their case relied upon Section 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which purported to protect for blacks many of the rights enjoyed by white men, including the right to buy and sell property. The district court dismissed the claim on the grounds that Supreme Court decisions had held that Section 1982 only applied to state actions and not to private actions, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that decision. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to hear the case, and it was argued on the first two days of April, 1968.
The debate before the Supreme Court centered around both the language and thecongressional debate preceding the passage of Section 1982. The issue was quite simple: If that section applied to private action, the decisions of the lower courts must be overturned and the plaintiff, now petitioner, would be allowed to sue. If it applied only to state action, the motion would be deniedand the case would be null and void. The Court decided that the section did apply to private action, setting a new precedent, striking a blow for civil rights in housing laws, and sparking a spirited and lengthy dissent from Justice Harlan.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart, was in five parts. The first part simply stated that the ruling did not amount to a comprehensive housing law, and was limited in scope to cases fairly identical to the Jonescase. It also stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1968, just recently passed, did not directly address the precise situation involved in the case and didnot render the case irrelevant.
The second part of the opinion concerned precedent, the most directly applicable being that of the Hurd v. Hodge case in 1948, which concerned a very similar situation. In that case, however, a federal district court had enforced the restrictive covenants in question. The High Court in that case hadoverruled the lower court decision, ruling that the district court's enforcement of the racial covenants amounted to state action concerning the covenant,thus bringing 1982 into effect. In that case, however, the black purchasersalready had deeds and the court had declared them void; in Jones the lower courts had declined to take action, so a new precedent would need to beset.
The Same Right as White Citizens
The third part dealt with the language of Section 1982, which stated that citizens of any race would enjoy "the same right" to purchase and lease property"as is enjoyed by white citizens." It was a very brief section which held that Section 1982 was unambiguous and clear-cut in its intention that all discrimination against blacks was forbidden, and no other interpretation was reasonable.
The fourth section was the lengthiest and triggered much of the disagreement.It studied the debates surrounding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and whether or not the Congress at that time believed or intended that the bill would affect private conduct as well as public. This section includedinformation concerning the state of black America in the 1860s, as well as elaborate studies and interpretations of comments and questions uttered by senators and congressmen on the floor during the debates. It concluded that the supporters of the bill understood that the bill would affect all discrimination against blacks, not just that which was sanctioned by state governments.
The fifth section of the decision concerned the question of Congress' power to pass a law such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Section 1982. The answer to this question the Court found in a previous interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibited slavery and gave Congress the power to enforce this prohibition. A subsequent Court ruling determined that the amendmentimbued "Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States." Civil rights issues such as free housing had already been established to fall under the heading of "incidents of slavery," since certain civil rights were so essentialto freedom that a citizen could be held in de facto slavery if these were denied.
Justice Douglas wrote a brief but stirring concurrence, pointing out that JimCrow laws and other widespread customs of the time held black citizens in acondition not resembling freedom, and urged that much more be done to equalize treatment of the races at several levels of society.
Justice Harlan weighed in with a lengthy and contentious dissent, speaking for himself and Justice White. He claimed that precedent was clearly contrary to the majority opinion, that there was ample reason to believe the statute only was meant to apply to state or state-sponsored action, that debate in Congress at the time supported this opinion, and that popular opinion after the Civil War made it impossible to believe that Congress would pass a bill whichwould prohibit private discrimination in such a manner. He then concluded that the Court should not have heard the case in the first place because the Civil Rights Act of 1968 made its application so narrow as to be nearly irrelevant.
Jones v. Mayer was the focus of some debate within the legal profession. While some hailed the decision as a brave and correct interpretation supporting civil rights, others questioned the soundness of the Court's logic andcalled the ruling a case of judicial activism. Nevertheless, the ruling foundhistorical significance, marking the first time the Supreme Court ruled thatblack homebuyers could not be denied by anyone the right to live where theywished because of their race.
Related Cases
Joseph Lee Jones
Respondent
Alfred H. Mayer Co., a housing development company
Petitioner's Claim
That the respondent's refusal to sell him a home strictly because he was black was in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Samuel H. Liberman
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Israel Treiman
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Abe Fortas, Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart (writing for the Court), Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
John Marshall Harlan II, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
17 June 1968
Decision
That the petitioner was entitled to redress under the civil rights law in question.
Significance
That the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which protected black citizens from several different forms of discrimination, applied not only to actions taken by thegovernment or sanctioned by the government, but to actions taken by privateindividuals as well.
The Alfred H. Mayer Company was developing a subdivision called Paddock Woodsin the suburbs of St. Louis, Missouri. The plaintiffs went to look at a house, and some time later contacted the developers again and inquired about theprice and the possibility of buying. At that time they were informed that thecompany had a general policy of not selling to blacks, which Joseph Lee Jones, one of the potential buyers, was. On 2 September 1965 the plaintiffs filedsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, seeking injunctive and declarative relief. A large part of their case relied upon Section 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which purported to protect for blacks many of the rights enjoyed by white men, including the right to buy and sell property. The district court dismissed the claim on the grounds that Supreme Court decisions had held that Section 1982 only applied to state actions and not to private actions, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that decision. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to hear the case, and it was argued on the first two days of April, 1968.
The debate before the Supreme Court centered around both the language and thecongressional debate preceding the passage of Section 1982. The issue was quite simple: If that section applied to private action, the decisions of the lower courts must be overturned and the plaintiff, now petitioner, would be allowed to sue. If it applied only to state action, the motion would be deniedand the case would be null and void. The Court decided that the section did apply to private action, setting a new precedent, striking a blow for civil rights in housing laws, and sparking a spirited and lengthy dissent from Justice Harlan.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart, was in five parts. The first part simply stated that the ruling did not amount to a comprehensive housing law, and was limited in scope to cases fairly identical to the Jonescase. It also stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1968, just recently passed, did not directly address the precise situation involved in the case and didnot render the case irrelevant.
The second part of the opinion concerned precedent, the most directly applicable being that of the Hurd v. Hodge case in 1948, which concerned a very similar situation. In that case, however, a federal district court had enforced the restrictive covenants in question. The High Court in that case hadoverruled the lower court decision, ruling that the district court's enforcement of the racial covenants amounted to state action concerning the covenant,thus bringing 1982 into effect. In that case, however, the black purchasersalready had deeds and the court had declared them void; in Jones the lower courts had declined to take action, so a new precedent would need to beset.
The Same Right as White Citizens
The third part dealt with the language of Section 1982, which stated that citizens of any race would enjoy "the same right" to purchase and lease property"as is enjoyed by white citizens." It was a very brief section which held that Section 1982 was unambiguous and clear-cut in its intention that all discrimination against blacks was forbidden, and no other interpretation was reasonable.
The fourth section was the lengthiest and triggered much of the disagreement.It studied the debates surrounding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and whether or not the Congress at that time believed or intended that the bill would affect private conduct as well as public. This section includedinformation concerning the state of black America in the 1860s, as well as elaborate studies and interpretations of comments and questions uttered by senators and congressmen on the floor during the debates. It concluded that the supporters of the bill understood that the bill would affect all discrimination against blacks, not just that which was sanctioned by state governments.
The fifth section of the decision concerned the question of Congress' power to pass a law such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Section 1982. The answer to this question the Court found in a previous interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibited slavery and gave Congress the power to enforce this prohibition. A subsequent Court ruling determined that the amendmentimbued "Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States." Civil rights issues such as free housing had already been established to fall under the heading of "incidents of slavery," since certain civil rights were so essentialto freedom that a citizen could be held in de facto slavery if these were denied.
Justice Douglas wrote a brief but stirring concurrence, pointing out that JimCrow laws and other widespread customs of the time held black citizens in acondition not resembling freedom, and urged that much more be done to equalize treatment of the races at several levels of society.
Justice Harlan weighed in with a lengthy and contentious dissent, speaking for himself and Justice White. He claimed that precedent was clearly contrary to the majority opinion, that there was ample reason to believe the statute only was meant to apply to state or state-sponsored action, that debate in Congress at the time supported this opinion, and that popular opinion after the Civil War made it impossible to believe that Congress would pass a bill whichwould prohibit private discrimination in such a manner. He then concluded that the Court should not have heard the case in the first place because the Civil Rights Act of 1968 made its application so narrow as to be nearly irrelevant.
Jones v. Mayer was the focus of some debate within the legal profession. While some hailed the decision as a brave and correct interpretation supporting civil rights, others questioned the soundness of the Court's logic andcalled the ruling a case of judicial activism. Nevertheless, the ruling foundhistorical significance, marking the first time the Supreme Court ruled thatblack homebuyers could not be denied by anyone the right to live where theywished because of their race.
Related Cases
- Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
- Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
- Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
- Buchanon v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
- Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
- Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
Further Readings
- American Bar Association Journal, November 1968, p. 1115.
- Arkansas Law Review, winter 1969, p. 773.
- Virginia Law Review, February 1969, p. 272.
- Washburn Law Journal, Volume 8, p. 268.
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