Petitioners
Charles Joseph Kastigar, Michael Gorean Stewart
Respondent
United States
Petitioners' Claim
That the petitioners were correct to refuse to testify because only transactional immunity, which was not granted, would satisfy the Fifth Amendment withrespect to self-incrimination.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Hugh R. Manes
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Erwin N. Griswold
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall (William J. Brennan, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
22 May 1972
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.
Significance
The case of Kastigar v. United States raised many important questionsconcerning the extent and application of Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, levels of immunity, refusal of a witness to testify on thegrounds of inadequate immunity, and the historical precedents for compulsorytestimony.
Case Background
The case of Kastigar v. United States arose from a situation in a California district court in 1971 where the petitioners were to appear before a grand jury. Believing that the petitioners would plead the Fifth Amendment, the district court issued an order to give them a grant of immunity that directed them to answer questions and turn over any evidence to the grand jury. Even though they were granted immunity, the petitioners appeared in court but refused to answer questions, "asserting their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." Both Kastigar and Stewart were found in contempt. The courtof appeals affirmed, "rejecting the petitioners' contention that it violatedtheir constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to compel them to testify without granting them transactional immunity from prosecution for anyoffense to which the compelled testimony might relate." Because of the important question as to what level of testimony was necessary to compel testimony,the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the case of Kastigar v. United States was argued on 11 January 1972.
How Comprehensive Must the Offered Immunity Be?
Hugh R. Manes, representing the petitioners Kastigar and Stewart, argued thathis clients declined to testify because they believed that only transactional immunity would afford them an appropriate level of protection against self-incrimination, as promised by the Fifth Amendment. He also implied that having to testify before a grand jury is unfair because although one would be faced with a lawyer, that person would not be allowed to have a lawyer in the room with him, and that having to decide between jail or incriminating oneself would be a "choice between a rock and a whirlpool."
The chief lawyer for the respondent, Erwin N. Griswold, pointed out that no compelled testimony can be used against a witness if a guarantee of immunity has been given. When using any testimony or evidence derived by a witness under immunity, the burden is placed upon the prosecution to show that such information came from a completely independent source. Griswold maintained that the extended immunity that was offered to Kastigar and Stewart met all of the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, which affirmed the rulingof the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found that a witness "who invokesthe Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination" can be compelled to testify if given immunity "as such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege and is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of privilege." While transactional immunity offers broader protection, it "is not constitutionally required."
Historically, many governments have been known to have the power to compel testimony from witnesses, as this information was important to the protection of their public. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is an exceptionthat protects an individual from having to incriminate himself. Justice Powell noted that the petitioners' first point of contention, that the Fifth Amendment's protection of a witness from self-incrimination may allow that witnessto decline to testify, would require that the cases of Brown v. Walker (1896) and Ullmann v. United States (1956) be overruled, to which the Court found no merit, and reaffirmed them. The petitioners' second contention was that the scope of the offered immunity was not coextensive with what the Fifth Amendment offers, which in their opinion would be transactional immunity, the most extensive available, pointing to Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892). The Court found that "transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution from the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the FifthAmendment privilege." The Court decided that transactional immunity was notrequired in this case, and that the immunity offered was "sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege." The Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.
Two justices offered dissenting views. Justice Douglas did not believe that the "use" immunity offered to the petitioners in this case was coextensive compared to making a person "be a witness against himself," saying that he "would adhere to Counselman v. Hitchcock and hold that this attempt to dilute the Self-Incrimination Clause is unconstitutional." Justice Marshall, alsodissenting, believed that the Fifth Amendment gives the right to withhold testimony, unless such a broad grant of immunity was offered so that there wasno "possibility that the testimony will in fact operate to incriminate him."He concluded that "it is clear to me that an immunity statute must be testedby a standard far more demanding than that appropriate for an exclusionary rule fashioned to deal with past constitutional violations. Measured by that standard, the statute approved today by the Court fails miserably."
Related Cases
Charles Joseph Kastigar, Michael Gorean Stewart
Respondent
United States
Petitioners' Claim
That the petitioners were correct to refuse to testify because only transactional immunity, which was not granted, would satisfy the Fifth Amendment withrespect to self-incrimination.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Hugh R. Manes
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Erwin N. Griswold
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall (William J. Brennan, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
22 May 1972
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.
Significance
The case of Kastigar v. United States raised many important questionsconcerning the extent and application of Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, levels of immunity, refusal of a witness to testify on thegrounds of inadequate immunity, and the historical precedents for compulsorytestimony.
Case Background
The case of Kastigar v. United States arose from a situation in a California district court in 1971 where the petitioners were to appear before a grand jury. Believing that the petitioners would plead the Fifth Amendment, the district court issued an order to give them a grant of immunity that directed them to answer questions and turn over any evidence to the grand jury. Even though they were granted immunity, the petitioners appeared in court but refused to answer questions, "asserting their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." Both Kastigar and Stewart were found in contempt. The courtof appeals affirmed, "rejecting the petitioners' contention that it violatedtheir constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to compel them to testify without granting them transactional immunity from prosecution for anyoffense to which the compelled testimony might relate." Because of the important question as to what level of testimony was necessary to compel testimony,the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the case of Kastigar v. United States was argued on 11 January 1972.
How Comprehensive Must the Offered Immunity Be?
Hugh R. Manes, representing the petitioners Kastigar and Stewart, argued thathis clients declined to testify because they believed that only transactional immunity would afford them an appropriate level of protection against self-incrimination, as promised by the Fifth Amendment. He also implied that having to testify before a grand jury is unfair because although one would be faced with a lawyer, that person would not be allowed to have a lawyer in the room with him, and that having to decide between jail or incriminating oneself would be a "choice between a rock and a whirlpool."
The chief lawyer for the respondent, Erwin N. Griswold, pointed out that no compelled testimony can be used against a witness if a guarantee of immunity has been given. When using any testimony or evidence derived by a witness under immunity, the burden is placed upon the prosecution to show that such information came from a completely independent source. Griswold maintained that the extended immunity that was offered to Kastigar and Stewart met all of the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, which affirmed the rulingof the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found that a witness "who invokesthe Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination" can be compelled to testify if given immunity "as such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege and is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of privilege." While transactional immunity offers broader protection, it "is not constitutionally required."
Historically, many governments have been known to have the power to compel testimony from witnesses, as this information was important to the protection of their public. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is an exceptionthat protects an individual from having to incriminate himself. Justice Powell noted that the petitioners' first point of contention, that the Fifth Amendment's protection of a witness from self-incrimination may allow that witnessto decline to testify, would require that the cases of Brown v. Walker (1896) and Ullmann v. United States (1956) be overruled, to which the Court found no merit, and reaffirmed them. The petitioners' second contention was that the scope of the offered immunity was not coextensive with what the Fifth Amendment offers, which in their opinion would be transactional immunity, the most extensive available, pointing to Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892). The Court found that "transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution from the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the FifthAmendment privilege." The Court decided that transactional immunity was notrequired in this case, and that the immunity offered was "sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege." The Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.
Two justices offered dissenting views. Justice Douglas did not believe that the "use" immunity offered to the petitioners in this case was coextensive compared to making a person "be a witness against himself," saying that he "would adhere to Counselman v. Hitchcock and hold that this attempt to dilute the Self-Incrimination Clause is unconstitutional." Justice Marshall, alsodissenting, believed that the Fifth Amendment gives the right to withhold testimony, unless such a broad grant of immunity was offered so that there wasno "possibility that the testimony will in fact operate to incriminate him."He concluded that "it is clear to me that an immunity statute must be testedby a standard far more demanding than that appropriate for an exclusionary rule fashioned to deal with past constitutional violations. Measured by that standard, the statute approved today by the Court fails miserably."
Related Cases
- Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
- Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
- Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
- Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
- Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1996.
- Hall, Kermit L., ed. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of theUnited States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
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