United States v. Sokolow

Petitioner
United States
Respondent
Andrew Sokolow
Petitioner's Claim
That agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency had probable cause to suspect that Sokolow was in possession of an illegal substance, and were legally justified under the Fourth Amendment in detaining Sokolow and searchinghis belongings.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Paul J. Larkin, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Robert P. Goldberg
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
3 April 1989
Decision
Upheld the position of the United States, overturning the ruling of the courtof appeals and holding that law enforcement officers can detain an individual if they have a "reasonable suspicion" that the individual is engaging or about to engage in criminal activity, even without probable cause to believe that any criminal action has or will occur.
Significance
The ruling demonstrated the willingness of the Court to define Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure narrowly in cases involving the transportation or sale of illegal drugs. In upholding the government's case, the Court ruled admissible the detention of suspects who merely fit a police profile for illegal activity. Prior to Sokolow, authoritieswere required to show evidence of "ongoing criminal activity" when using profiling to identify potential criminal suspects.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s public concern over the use of and traffickingin illegal drugs remained at a high level. Many people came to believe thatconstitutional guarantees of the rights of the individual served in large measure to protect criminals, and political sentiment ran toward allowing greater latitude in police work involving the illegal drug trade, and toward more stringent sentencing of convicted drug offenders. Amid this political climate,law enforcement techniques for identifying potential suspects, including profiling and the use of electronic eavesdropping devices and drug-detecting dogs, improved greatly and began to run afoul of Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure by state authorities. During this timethe U.S. Supreme Court used the precedent established in Terry v. Ohio (1968), which allowed authorities to briefly detain an individual if they "have a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable fact that criminal activity 'may be afoot,' even if they lack probable cause under the FourthAmendment," to broaden the scope of allowable activities for law enforcementofficers and investigators.
A Brief and Unusual Trip
In July of 1984 Andrew Sokolow, using the assumed name Andrew Kray, booked airline flights from Honolulu, Hawaii, to Miami, Florida, for himself and his girlfriend, Janet Norian. He paid cash for their tickets, bringing out a substantial roll of $20 bills and peeling off the requisite $2100 in front of a rather surprised airline ticket agent. The ticket agent found Sokolow's mannerof payment for his tickets unusual, and thought that Sokolow was "acting nervous." Accordingly, the agent alerted Officer John McCarthy of the Honolulu Police Department to the situation. McCarthy investigated by attempting to telephone "Kray" at the phone number Sokolow had left with the ticket agent, butwas only able to reach a message machine at the number. The ticket agent listened to the message on the tape and confirmed that it was Sokolow's voice onthe recording. McCarthy then found that "Kray" and Norian had booked a returnflight from Miami to Honolulu just three days hence, making their stay in Florida exceedingly short given the 20 hours of flying time required for the round-trip journey. He also determined that "Kray" and Norian would make stopovers in Denver, Colorado, and Los Angeles, California, on their return flight.
A Successful Police Operation
During his stopover in Los Angeles, "Kray" was shadowed by agents of the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). These agents confirmed that "Kray"seemed highly nervous, and was unwilling to check any of his baggage. When "Kray" and Norian arrived in Honolulu, they immediately left the airport and were attempting to hail a cab when they were detained by DEA Agent Richard Kempshall and three of his colleagues. Kempshall asked "Kray" for his airline ticket and identification, and "Kray" responded that he possessed neither, andrevealed his true name, explaining that he was travelling using his mother'smaiden name. Sokolow and Norian were then escorted to the DEA offices in theHonolulu airport, where their luggage was examined by Donker, a narcotics-sniffing police dog. Donker responded positively to Sokolow's shoulder bag, andthe agents arrested Sokolow forthwith. Sokolow was advised of his constitutional rights and declined to make any statements. The DEA agents then acquireda warrant to search Sokolow's bag, which contained no illegal substances, butdid hold business papers indicating his involvement in drug trafficking. Donker then sniffed the rest of Sokolow's luggage, and responded positively to another piece, but it was too late in the day for the DEA agents to acquire asecond search warrant. Sokolow was thus allowed to leave for the night, but his luggage was impounded pending acquisition of a new warrant in the morning.The warrant was duly obtained, and 1063 grams of cocaine were uncovered in the second bag identified by Donker.
An Invasion of Privacy
Sokolow was indicted for intent to distribute cocaine, and filed a motion tosuppress the evidence obtained against him by the DEA in the U.S. District Court for Hawaii. The district court denied Sokolow's motion, ruling that DEA agents had "reasonable suspicion" that he was involved in drug trafficking when they stopped him outside the Honolulu airport. Sokolow then appealed for the suppression of the DEA's evidence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and entered a conditional guilty plea in his criminal trial. The court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling, holding that DEA agentsdid not have sufficient evidence to justify detaining Sokolow and searching his possessions. In reaching this verdict the court applied a two-pronged testfor determining validity of evidence leading to reasonable suspicion on thepart of the authorities: evidence of ongoing criminal activity, such as the use of an alias and evasive behavior around law enforcement personnel; and personal characteristics "shared by drug couriers and the public at large." Thecourt of appeals found that evidence of the former type should carry far moreweight than the latter, and in this case, that DEA agents had relied more onSokolow's behavior, such as the paying of cash for his tickets and his nervousness, than on his use of an alias or any other evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court than granted certiorari to review the case, given its obvious implications for the investigation of trafficking in illegal drugs, and heard arguments on 3 April 1989.
Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause
The court of appeals had ruled that Sokolow was seized by the authorities when they stopped him from hailing a cab outside the Honolulu airport, so the Supreme Court examined whether or not a reasonable suspicion existed that he was engaging in a criminal activity at that time. The Court had already ruled,in case of Terry v. Ohio, that police officers could briefly detain aperson given a reasonable suspicion that the person was engaged or preparingto engage in a criminal activity. Furthermore, in Illinois v. Gates (1983), the Court had defined probable cause as: "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of crime will be found" if a search is conducted. While admitting that definitions of reasonable suspicion were highly subjective, the Court believed that the two-pronged evaluation of evidence used by the court of appeals to be even less useful. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquiststated that while reasonable suspicion must consist of something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion," it need not adhere to as stricta scrutiny as the probable cause required to obtain a warrant. In the Court'sopinion, the Fourth Amendment required only that authorities show "some minimal level of objective justification" for making a stop, and that this minimal level of justification existed in Sokolow's case. As such, the decision ofthe court of appeals was reversed and the evidence obtained against Sokolow deemed admissible in court.
Impact
United States v. Sokolow continued the Court's tendency to interpret the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure in such a way as not to unduly hamper law enforcement officials, particularly those engaged in curtailing the illegal drug trade. The ruling had the effect ofgiving legal credence to the use of profiles of "typical" behavior and appearance of various types of criminals to identify potential offenders. It was this point which most troubled the dissenting justices, who noted that none ofthe behaviors exhibited by Sokolow that were used to put the authorities on his trail were illegal. Especially troubling to the dissenters was the use made by authorities of Sokolow's nervousness in various airports, noting that many individuals who are innocent of any wrongdoing are anxious about flying aboard commercial airlines.
Related Cases

• Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
  
• Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
  
• INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
  
• United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).