Appellant
Hawaii Housing Authority
Appellee
Frank E. Midkiff
Appellant's Claim
That the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967, which uses condemnation procedures to redistribute landholdings, violates the Fifth Amendment requirement that government takings must be for public use.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Lawrence H. Tribe
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Clinton R. Ashford
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None (Thurgood Marshall did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
30 May 1984
Decision
Finding that there needs only to be a rational relationship between the taking and some purpose that will benefit the public, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the act.
Significance
In Midkiff, the Court essentially threw out the requirement that a government taking of property must be for public use; the state's power to condemn property, said the Court, is as broad as its extensive police power.
Hawaii was at one time a monarchy, in which a few major landholders owned most of the property in the islands. After Hawaii became a U.S. territory, and even after it gained statehood in 1959, landholdings remained concentrated ina few hands. In order to redistribute real estate, the Hawaiian legislature passed the Land Reform Act of 1967, which allowed the state to transfer land from lessors to lessees by using condemnation procedures. The Fifth Amendmentto the Constitution authorizes government "takings" of private property so long as they are instituted for public use and the original owners receive justcompensation.
The statute in question gave lessees of single family homes the right to invoke the state's power of eminent domain, or condemnation, in order to purchasethe property they leased, even if the owner did not want to sell. After an initial public hearing to determine whether or not such a taking would "effectuate the public purposes" of the act, the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) would then purchase the land in question at a price set by condemnation trial orby a negotiation between the lessor and the lessee. The HHA would then sell the property to the lessees at the agreed price. If the lessors refuse to negotiate, the HHA was empowered to order that they submit to compulsory arbitration to determine the price at which the land would be sold.
When Frank E. Midkiff, as a land trustee, was ordered to participate in sucharbitration, he declined, opting instead to file suit in federal district court. He asked that the land reform act be declared unconstitutional and the state prevented from proceeding to acquire his property. Instead, the districtcourt granted HHA summary judgment, essentially throwing Midkiff's case out of court. Midkiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,which agreed with his claim that the act violated the Fifth Amendment's Public Use Clause, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. HHAin turn appealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Supreme Court Rules that Public Purpose, Not Public Use, Determines Constitutionality of a Government Taking of Land
By a vote of 8-0, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the act. Writingfor the Court, Justice O'Connor stated that even when land is turned over toprivate hands under the act, without ever having been used by the public, therequirement of the Public Use Clause is met. What matters, she stated, is not the use of the property, but the purpose of the taking:
O'Connor added that the state's power of eminent domain is so broad that itsscope equals that of the state police power, which permits states and localities to restrict individual rights in order to promote the public welfare. Andcourts should defer to legislative determinations of what constitutes a public use of land unless there is no rational relationship between the taking and the government purpose that motivated it. Midkiff was a unanimous decision by the Court, which spoke with one voice through Justice O'Connor. Because of this rare unanimity and because of the clear language of the opinion,Midkiff seems to have done away with the concept of public use as a limitation on government takings.
Related Cases
The Public Use Clause
The Public Use Clause limits eminent domain powers on the part of governmentin order to prevent the kind of abuses that might take place in a monarchy orother authoritarian state, where a king might simply desire a piece of property and seize it from the owner.
In 1897 the Supreme Court extended the application of the Public Use Clause to the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment. A number of cases since thenhave broadened the meaning of "public" so as to include anything that would provide the greatest good for the greatest number. Thus in Berman v. Parker (1954), for instance, the acquisition of private property, which was then sold to private individuals to redevelop for a community rehabilitation project, was justified because it served a sufficiently "public" interest.
The loosening of standards with regard to the Public Use Clause heralded an overall erosion of respect for property rights. Midkiff seemed to soundthe death knell for property rights, but the Court's decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987)--in which the justices split 5-4,more or less along ideological lines--reaffirmed the idea that taking of property is justified only if to do so "substantially furthered governmental purposes."
Sources
Levy, Leonard W., ed. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. New York: Macmillan, 1986.
Hawaii Housing Authority
Appellee
Frank E. Midkiff
Appellant's Claim
That the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967, which uses condemnation procedures to redistribute landholdings, violates the Fifth Amendment requirement that government takings must be for public use.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Lawrence H. Tribe
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Clinton R. Ashford
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None (Thurgood Marshall did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
30 May 1984
Decision
Finding that there needs only to be a rational relationship between the taking and some purpose that will benefit the public, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the act.
Significance
In Midkiff, the Court essentially threw out the requirement that a government taking of property must be for public use; the state's power to condemn property, said the Court, is as broad as its extensive police power.
Hawaii was at one time a monarchy, in which a few major landholders owned most of the property in the islands. After Hawaii became a U.S. territory, and even after it gained statehood in 1959, landholdings remained concentrated ina few hands. In order to redistribute real estate, the Hawaiian legislature passed the Land Reform Act of 1967, which allowed the state to transfer land from lessors to lessees by using condemnation procedures. The Fifth Amendmentto the Constitution authorizes government "takings" of private property so long as they are instituted for public use and the original owners receive justcompensation.
The statute in question gave lessees of single family homes the right to invoke the state's power of eminent domain, or condemnation, in order to purchasethe property they leased, even if the owner did not want to sell. After an initial public hearing to determine whether or not such a taking would "effectuate the public purposes" of the act, the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) would then purchase the land in question at a price set by condemnation trial orby a negotiation between the lessor and the lessee. The HHA would then sell the property to the lessees at the agreed price. If the lessors refuse to negotiate, the HHA was empowered to order that they submit to compulsory arbitration to determine the price at which the land would be sold.
When Frank E. Midkiff, as a land trustee, was ordered to participate in sucharbitration, he declined, opting instead to file suit in federal district court. He asked that the land reform act be declared unconstitutional and the state prevented from proceeding to acquire his property. Instead, the districtcourt granted HHA summary judgment, essentially throwing Midkiff's case out of court. Midkiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,which agreed with his claim that the act violated the Fifth Amendment's Public Use Clause, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. HHAin turn appealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Supreme Court Rules that Public Purpose, Not Public Use, Determines Constitutionality of a Government Taking of Land
By a vote of 8-0, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the act. Writingfor the Court, Justice O'Connor stated that even when land is turned over toprivate hands under the act, without ever having been used by the public, therequirement of the Public Use Clause is met. What matters, she stated, is not the use of the property, but the purpose of the taking:
To be sure, the Court's cases have repeatedly stated that "one person's property maynot be taken for the benefit of another private person without justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid." . . . But where the exerciseof eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.
O'Connor added that the state's power of eminent domain is so broad that itsscope equals that of the state police power, which permits states and localities to restrict individual rights in order to promote the public welfare. Andcourts should defer to legislative determinations of what constitutes a public use of land unless there is no rational relationship between the taking and the government purpose that motivated it. Midkiff was a unanimous decision by the Court, which spoke with one voice through Justice O'Connor. Because of this rare unanimity and because of the clear language of the opinion,Midkiff seems to have done away with the concept of public use as a limitation on government takings.
Related Cases
- United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
- Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
- Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
- Rindge v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
- Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55 (1925).
- Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
- United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
- Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
- Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
- Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
- Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
- Western and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
The Public Use Clause
The Public Use Clause limits eminent domain powers on the part of governmentin order to prevent the kind of abuses that might take place in a monarchy orother authoritarian state, where a king might simply desire a piece of property and seize it from the owner.
In 1897 the Supreme Court extended the application of the Public Use Clause to the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment. A number of cases since thenhave broadened the meaning of "public" so as to include anything that would provide the greatest good for the greatest number. Thus in Berman v. Parker (1954), for instance, the acquisition of private property, which was then sold to private individuals to redevelop for a community rehabilitation project, was justified because it served a sufficiently "public" interest.
The loosening of standards with regard to the Public Use Clause heralded an overall erosion of respect for property rights. Midkiff seemed to soundthe death knell for property rights, but the Court's decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987)--in which the justices split 5-4,more or less along ideological lines--reaffirmed the idea that taking of property is justified only if to do so "substantially furthered governmental purposes."
Sources
Levy, Leonard W., ed. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. New York: Macmillan, 1986.
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