Petitioner
State of New York
Respondent
Roger Belton
Petitioner's Claim
During a lawful arrest of persons riding in an automobile, it is constitutional for the arresting police officer to conduct a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of the arrested person's vehicle and any containers contained therein, and it is constitutional for the arresting officer to search, without a warrant, through an arrestee's jacket.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
James R. Harvey
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Paul J. Cambria, Jr.
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
1 July 1981
Decision
During a lawful arrest, it is constitutional for an officer to conduct a warrantless search of the immediate vicinity, including closed containers and zipped pockets.
Significance
The holding in Belton seemed to increase the permissible scope of warrantless police searches that are conducted as part of an arrest. Prior to thedecision, officers generally were required to limit such searches to the person and the area immediately surrounding the person. In Belton, the Court confirmed that law enforcement personnel have the right to conduct warrantless searches of enclosed places that may be outside of the arrestee's immediate vicinity.
On 9 April 1978, New York State Trooper Douglas Nicot noticed a speeding automobile on the New York State Thruway. Nicot stopped the car and asked to seethe driver's license and registration. Neither the driver nor his companionshad a driver's license or registration for the vehicle, and no one was related to the vehicle's owner. Nicot smelled an odor of burnt marijuana emanatingfrom the car, and he spotted an envelope marked "Supergold." Suspecting thatthere was marijuana in the car, Nicot ordered the occupants out of the car, informed them that they were under arrest, read them their Miranda rights, andordered them to stand apart from each other around his squad car. Nicot opened the suspicious envelope and discovered marijuana. He then searched a jacket that had been left in the vehicle by one of the occupants, Roger Belton. Nicot unzipped a pocket of the jacket and found cocaine.
Belton subsequently was indicted for criminal possession of cocaine. At trial, Belton asked the trial court to exclude the cocaine evidence, arguing thatthe search of his jacket was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. According toBelton, Officer Nicot should have obtained a search warrant before searchinghis jacket. The trial court denied the request, and Belton pleaded guilty tocriminal possession of a controlled substance. However, in a special plea, Belton preserved a right to appeal the trial court's decision.
Belton lost his first appeal, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed thedecision, holding that because Belton was not in a position to gain access tohis jacket, Nicot had no right to search it at that time because he did nothave a warrant issued by a magistrate. One of the first principles of searchand seizure law is that law enforcement personnel must have a warrant beforethey conduct a search of a person or place. A warrant is issued by a magistrate only after a police officer has persuaded the magistrate that probable cause exists to believe that the person or place to be searched will turn up evidence of a crime. Sometimes an officer does not need a warrant to conduct a search, but the New York Court of Appeals did not consider this one of those times.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that theFourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search of a car's backseatand closed containers in the backseat when the search is incident to a lawful arrest of the car's occupants. The majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart, began its analysis by quoting a law review article written by ProfessorWayne R. LaFave. In "Case-By-Case Adjudication Versus Standardized Procedures: The Robinson Dilemma," LaFave posited that the Fourth Amendment "is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities," and thatthe amendment did not require a "highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions."
Having advanced the notion that rules on warrantless searches by police officers should be simplified, the Court then declared that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on warrantless searches also needed to be simplified. Various courtsaround the United States were in disagreement on what constituted an illegalwarrantless search, and this was having a detrimental impact on police and the general public. "When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation," Stewart observed, "that personcannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policemanknow the scope of his authority." The Court acknowledged that Chimel v. California (1969) had established that a warrantless search contemporaneousto an arrest may not "stray beyond the immediate control of the arrestee," but it also noted that courts around the country could not agree on a definition of "beyond the immediate control of the arrestee."
The Court decided that since Belton was seated in the passenger compartment of the vehicle, the passenger compartment of the vehicle was within Belton's immediate control. Thus, it was not unlawful for Nicot to search the passengercompartment. Furthermore, it was not unlawful for Nicot to search any enclosed containers that he found in the passenger compartment. Citing United States v. Robinson (1973) and Draper v. United States (1959), the High Court reasoned that since the passenger compartment was within Belton's reach, so too were any enclosed containers in the passenger area. Since the closed containers also were within Belton's reach, Nicot was justified in opening and searching them.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the warrantless search of Belton's jacket was illegal because Nicot had gained exclusive control over the jacket by seizing it. Such reasoning was "fallacious," wrote Justice Stewart in a footnote, because under such a theory "no search or seizure incident to a lawfulcustodial arrest would ever be valid; by seizing an article even on the arrestee's person, an officer may be said to have reduced that article to his `exclusive control.'"
Justices Stevens and Rehnquist concurred in the opinion, while Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented. In a dissenting opinion joined by Marshall, Brennan criticized the ruling for creating a rule "that fails to reflect Chimel's underlying policy justifications." Quoting Chimel, Brennan maintained that the real reason for allowing the warrantless search of thearea within the immediate control of an arrestee was to permit police officers to conduct a warrantless search of areas "within which [an arrestee] mightgain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Quoting more SupremeCourt precedents, Brennan argued that there is a "temporal and a spatial limitation of searches incident to arrest," and that the formality of a warrant may be excused only when the search is conducted at the same time as the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest. As Belton was already arrested and had been placed by Nicot some distance away from the car when Nicot conducted the warrantless search, the High Court's approval of the search "ignore[d] both precedent and principle."
The Court's decision, according to Brennan, also failed to create a more understandable set of rules for warrantless police searches that are conducted incident to an arrest. "Would a warrantless search incident to arrest be conducted five minutes after the suspect left his car?" Brennan wondered. "Thirty minutes? Three hours? Does it matter whether the suspect is standing in closeproximity to the car?" Brennan offered a dozen-odd questions that were raisedby the majority's decision and then insisted that Chimel "provides asound, workable rule for determining the constitutionality of a warrantless search incident to arrest." "Unlike the Court's rule," Brennan chided, "it would be faithful to the Fourth Amendment."
Finally, in his own footnote, Brennan ridiculed the majority's claim that allwarrantless police searches would be invalid under the analysis employed bythe New York Court of Appeals. The majority had set up a "strawman," or a false danger, with such rhetoric. Quoting Chimel and United States v.Chadwick (1977), Brennan complained that the High Court had chosen to ignore its own case precedent that gave the term "exclusive control" a clear definition: "sufficient control such that there is not significant risk that thearrestee or his confederates might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."
In a shorter dissenting opinion also joined by Justice Marshall, Justice White called the ruling "an extreme extension of Chimel and one to which Icannot subscribe." The Court had ignored its own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, said Justice White, and "[t]his calls for more caution than the Court today exhibits."
Impact
The decision in Belton increased the police authority to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles incident to an on-the-spot arrest. Prior to the ruling, it was unclear how extensively a police officer could search the vehicle of an arrested motorist or arrested passenger. The ruling did not specifically define everything associated with warrantless searches of vehicles incident to arrest, but it clearly gave police officers in the field more breathing room. The Supreme Court finally brought its basic analysis on the issueto a conclusion in California v. Acevedo (1991), where the Court heldthat police may search an automobile and all the containers within the automobile if the search is supported by probable cause to believe that contrabandor evidence of a crime is contained therein.
Related Cases
State of New York
Respondent
Roger Belton
Petitioner's Claim
During a lawful arrest of persons riding in an automobile, it is constitutional for the arresting police officer to conduct a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of the arrested person's vehicle and any containers contained therein, and it is constitutional for the arresting officer to search, without a warrant, through an arrestee's jacket.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
James R. Harvey
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Paul J. Cambria, Jr.
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
1 July 1981
Decision
During a lawful arrest, it is constitutional for an officer to conduct a warrantless search of the immediate vicinity, including closed containers and zipped pockets.
Significance
The holding in Belton seemed to increase the permissible scope of warrantless police searches that are conducted as part of an arrest. Prior to thedecision, officers generally were required to limit such searches to the person and the area immediately surrounding the person. In Belton, the Court confirmed that law enforcement personnel have the right to conduct warrantless searches of enclosed places that may be outside of the arrestee's immediate vicinity.
On 9 April 1978, New York State Trooper Douglas Nicot noticed a speeding automobile on the New York State Thruway. Nicot stopped the car and asked to seethe driver's license and registration. Neither the driver nor his companionshad a driver's license or registration for the vehicle, and no one was related to the vehicle's owner. Nicot smelled an odor of burnt marijuana emanatingfrom the car, and he spotted an envelope marked "Supergold." Suspecting thatthere was marijuana in the car, Nicot ordered the occupants out of the car, informed them that they were under arrest, read them their Miranda rights, andordered them to stand apart from each other around his squad car. Nicot opened the suspicious envelope and discovered marijuana. He then searched a jacket that had been left in the vehicle by one of the occupants, Roger Belton. Nicot unzipped a pocket of the jacket and found cocaine.
Belton subsequently was indicted for criminal possession of cocaine. At trial, Belton asked the trial court to exclude the cocaine evidence, arguing thatthe search of his jacket was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. According toBelton, Officer Nicot should have obtained a search warrant before searchinghis jacket. The trial court denied the request, and Belton pleaded guilty tocriminal possession of a controlled substance. However, in a special plea, Belton preserved a right to appeal the trial court's decision.
Belton lost his first appeal, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed thedecision, holding that because Belton was not in a position to gain access tohis jacket, Nicot had no right to search it at that time because he did nothave a warrant issued by a magistrate. One of the first principles of searchand seizure law is that law enforcement personnel must have a warrant beforethey conduct a search of a person or place. A warrant is issued by a magistrate only after a police officer has persuaded the magistrate that probable cause exists to believe that the person or place to be searched will turn up evidence of a crime. Sometimes an officer does not need a warrant to conduct a search, but the New York Court of Appeals did not consider this one of those times.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that theFourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search of a car's backseatand closed containers in the backseat when the search is incident to a lawful arrest of the car's occupants. The majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart, began its analysis by quoting a law review article written by ProfessorWayne R. LaFave. In "Case-By-Case Adjudication Versus Standardized Procedures: The Robinson Dilemma," LaFave posited that the Fourth Amendment "is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities," and thatthe amendment did not require a "highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions."
Having advanced the notion that rules on warrantless searches by police officers should be simplified, the Court then declared that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on warrantless searches also needed to be simplified. Various courtsaround the United States were in disagreement on what constituted an illegalwarrantless search, and this was having a detrimental impact on police and the general public. "When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation," Stewart observed, "that personcannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policemanknow the scope of his authority." The Court acknowledged that Chimel v. California (1969) had established that a warrantless search contemporaneousto an arrest may not "stray beyond the immediate control of the arrestee," but it also noted that courts around the country could not agree on a definition of "beyond the immediate control of the arrestee."
The Court decided that since Belton was seated in the passenger compartment of the vehicle, the passenger compartment of the vehicle was within Belton's immediate control. Thus, it was not unlawful for Nicot to search the passengercompartment. Furthermore, it was not unlawful for Nicot to search any enclosed containers that he found in the passenger compartment. Citing United States v. Robinson (1973) and Draper v. United States (1959), the High Court reasoned that since the passenger compartment was within Belton's reach, so too were any enclosed containers in the passenger area. Since the closed containers also were within Belton's reach, Nicot was justified in opening and searching them.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the warrantless search of Belton's jacket was illegal because Nicot had gained exclusive control over the jacket by seizing it. Such reasoning was "fallacious," wrote Justice Stewart in a footnote, because under such a theory "no search or seizure incident to a lawfulcustodial arrest would ever be valid; by seizing an article even on the arrestee's person, an officer may be said to have reduced that article to his `exclusive control.'"
Justices Stevens and Rehnquist concurred in the opinion, while Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented. In a dissenting opinion joined by Marshall, Brennan criticized the ruling for creating a rule "that fails to reflect Chimel's underlying policy justifications." Quoting Chimel, Brennan maintained that the real reason for allowing the warrantless search of thearea within the immediate control of an arrestee was to permit police officers to conduct a warrantless search of areas "within which [an arrestee] mightgain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Quoting more SupremeCourt precedents, Brennan argued that there is a "temporal and a spatial limitation of searches incident to arrest," and that the formality of a warrant may be excused only when the search is conducted at the same time as the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest. As Belton was already arrested and had been placed by Nicot some distance away from the car when Nicot conducted the warrantless search, the High Court's approval of the search "ignore[d] both precedent and principle."
The Court's decision, according to Brennan, also failed to create a more understandable set of rules for warrantless police searches that are conducted incident to an arrest. "Would a warrantless search incident to arrest be conducted five minutes after the suspect left his car?" Brennan wondered. "Thirty minutes? Three hours? Does it matter whether the suspect is standing in closeproximity to the car?" Brennan offered a dozen-odd questions that were raisedby the majority's decision and then insisted that Chimel "provides asound, workable rule for determining the constitutionality of a warrantless search incident to arrest." "Unlike the Court's rule," Brennan chided, "it would be faithful to the Fourth Amendment."
Finally, in his own footnote, Brennan ridiculed the majority's claim that allwarrantless police searches would be invalid under the analysis employed bythe New York Court of Appeals. The majority had set up a "strawman," or a false danger, with such rhetoric. Quoting Chimel and United States v.Chadwick (1977), Brennan complained that the High Court had chosen to ignore its own case precedent that gave the term "exclusive control" a clear definition: "sufficient control such that there is not significant risk that thearrestee or his confederates might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."
In a shorter dissenting opinion also joined by Justice Marshall, Justice White called the ruling "an extreme extension of Chimel and one to which Icannot subscribe." The Court had ignored its own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, said Justice White, and "[t]his calls for more caution than the Court today exhibits."
Impact
The decision in Belton increased the police authority to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles incident to an on-the-spot arrest. Prior to the ruling, it was unclear how extensively a police officer could search the vehicle of an arrested motorist or arrested passenger. The ruling did not specifically define everything associated with warrantless searches of vehicles incident to arrest, but it clearly gave police officers in the field more breathing room. The Supreme Court finally brought its basic analysis on the issueto a conclusion in California v. Acevedo (1991), where the Court heldthat police may search an automobile and all the containers within the automobile if the search is supported by probable cause to believe that contrabandor evidence of a crime is contained therein.
Related Cases
- Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
- Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
- United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
- United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
- California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
Further Readings
- Schwartz, Herman, ed. The Burger Years: Rights and Wrongs In the Supreme Court, 1969-1986. Nation Enterprises, 1987.
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