Petitioner
Crispus Nix, Warden
Respondent
Emanuel Charles Whiteside
Petitioner's Claim
That even though Emanuel Whiteside's attorney dissuaded him from giving falsetestimony and warned him that he would withdraw if Whiteside insisted on perjuring, Whiteside nonetheless received a fair trial and effective legal representation, suffering no violation of his the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Brent R. Appel
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Patrick Reilly Grady
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger (writing for theCourt), Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White.
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 February 1986
Decision
The Court ruled that Whiteside's lawyer did not violate Whiteside's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by refusing to allow him to present perjured testimony.
Significance
In conjunction with Strickland v. Washington and Harris v. New York, this case determined and emphasized that the right to effective counselguaranteed by the Sixth Amendment does not force an attorney to assist a client in perjury. In fact, the codes of ethics adopted by states and legal associations prohibit such conduct and require attorneys to make a full disclosure when a client threatens or actually has committed perjury. The decision sent a clear message to attorneys that they must take appropriate action if clients intend to or do commit perjury and to the accused that the right to effective counsel does not include the right to perjure.
Overview
The Sixth Amendment protects the rights of the accused by allowing everyone the right to legal representation at trial. However, this amendment does not specify exactly how an attorney must provide effective counsel. Consequently,when Emanuel Whiteside faced murder charges, he tried to present a fabricatedaccount of the events or perjure as part of his defense, he expected his lawyer to assist him in presenting the kind of defense he wanted. However, the attorney refused and warned Whiteside not to present false testimony at trial.Whiteside agreed and was convicted of second-degree murder. Afterwards, Whiteside began to protest, arguing that his right to effective counsel had beenviolated. Whiteside petitioned courts in Iowa to hear his case, which severalcourts denied, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth District sided with Whiteside. However, the U.S. Supreme Court reached a unanimous decision to reverse the ruling by the court of appeals.
Whiteside's Crime and Defense
The crime occurred on 8 February 1977 in Iowa, when Whiteside and two friendsstopped by Calvin Love's residence to purchase marijuana. When they arrived,Love was sleeping and an argument between Whiteside and Love broke out overthe marijuana. Throughout the course of the argument, Love asked his girlfriend to get his "piece" or gun and began reaching under his pillow at another point. Whiteside saw Love reaching under the pillow and fatally stabbed him.
Confronted with murder charges, Whiteside objected to his first appointed lawyer, because he had been a prosecutor. Gary L. Robinson was assigned to defend Whiteside and questioned him about the incident. Whiteside said that he stabbed Love because he saw him, "pulling a pistol from underneath the pillow onthe bed." However, when Robinson questioned this statement, Whiteside admitted that he had not actually seen a gun, but that he was sure Love was retrieving a pistol when he was slain. Despite Whiteside's insistence that Love hada gun, no police evidence supported his claim. The police searched Love's apartment after the murder, but found no gun. Furthermore, Robinson learned frominterviewing Whiteside's companions who accompanied him that they had not seen a gun either.
Therefore, Robinson advised Whiteside not to testify that he had actually seen a gun, because he could make a self-defense argument based solely on the reasonable belief that Love was getting a gun. Although Whiteside repeatedly said he had not seen a gun, about a week before his trial he told Robinson thathe had seen Love holding a "metallic" object. Robinson questioned the statement and Whiteside replied that "in Howard Cook's case there was a gun" and said "If I don't say I saw a gun, I'm dead." Robinson once again assured him that seeing a gun was not necessary for his defense and warned him that givinga false statement constituted perjury. Robinson also informed Whiteside thathe would withdraw from the case if he insisted on giving false testimony.
At the trial, Whiteside testified that he knew Love had a gun, which he was trying to get at the time of the stabbing, and that he stabbed Love quickly inself-defense. During cross examination, Whiteside conceded that he had not seen a gun, however. But Robinson presented evidence to demonstrate Whitesidehad strong reason to believe Love had a gun and was getting it at the time ofthe stabbing. Robinson argued that Love carried a sawed-off shotgun at othertimes, that the police search of Love's place may not have been thorough enough, and that Love's family removed all of his belongings immediately after the police search.
Nonetheless, a jury convicted Whiteside of second-degree murder, so Whitesidefiled a motion for a new trial, arguing that Robinson prevented him from having a fair trial because he warned him not to say he saw a gun or something "metallic." The trial court heard statements by both Whiteside and Robinson and decided to deny Whiteside a new trial, holding that the facts of the case corresponded to Robinson's account. The Supreme Court of Iowa upheld Whiteside's conviction, noting that the right to effective counsel did not mean the right to an attorney who would assist in presenting perjured testimony.
Whiteside did not give up, however, and filed for a writ of habeas corpus--a legal document granting relief from improper imprisonment--from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The district court denied Whiteside the writ, agreeing with the trial court that the accused have noright to present a perjured defense. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, granting Whitesidea writ of habeas corpus. Though court of appeals agreed with the othercourts that Robinson had strong reason to believe Whiteside would commit perjury and that Whiteside has no constitutional right to give false testimony,it argued that since Robinson threatened to inform the court of Whiteside's intention to commit perjury and withdraw his services, he failed to preserve the confidence of his client. The court of appeals felt that by having intentto testify falsely, Whiteside did not forfeit his right to effective counsel.
A Unanimous Decision
However, Warden Crispus Nix and the Iowa correctional system petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case, maintaining that Whiteside received a fair trial and effective legal counsel and was convicted through a fair legal process. The Court set out on 5 November 1985 to determine if Robinson's conduct violated Whiteside's Sixth Amendment right to fair and effective legal representation. The Court examined the decision in Strickland v. Washington (1984) where it laid down a number guidelines for judging the appropriateness of defense attorney conduct for cases of alleged Sixth Amendment rights violations. Writing for the majority, Justice Burger noted that the Court called for defense attorneys' "duty of loyalty" and "overarching duty to advocatethe defendant's cause" but not for attorneys to aid in testifying falsely orany activity that obstructs the truth.
Furthermore, the American Bar Association's Code of Ethics also prohibits such conduct, demanding that the attorney "must . . . observe and advise his client to observe the statute law." Although attorneys maintain a policy of confidentiality with their clients under the American Bar Association, they cannot uphold this policy when clients inform them of their intentions to commit acrime, including presenting perjured testimony. The Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers also allows an exception to attorney/client confidentiality for cases where clients have committed or announce their intentions to commit crimes. Moreover, the Iowa code not only gives attorneys the option of revealing that their clients plan to commit perjury, it requires thatthey reveal this information. Justice Burger also pointed out that Robinson could have faced felony charges and disbarment for aiding in Whiteside's falsetestimony, if he passively allowed Whiteside to offer it.
Given these standards of the American Bar Association and the state of Iowa,the Court concluded that Robinson's conduct clearly remained consistent withcommonly held ethical practices of lawyers and that his conduct in no way violated Whiteside's right to effective counsel. The Court argued that Robinson's conduct did not deprive Whiteside of due process of law or effective counsel as the court of appeals maintained. Instead, the Court held that at most Robinson deprived Whiteside of an opportunity to present perjured testimony, but nothing to undermine Whiteside's argument that he believed Love owned a gunand was reaching for one when the stabbing occurred. The Court reiterated that no one has a constitutional right to testify falsely and that no Supreme Court case set a precedent for such a right or expectation.
Although all the justices agreed that Whiteside failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation or an ethical violation by Robinson under Strickland v. Washington, some disagreed with the Court's stance on ethical conduct by lawyers. Justice Brennan argued that "the Court cannot tell the states or the lawyers in the states how to behave in their courts, unless and until federal rights are violated." Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens also balked at the Court's adoption of a code of ethics forlawyers, maintaining that the states have that responsibility, not the federal government.
Related Cases
Federal District Court
The country's court system includes a state and local court system as well asa federal court system. The federal district court is the first of three levels in the federal system, which also includes U.S. court of appeals and theU.S. Supreme Court. Federal cases begin at the district level, where they areheard and decided. If a party disagrees with the ruling by a federal district court, it can petition the federal court of appeals and if still dissatisfied the party can petition the Supreme Court.
All district court judges receive life appointments by the president with approval from the Senate, except for territorial courts. Congress determines thenumber of judges per district based on caseloads. In the late 1990s, there were 646 district court judges serving the country's 94 district courts.
Sources
The Federal Judiciary Home Page. http://www.uscourts.gov.
Crispus Nix, Warden
Respondent
Emanuel Charles Whiteside
Petitioner's Claim
That even though Emanuel Whiteside's attorney dissuaded him from giving falsetestimony and warned him that he would withdraw if Whiteside insisted on perjuring, Whiteside nonetheless received a fair trial and effective legal representation, suffering no violation of his the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Brent R. Appel
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Patrick Reilly Grady
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger (writing for theCourt), Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White.
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 February 1986
Decision
The Court ruled that Whiteside's lawyer did not violate Whiteside's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by refusing to allow him to present perjured testimony.
Significance
In conjunction with Strickland v. Washington and Harris v. New York, this case determined and emphasized that the right to effective counselguaranteed by the Sixth Amendment does not force an attorney to assist a client in perjury. In fact, the codes of ethics adopted by states and legal associations prohibit such conduct and require attorneys to make a full disclosure when a client threatens or actually has committed perjury. The decision sent a clear message to attorneys that they must take appropriate action if clients intend to or do commit perjury and to the accused that the right to effective counsel does not include the right to perjure.
Overview
The Sixth Amendment protects the rights of the accused by allowing everyone the right to legal representation at trial. However, this amendment does not specify exactly how an attorney must provide effective counsel. Consequently,when Emanuel Whiteside faced murder charges, he tried to present a fabricatedaccount of the events or perjure as part of his defense, he expected his lawyer to assist him in presenting the kind of defense he wanted. However, the attorney refused and warned Whiteside not to present false testimony at trial.Whiteside agreed and was convicted of second-degree murder. Afterwards, Whiteside began to protest, arguing that his right to effective counsel had beenviolated. Whiteside petitioned courts in Iowa to hear his case, which severalcourts denied, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth District sided with Whiteside. However, the U.S. Supreme Court reached a unanimous decision to reverse the ruling by the court of appeals.
Whiteside's Crime and Defense
The crime occurred on 8 February 1977 in Iowa, when Whiteside and two friendsstopped by Calvin Love's residence to purchase marijuana. When they arrived,Love was sleeping and an argument between Whiteside and Love broke out overthe marijuana. Throughout the course of the argument, Love asked his girlfriend to get his "piece" or gun and began reaching under his pillow at another point. Whiteside saw Love reaching under the pillow and fatally stabbed him.
Confronted with murder charges, Whiteside objected to his first appointed lawyer, because he had been a prosecutor. Gary L. Robinson was assigned to defend Whiteside and questioned him about the incident. Whiteside said that he stabbed Love because he saw him, "pulling a pistol from underneath the pillow onthe bed." However, when Robinson questioned this statement, Whiteside admitted that he had not actually seen a gun, but that he was sure Love was retrieving a pistol when he was slain. Despite Whiteside's insistence that Love hada gun, no police evidence supported his claim. The police searched Love's apartment after the murder, but found no gun. Furthermore, Robinson learned frominterviewing Whiteside's companions who accompanied him that they had not seen a gun either.
Therefore, Robinson advised Whiteside not to testify that he had actually seen a gun, because he could make a self-defense argument based solely on the reasonable belief that Love was getting a gun. Although Whiteside repeatedly said he had not seen a gun, about a week before his trial he told Robinson thathe had seen Love holding a "metallic" object. Robinson questioned the statement and Whiteside replied that "in Howard Cook's case there was a gun" and said "If I don't say I saw a gun, I'm dead." Robinson once again assured him that seeing a gun was not necessary for his defense and warned him that givinga false statement constituted perjury. Robinson also informed Whiteside thathe would withdraw from the case if he insisted on giving false testimony.
At the trial, Whiteside testified that he knew Love had a gun, which he was trying to get at the time of the stabbing, and that he stabbed Love quickly inself-defense. During cross examination, Whiteside conceded that he had not seen a gun, however. But Robinson presented evidence to demonstrate Whitesidehad strong reason to believe Love had a gun and was getting it at the time ofthe stabbing. Robinson argued that Love carried a sawed-off shotgun at othertimes, that the police search of Love's place may not have been thorough enough, and that Love's family removed all of his belongings immediately after the police search.
Nonetheless, a jury convicted Whiteside of second-degree murder, so Whitesidefiled a motion for a new trial, arguing that Robinson prevented him from having a fair trial because he warned him not to say he saw a gun or something "metallic." The trial court heard statements by both Whiteside and Robinson and decided to deny Whiteside a new trial, holding that the facts of the case corresponded to Robinson's account. The Supreme Court of Iowa upheld Whiteside's conviction, noting that the right to effective counsel did not mean the right to an attorney who would assist in presenting perjured testimony.
Whiteside did not give up, however, and filed for a writ of habeas corpus--a legal document granting relief from improper imprisonment--from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The district court denied Whiteside the writ, agreeing with the trial court that the accused have noright to present a perjured defense. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, granting Whitesidea writ of habeas corpus. Though court of appeals agreed with the othercourts that Robinson had strong reason to believe Whiteside would commit perjury and that Whiteside has no constitutional right to give false testimony,it argued that since Robinson threatened to inform the court of Whiteside's intention to commit perjury and withdraw his services, he failed to preserve the confidence of his client. The court of appeals felt that by having intentto testify falsely, Whiteside did not forfeit his right to effective counsel.
A Unanimous Decision
However, Warden Crispus Nix and the Iowa correctional system petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case, maintaining that Whiteside received a fair trial and effective legal counsel and was convicted through a fair legal process. The Court set out on 5 November 1985 to determine if Robinson's conduct violated Whiteside's Sixth Amendment right to fair and effective legal representation. The Court examined the decision in Strickland v. Washington (1984) where it laid down a number guidelines for judging the appropriateness of defense attorney conduct for cases of alleged Sixth Amendment rights violations. Writing for the majority, Justice Burger noted that the Court called for defense attorneys' "duty of loyalty" and "overarching duty to advocatethe defendant's cause" but not for attorneys to aid in testifying falsely orany activity that obstructs the truth.
Furthermore, the American Bar Association's Code of Ethics also prohibits such conduct, demanding that the attorney "must . . . observe and advise his client to observe the statute law." Although attorneys maintain a policy of confidentiality with their clients under the American Bar Association, they cannot uphold this policy when clients inform them of their intentions to commit acrime, including presenting perjured testimony. The Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers also allows an exception to attorney/client confidentiality for cases where clients have committed or announce their intentions to commit crimes. Moreover, the Iowa code not only gives attorneys the option of revealing that their clients plan to commit perjury, it requires thatthey reveal this information. Justice Burger also pointed out that Robinson could have faced felony charges and disbarment for aiding in Whiteside's falsetestimony, if he passively allowed Whiteside to offer it.
Given these standards of the American Bar Association and the state of Iowa,the Court concluded that Robinson's conduct clearly remained consistent withcommonly held ethical practices of lawyers and that his conduct in no way violated Whiteside's right to effective counsel. The Court argued that Robinson's conduct did not deprive Whiteside of due process of law or effective counsel as the court of appeals maintained. Instead, the Court held that at most Robinson deprived Whiteside of an opportunity to present perjured testimony, but nothing to undermine Whiteside's argument that he believed Love owned a gunand was reaching for one when the stabbing occurred. The Court reiterated that no one has a constitutional right to testify falsely and that no Supreme Court case set a precedent for such a right or expectation.
Although all the justices agreed that Whiteside failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation or an ethical violation by Robinson under Strickland v. Washington, some disagreed with the Court's stance on ethical conduct by lawyers. Justice Brennan argued that "the Court cannot tell the states or the lawyers in the states how to behave in their courts, unless and until federal rights are violated." Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens also balked at the Court's adoption of a code of ethics forlawyers, maintaining that the states have that responsibility, not the federal government.
Whiteside's attorney treated Whiteside's proposed perjury in accord with professional standards, and since Whiteside's truthful testimony could not have prejudiced the result of his trial, the Court of Appeals was in error to direct the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and must be reversed.
Related Cases
- Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
- Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F. 2d 115 (1977).
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Federal District Court
The country's court system includes a state and local court system as well asa federal court system. The federal district court is the first of three levels in the federal system, which also includes U.S. court of appeals and theU.S. Supreme Court. Federal cases begin at the district level, where they areheard and decided. If a party disagrees with the ruling by a federal district court, it can petition the federal court of appeals and if still dissatisfied the party can petition the Supreme Court.
All district court judges receive life appointments by the president with approval from the Senate, except for territorial courts. Congress determines thenumber of judges per district based on caseloads. In the late 1990s, there were 646 district court judges serving the country's 94 district courts.
Sources
The Federal Judiciary Home Page. http://www.uscourts.gov.
Further Readings
- Hirsch, Alan. "The Gladiators of the Courtroom." Washington Times, January 31, 1997, p. A19.
- Pope, Daniel J., and Stephanie J. Kim. "Client Perjury: Should a Lawyer Defend the System or the Client?" Defense Counsel Journal, July 1997, p. 447.
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