New York v. Quarles
Petitioner
State of New York
Respondent
Benjamin Quarles
Petitioner's Claim
A police officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings before questioning therespondent about incriminating evidence did not violate Fifth Amendment rights, as the delay was justified in the interest of public safety.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Steven J. Rappaport
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Steven A. Hyman
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
12 June 1984
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court held that an officer's immediate concern with protecting the safety and welfare of the public represented a justified exception tothe Miranda rule.
Significance
The most important issue addressed by this case was whether an incriminatingstatement regarding information about where the respondent hid his gun, couldbe accepted as testimonial evidence at trial if a police officer failed to provide a Fifth Amendment Miranda rights warning before questioning his suspect. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed judgments of lower courts and explained that an exception to the Miranda rule was justified because the officer believed he needed to ensure public safety. In ruling as acceptable a departure fromthe required, very precise instructions of the Miranda rule, which ensured asuspect would not be subject to self-incrimination if Miranda warnings werenot given, the U.S. Supreme Court gave guidance that in circumstances where public safety was at risk, it may be necessary and correct to forego Miranda warnings.
On 11 September 1980, shortly after midnight, two police officers, Frank Craft and Sal Scarring, were on patrol when a woman came to their car and told them she had been raped. She provided a description of an black male, six feettall, armed, and wearing a black jacket. She also told officers he fled intoa supermarket. Officer Craft rushed in to apprehend the suspect while his partner called for assistance. He recognized a man who matched the description and gave chase. Craft ordered his suspect to stop and put his hands over his head. Other officers convened and surrounded the suspect in back of the store,but Officer Kraft was the first to reach the man. Handcuffing the suspect, the officer noticed the man's empty shoulder holster and asked him where the gun was. The suspect nodded his head toward some empty boxes answering, "The gun is over there." Officer Craft secured the weapon then returned to inform the suspect, Benjamin Quarles, of his Miranda rights. Quarles decided to waivehis Miranda rights and answer the officer's questions without an attorney'spresence. He stated that he bought the revolver in Miami, Florida, and it washis.
Miranda Warnings Inadequate
Benjamin Quarles was charged with criminal possession of a gun. (Under New York Penal Law, "any person who possesses a loaded firearm outside of his homeor place of business is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.") The trial court elected to exclude the respondent's evidential testimony, "The gun is over there," and the physical evidence, a .38 caliber revolver, because Miranda warnings were not given to Quarles before the officerasked him the location of the gun. The New York Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision to suppress Quarles's statements. Because Officer Kraft failedto advise Quarles of his rights before asking any questions, the court believed the Miranda warning was inappropriately omitted. The court of appeals didnot accept the state of New York's contention that the police officer was ina situation where the safety of himself, fellow officers, and the public hadto be protected. The appellate court held that any interrogation before giving Miranda warnings, such as questioning about the location of the gun, was inviolation of Fifth Amendment rights, which states that "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Consequently,because due process was violated, lower court rulings were affirmed.
A Compelling Exception
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower courts. The Court found that the use of the Miranda warnings could be avoided when public safetywas at issue. They explained the "immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of the gun" to ensure the safety of the public was important enoughto justify an exception to Miranda v. Arizona (1966). Justices for the majority opinion reasoned that a suspect's associates "might make use" of the weapon or shoppers or employees might later find it. They pointed out thatif officers were required to give Miranda warnings in such circumstances, itmight deter the suspect from responding. Consequently, while the constitutional Miranda rights of a suspect would be secured, the risk of potential danger could be substantial. Justice Rehnquist wrote, "Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply to make his case against Quarles but to insurethat further danger to the public did not result from the concealment of thegun in a public area."
The Court conceded that its decision would have the impact of reducing the "explicitness" of the Miranda rule. On the other hand, it believed that in order to ensure safety to life and limb, police officers had to retain the ability to instinctively judge the conditions in any given situation. The majorityopinion went on to suggest that although Miranda safeguards against self-incrimination were abandoned, in certain situations when swift action is needed officers may have to decide whether it was appropriate to "ask necessary questions without the Miranda warnings." Such a decision could "render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible." Or an officer may decide to "give the warnings in order to preserve admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence andneutralize the volatile situation confronting them." Thus, in light of its findings, the Court reversed and remanded the case for readjudication by a lower court.
Justice O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in part. She opined that theCourt's arguments did not justify making a departure from the clear prospectof the Miranda rule. The Self-Incrimination Clause should have been considered a safeguard against interrogations that could implicate involuntary confessions or disclose evidence connected with a crime. Justice O'Connor thus maintained that unequivocal application of Miranda warnings should be exercised.She reasoned that "society's need for interrogation" (e.g., Officer Craft's question about the gun) should not usurp the guards assumed in Miranda.Thus, to accurately enforce Miranda warnings, it is only necessarily to prevent an "admission of testimonial self-incriminations." However, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority opinion that the lower courts incorrectly suppressed the gun as evidence. Incrimination with non-testimonial evidence could not be considered a violation of privilege against self-incrimination. JusticeO'Connor regarded the gun as physical evidence, and finding that the gun could not be categorized as testimonial evidence, she held that suppression of the gun was unjustified.
The dissenting justices pointed out that the respondent, Quarles "had been reduced to a condition of physical powerlessness" when he was asked about the gun. Justices found it difficult, therefore, to believe Quarles, who did not have any accomplices, was a significant danger to anybody. The dissenting justices rejected the petitioner's assertion that interrogation without Miranda warnings was appropriate because of a risk to public safety. The supermarket was almost empty. Quarles was apprehended around midnight, and police could have easily conducted a search after arresting their suspect. The dissenting justices reasoned that because the weapon was out of sight it "did not pose a risk either to the arresting officers or to the public."
In writing the dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall voiced the minority viewthat majority justices made assumptions which seemed to represent an "abuse of the facts." They could not conceive any reason to justify any departure from Miranda. They did not agree that the police officers were faced withthe dilemma of having to choose between "establishing the suspect's guilt and safeguarding the public from danger." Miranda v. Arizona (1966) wasestablished to address procedural safeguards when suspects were taken into custody; its explicit purpose was to provide law enforcement with definitive protocol which would protect a suspect's rights during while he was being questioned. It was unacceptable to deviate from due process of law and to nullifythe years of explicitness represented by Miranda. The minority justices thus felt their position voiced resolute support of the Fifth Amendment infinding fault with allowing an invalid concern for "public safety" to justifydeparture from the common explicitness of the Miranda rule.
The minority justices believed that under Miranda, "coerced confessions were simply inadmissible in criminal prosecutions." To do otherwise interfered with due process. Thus, it was especially disturbing to the justices thatalthough Quarles was handcuffed and surrounded by officers in the back of the store, the majority did not find such circumstances to be coercive. (Justice Marshall's opinion apparently was referring to the manner in which the majority opinion characterized circumstances of Quarles' arrest as "instinctive.") The minority justices felt the arresting officer's conduct did not correctly adhere to Miranda "safeguards" which would have ensured an untainted gathering of criminal evidence. By not reading the suspect his rights prior to questioning, the officer's conduct had to be viewed as unacceptably coercive. Thus, the gun, obtained as a direct product of forcible, improper inquiry, represented inadmissible evidence because, in direct violation of the Miranda rule, it was "derived from an illegally obtained source."
Impact
The dissenting justices pointed out that the Miranda rule did not represent a"decision about public safety; it was decision about coerced confessions." They questioned how, given the majority opinion's exception to the Miranda rule, police officers could avoid future misunderstandings when apprehending suspects. Nonetheless, the majority of justices believed their ruling to be an expression of clarification which extended the Miranda rule to allow law enforcement more latitude in instances where there appeared to be a risk to the safety of officers or the public. Thus, the Court ruled that an individual's Fifth Amendment rights could be superseded in specific circumstances. In an apparent departure from years of upholding an explicit, resolute, and persistentinterpretation of Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court made a precedent-setting decision in rationalizing that when security concerns were involved, police offers were justified in delaying Miranda warnings. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Related Cases
Self-Incrimination Clause
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "no person shall be held to answer for acapital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself . . . "
In criminal cases the prosecution must prove the guilt of the defendant without forcing the accused to confess or testify. Only individuals, and not businesses or corporations, can use the privilege against self-incrimination. Thisprivilege also extends to witnesses, who can refuse to answer questions thatmay incriminate them in a civil or criminal proceeding. The privilege against self-incrimination extends to all judicial proceedings including grand jurytransactions, legislative investigations and administrative hearings.
In order to claim this privilege, a witness must first appear in court. Failure to appear can result in a contempt of court citation. Defendants in criminal cases have the same privileges as witnesses. Unless the accused has been given their Miranda rights any statement made is considered involuntary and cannot be used against them.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Vol. 4. Minneapolis, MN: West Publishing, 1998.
State of New York
Respondent
Benjamin Quarles
Petitioner's Claim
A police officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings before questioning therespondent about incriminating evidence did not violate Fifth Amendment rights, as the delay was justified in the interest of public safety.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Steven J. Rappaport
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Steven A. Hyman
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
12 June 1984
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court held that an officer's immediate concern with protecting the safety and welfare of the public represented a justified exception tothe Miranda rule.
Significance
The most important issue addressed by this case was whether an incriminatingstatement regarding information about where the respondent hid his gun, couldbe accepted as testimonial evidence at trial if a police officer failed to provide a Fifth Amendment Miranda rights warning before questioning his suspect. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed judgments of lower courts and explained that an exception to the Miranda rule was justified because the officer believed he needed to ensure public safety. In ruling as acceptable a departure fromthe required, very precise instructions of the Miranda rule, which ensured asuspect would not be subject to self-incrimination if Miranda warnings werenot given, the U.S. Supreme Court gave guidance that in circumstances where public safety was at risk, it may be necessary and correct to forego Miranda warnings.
On 11 September 1980, shortly after midnight, two police officers, Frank Craft and Sal Scarring, were on patrol when a woman came to their car and told them she had been raped. She provided a description of an black male, six feettall, armed, and wearing a black jacket. She also told officers he fled intoa supermarket. Officer Craft rushed in to apprehend the suspect while his partner called for assistance. He recognized a man who matched the description and gave chase. Craft ordered his suspect to stop and put his hands over his head. Other officers convened and surrounded the suspect in back of the store,but Officer Kraft was the first to reach the man. Handcuffing the suspect, the officer noticed the man's empty shoulder holster and asked him where the gun was. The suspect nodded his head toward some empty boxes answering, "The gun is over there." Officer Craft secured the weapon then returned to inform the suspect, Benjamin Quarles, of his Miranda rights. Quarles decided to waivehis Miranda rights and answer the officer's questions without an attorney'spresence. He stated that he bought the revolver in Miami, Florida, and it washis.
Miranda Warnings Inadequate
Benjamin Quarles was charged with criminal possession of a gun. (Under New York Penal Law, "any person who possesses a loaded firearm outside of his homeor place of business is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.") The trial court elected to exclude the respondent's evidential testimony, "The gun is over there," and the physical evidence, a .38 caliber revolver, because Miranda warnings were not given to Quarles before the officerasked him the location of the gun. The New York Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision to suppress Quarles's statements. Because Officer Kraft failedto advise Quarles of his rights before asking any questions, the court believed the Miranda warning was inappropriately omitted. The court of appeals didnot accept the state of New York's contention that the police officer was ina situation where the safety of himself, fellow officers, and the public hadto be protected. The appellate court held that any interrogation before giving Miranda warnings, such as questioning about the location of the gun, was inviolation of Fifth Amendment rights, which states that "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Consequently,because due process was violated, lower court rulings were affirmed.
A Compelling Exception
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower courts. The Court found that the use of the Miranda warnings could be avoided when public safetywas at issue. They explained the "immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of the gun" to ensure the safety of the public was important enoughto justify an exception to Miranda v. Arizona (1966). Justices for the majority opinion reasoned that a suspect's associates "might make use" of the weapon or shoppers or employees might later find it. They pointed out thatif officers were required to give Miranda warnings in such circumstances, itmight deter the suspect from responding. Consequently, while the constitutional Miranda rights of a suspect would be secured, the risk of potential danger could be substantial. Justice Rehnquist wrote, "Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply to make his case against Quarles but to insurethat further danger to the public did not result from the concealment of thegun in a public area."
The Court conceded that its decision would have the impact of reducing the "explicitness" of the Miranda rule. On the other hand, it believed that in order to ensure safety to life and limb, police officers had to retain the ability to instinctively judge the conditions in any given situation. The majorityopinion went on to suggest that although Miranda safeguards against self-incrimination were abandoned, in certain situations when swift action is needed officers may have to decide whether it was appropriate to "ask necessary questions without the Miranda warnings." Such a decision could "render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible." Or an officer may decide to "give the warnings in order to preserve admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence andneutralize the volatile situation confronting them." Thus, in light of its findings, the Court reversed and remanded the case for readjudication by a lower court.
Justice O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in part. She opined that theCourt's arguments did not justify making a departure from the clear prospectof the Miranda rule. The Self-Incrimination Clause should have been considered a safeguard against interrogations that could implicate involuntary confessions or disclose evidence connected with a crime. Justice O'Connor thus maintained that unequivocal application of Miranda warnings should be exercised.She reasoned that "society's need for interrogation" (e.g., Officer Craft's question about the gun) should not usurp the guards assumed in Miranda.Thus, to accurately enforce Miranda warnings, it is only necessarily to prevent an "admission of testimonial self-incriminations." However, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority opinion that the lower courts incorrectly suppressed the gun as evidence. Incrimination with non-testimonial evidence could not be considered a violation of privilege against self-incrimination. JusticeO'Connor regarded the gun as physical evidence, and finding that the gun could not be categorized as testimonial evidence, she held that suppression of the gun was unjustified.
In writing the dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall voiced the minority viewthat majority justices made assumptions which seemed to represent an "abuse of the facts." They could not conceive any reason to justify any departure from Miranda. They did not agree that the police officers were faced withthe dilemma of having to choose between "establishing the suspect's guilt and safeguarding the public from danger." Miranda v. Arizona (1966) wasestablished to address procedural safeguards when suspects were taken into custody; its explicit purpose was to provide law enforcement with definitive protocol which would protect a suspect's rights during while he was being questioned. It was unacceptable to deviate from due process of law and to nullifythe years of explicitness represented by Miranda. The minority justices thus felt their position voiced resolute support of the Fifth Amendment infinding fault with allowing an invalid concern for "public safety" to justifydeparture from the common explicitness of the Miranda rule.
The minority justices believed that under Miranda, "coerced confessions were simply inadmissible in criminal prosecutions." To do otherwise interfered with due process. Thus, it was especially disturbing to the justices thatalthough Quarles was handcuffed and surrounded by officers in the back of the store, the majority did not find such circumstances to be coercive. (Justice Marshall's opinion apparently was referring to the manner in which the majority opinion characterized circumstances of Quarles' arrest as "instinctive.") The minority justices felt the arresting officer's conduct did not correctly adhere to Miranda "safeguards" which would have ensured an untainted gathering of criminal evidence. By not reading the suspect his rights prior to questioning, the officer's conduct had to be viewed as unacceptably coercive. Thus, the gun, obtained as a direct product of forcible, improper inquiry, represented inadmissible evidence because, in direct violation of the Miranda rule, it was "derived from an illegally obtained source."
Impact
The dissenting justices pointed out that the Miranda rule did not represent a"decision about public safety; it was decision about coerced confessions." They questioned how, given the majority opinion's exception to the Miranda rule, police officers could avoid future misunderstandings when apprehending suspects. Nonetheless, the majority of justices believed their ruling to be an expression of clarification which extended the Miranda rule to allow law enforcement more latitude in instances where there appeared to be a risk to the safety of officers or the public. Thus, the Court ruled that an individual's Fifth Amendment rights could be superseded in specific circumstances. In an apparent departure from years of upholding an explicit, resolute, and persistentinterpretation of Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court made a precedent-setting decision in rationalizing that when security concerns were involved, police offers were justified in delaying Miranda warnings. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The exception will not be difficult for police to apply because in each case it will be circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it.We think police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the publicand questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.
Related Cases
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
- Orzoco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
Self-Incrimination Clause
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "no person shall be held to answer for acapital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself . . . "
In criminal cases the prosecution must prove the guilt of the defendant without forcing the accused to confess or testify. Only individuals, and not businesses or corporations, can use the privilege against self-incrimination. Thisprivilege also extends to witnesses, who can refuse to answer questions thatmay incriminate them in a civil or criminal proceeding. The privilege against self-incrimination extends to all judicial proceedings including grand jurytransactions, legislative investigations and administrative hearings.
In order to claim this privilege, a witness must first appear in court. Failure to appear can result in a contempt of court citation. Defendants in criminal cases have the same privileges as witnesses. Unless the accused has been given their Miranda rights any statement made is considered involuntary and cannot be used against them.
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Vol. 4. Minneapolis, MN: West Publishing, 1998.
Further Readings
- Hall, Kermit L., ed. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court ofthe United States. 1992.
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