Petitioner
United States
Respondents
Anthony Salerno, Vincent Cafaro
Petitioner's Claim
That the federal court can order someone who presents a danger to others or the community to be held without bail before trial.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Charles Fried, U.S. Solicitor General
Chief Lawyer for Respondents
Anthony M. Cardinale
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 May 1987
Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision that pretrial detention violated the right to due process of the arrested. The Court found that holding a potentially dangerous person without bail did not violate the rightto due process or constitute excessive bail, if the government can supply sufficient evidence to warrant such detention.
Significance
The ruling provided the federal government with a tool for reducing threats posed by dangerous people who are arrested and likely to commit further crime,if the government can produce clear and convincing evidence to support pretrial detention, such as the criminal history and background of the arrested. With this decision, the Supreme Court decision resolved ongoing controversy ofthe right of the arrested to due process and a reasonable amount of bail, resulting from the Bail Reform Act of 1984.
Background
In the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration began pushing for legislation that would reduce crime, especially crime by previously convicted felons and crime lords. The Reagan administration also sought to eradicate organized crimeand began targeting Mafia leaders for prosecution through investigation by various government agencies. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct of 1970 (RICO) provided prosecutors with an effective method of chargingcrime chiefs, by authorizing the convictions based on crime patterns insteadof completely on individual crimes. Furthermore, the administration allowedthe use of phone taps for obtaining evidence and offered witness protection programs to Mafia members who provided information on crime bosses.
Resulting from the Reagan administration's initiatives, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 required courts to conduct a special hearing to decide whether to holdthose accused of serious felonies, such as murder and racketeering, withoutbail before their trial. Under the act, in order for the court to detain theaccused in this manner, the government must offer ample evidence to demonstrate that the accused presents a danger to particular people or to the community. At the same time, the accused has a right to legal representation, to testify, to cross examine witnesses, and to offer evidence.
Following these procedures, the District Court of Southern New York ordered the respondents, Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro, to remain in jail until after their trial, because of their extensive criminal charges: 35 counts of racketeering, including fraud, extortion, and conspiracy to commit murder. Moreover, Salerno, know as "Fat Tony," was the boss or leader of the Genovese Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, a crime organization that operated throughout the Northeast. In addition, Salerno controlled several Teamsters union officials and used his power to influence the International Brotherhood of Teamsters' elections. Fortune magazine recognized him as the wealthiest and most powerful gangster in the country in 1986. The other respondent, Vincent Cafaro, held the important position of captain in the organization.
The respondents used their rights under the Bail Reform Act to appeal their pretrial detention, arguing that it violated their Fifth Amendment right to afair and speedy trial or due process. The court of appeals reversed the district courts decision, finding the pretrial detention of the respondents unconstitutional. The appeals court found that denial of bail applies only to circumstances where the accused is apt to disrupt the trial by intimidating witnesses and fleeing before trial, not to the mere suspicion of danger. Elsewhere,other courts of appeals considered the act and also found it unconstitutional.
Rights of the Community v. Rights of the Individual
The government petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which began hearing the case on 21 January 1987. At stake in the case was whether people could lose someof their constitutionally granted rights if they were repeat offenders or posed a potential danger to society. While reviewing the decision of the courtof appeals, the Supreme Court majority noticed a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the Bail Reform Act as well as the amendments in question in the previous trials and in the respondents' view. The act called not for the indiscriminate application of its policies, but for the application in very specific circumstances where the accused committed extremely serious felonies, following a specific set of procedures by the government and by the accused.
Hence, by a 6-3 vote the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion that the Bail of Reform Act of 1984 did not violate the constitutional rights of the accused under the bail provision of the Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,providing the federal government could clearly demonstrate the likely dangerposed by the accused. He contended that the act is "regulatory in nature, and does not constitute punishment before trial," as the respondents and othersargued.
The Court believed that the respondents failed in their attempt to demonstrate the Bail Reform Act amounted to punishment before trial and to excessive bail. The Supreme Court viewed the pretrial detention as a method of controlling crime, not as punishment, reasoning that holding someone before trial doesnot necessarily constitute punishment in any straightforward way. Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist showed that the Constitution does permit denial of certain rights in special circumstances, as in times of war when the governmentcan hold people considered dangerous. In addition, the Supreme Court alreadygave lower federal courts this power for holding juvenile offenders if they posed a demonstrable risk to society in Schall v. Martin (1984). In such cases, the rights of society outweigh the rights of the individual. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that since the Court previously upheld these kindsof exceptions to individual rights, the Bail Reform Act in no way violated the tenor of the Constitution given the carefully delineated policies and procedures of the act.
The Court also found no evidence to support the respondents' second claim: that the Bail Reform Act violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on excessive bail.Though the respondents reasoned that denial of bail equaled setting bail atan infinitely high level even when there was no apparent risk of flight, theCourt held that this clause does not guarantee bail in all cases. Instead itstates that when there is bail, the court may not set it at an unreasonable amount. Again, the Court noted numerous circumstances when courts can deny bail such as in capital offense and deportation trials. "On the other side of the scale, of course, is the individual's strong interest in liberty. We do notminimize the importance and fundamental nature of this right. But, as our cases hold, this right may, in circumstances where the government's interest issufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of society."
Further Resistance to the Bail Reform Act
Not only did three Supreme Court justices voice dissent after hearing the case, but lawyers around the country took issue with the finding, in particularmembers of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Justices Marshall and Brennan sided largely with the court of appeals, asserting that provisions ofthe Bail Reform Act of 1984 violated portions of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, as the respondents claimed. Justice Stevens dissented separately, expressing the view that though the government could detain people accused of crimes briefly in special circumstances, the act was unconstitutional and the government was using United States v. Salerno as a test case, not trying to protect the community. In United States v. Salerno, the district court tried to use criminal allegations against respondents as proof of their dangerousness, but that violated their right to be treated as innocent until proven guilty, according to the dissenting justices. Furthermore, ACLU lawyer David Goldstein argued that, "What the court has done is to reverse the 200-year assumption of innocence and replace it with this vague notion of dangerousness." The ACLU disputed the finding, asserting that the provisions of the act gave the government the authority to impose punishment before trial and conviction.
Related Cases
Racketeering-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970
Congress passed The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, more commonly referred to as RICO, in 1970 to help prosecute rapidly expandingorganized criminal activity. To that end, a wide array of criminal activitiesfall under RICO, once a pattern of repeated criminal activity can be established. Racketeering activity requires that such acts must occur within a ten-year period of the first criminal act. Crimes that display a pattern of racketeering include any act or threat of murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, and/or extortion.
Other criminal acts that can be prosecuted under RICO include embezzlement ofpension funds, welfare fraud, sports bribery, interstate transportation of stolen vehicles, sexual exploitation of children, obstruction of justice and mail fraud.
Conviction under the RICO statue could result in a maximum 20 year sentencedfor each violation. Additionally, the accused, if convicted, must forfeit anyprofits from the criminal enterprise and can be liable for damages in civilcourt.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Vol. 7. Minneapolis, MN: West Publishing, 1998.
United States
Respondents
Anthony Salerno, Vincent Cafaro
Petitioner's Claim
That the federal court can order someone who presents a danger to others or the community to be held without bail before trial.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Charles Fried, U.S. Solicitor General
Chief Lawyer for Respondents
Anthony M. Cardinale
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 May 1987
Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision that pretrial detention violated the right to due process of the arrested. The Court found that holding a potentially dangerous person without bail did not violate the rightto due process or constitute excessive bail, if the government can supply sufficient evidence to warrant such detention.
Significance
The ruling provided the federal government with a tool for reducing threats posed by dangerous people who are arrested and likely to commit further crime,if the government can produce clear and convincing evidence to support pretrial detention, such as the criminal history and background of the arrested. With this decision, the Supreme Court decision resolved ongoing controversy ofthe right of the arrested to due process and a reasonable amount of bail, resulting from the Bail Reform Act of 1984.
Background
In the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration began pushing for legislation that would reduce crime, especially crime by previously convicted felons and crime lords. The Reagan administration also sought to eradicate organized crimeand began targeting Mafia leaders for prosecution through investigation by various government agencies. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct of 1970 (RICO) provided prosecutors with an effective method of chargingcrime chiefs, by authorizing the convictions based on crime patterns insteadof completely on individual crimes. Furthermore, the administration allowedthe use of phone taps for obtaining evidence and offered witness protection programs to Mafia members who provided information on crime bosses.
Resulting from the Reagan administration's initiatives, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 required courts to conduct a special hearing to decide whether to holdthose accused of serious felonies, such as murder and racketeering, withoutbail before their trial. Under the act, in order for the court to detain theaccused in this manner, the government must offer ample evidence to demonstrate that the accused presents a danger to particular people or to the community. At the same time, the accused has a right to legal representation, to testify, to cross examine witnesses, and to offer evidence.
Following these procedures, the District Court of Southern New York ordered the respondents, Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro, to remain in jail until after their trial, because of their extensive criminal charges: 35 counts of racketeering, including fraud, extortion, and conspiracy to commit murder. Moreover, Salerno, know as "Fat Tony," was the boss or leader of the Genovese Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, a crime organization that operated throughout the Northeast. In addition, Salerno controlled several Teamsters union officials and used his power to influence the International Brotherhood of Teamsters' elections. Fortune magazine recognized him as the wealthiest and most powerful gangster in the country in 1986. The other respondent, Vincent Cafaro, held the important position of captain in the organization.
The respondents used their rights under the Bail Reform Act to appeal their pretrial detention, arguing that it violated their Fifth Amendment right to afair and speedy trial or due process. The court of appeals reversed the district courts decision, finding the pretrial detention of the respondents unconstitutional. The appeals court found that denial of bail applies only to circumstances where the accused is apt to disrupt the trial by intimidating witnesses and fleeing before trial, not to the mere suspicion of danger. Elsewhere,other courts of appeals considered the act and also found it unconstitutional.
Rights of the Community v. Rights of the Individual
The government petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which began hearing the case on 21 January 1987. At stake in the case was whether people could lose someof their constitutionally granted rights if they were repeat offenders or posed a potential danger to society. While reviewing the decision of the courtof appeals, the Supreme Court majority noticed a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the Bail Reform Act as well as the amendments in question in the previous trials and in the respondents' view. The act called not for the indiscriminate application of its policies, but for the application in very specific circumstances where the accused committed extremely serious felonies, following a specific set of procedures by the government and by the accused.
Hence, by a 6-3 vote the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion that the Bail of Reform Act of 1984 did not violate the constitutional rights of the accused under the bail provision of the Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,providing the federal government could clearly demonstrate the likely dangerposed by the accused. He contended that the act is "regulatory in nature, and does not constitute punishment before trial," as the respondents and othersargued.
The Court believed that the respondents failed in their attempt to demonstrate the Bail Reform Act amounted to punishment before trial and to excessive bail. The Supreme Court viewed the pretrial detention as a method of controlling crime, not as punishment, reasoning that holding someone before trial doesnot necessarily constitute punishment in any straightforward way. Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist showed that the Constitution does permit denial of certain rights in special circumstances, as in times of war when the governmentcan hold people considered dangerous. In addition, the Supreme Court alreadygave lower federal courts this power for holding juvenile offenders if they posed a demonstrable risk to society in Schall v. Martin (1984). In such cases, the rights of society outweigh the rights of the individual. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that since the Court previously upheld these kindsof exceptions to individual rights, the Bail Reform Act in no way violated the tenor of the Constitution given the carefully delineated policies and procedures of the act.
The Court also found no evidence to support the respondents' second claim: that the Bail Reform Act violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on excessive bail.Though the respondents reasoned that denial of bail equaled setting bail atan infinitely high level even when there was no apparent risk of flight, theCourt held that this clause does not guarantee bail in all cases. Instead itstates that when there is bail, the court may not set it at an unreasonable amount. Again, the Court noted numerous circumstances when courts can deny bail such as in capital offense and deportation trials. "On the other side of the scale, of course, is the individual's strong interest in liberty. We do notminimize the importance and fundamental nature of this right. But, as our cases hold, this right may, in circumstances where the government's interest issufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of society."
Further Resistance to the Bail Reform Act
Not only did three Supreme Court justices voice dissent after hearing the case, but lawyers around the country took issue with the finding, in particularmembers of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Justices Marshall and Brennan sided largely with the court of appeals, asserting that provisions ofthe Bail Reform Act of 1984 violated portions of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, as the respondents claimed. Justice Stevens dissented separately, expressing the view that though the government could detain people accused of crimes briefly in special circumstances, the act was unconstitutional and the government was using United States v. Salerno as a test case, not trying to protect the community. In United States v. Salerno, the district court tried to use criminal allegations against respondents as proof of their dangerousness, but that violated their right to be treated as innocent until proven guilty, according to the dissenting justices. Furthermore, ACLU lawyer David Goldstein argued that, "What the court has done is to reverse the 200-year assumption of innocence and replace it with this vague notion of dangerousness." The ACLU disputed the finding, asserting that the provisions of the act gave the government the authority to impose punishment before trial and conviction.
Related Cases
- Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
- United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (1985).
- United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 1102 (1986).
- United States v. Walker, 805 F.2d 1042 (1986).
Racketeering-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970
Congress passed The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, more commonly referred to as RICO, in 1970 to help prosecute rapidly expandingorganized criminal activity. To that end, a wide array of criminal activitiesfall under RICO, once a pattern of repeated criminal activity can be established. Racketeering activity requires that such acts must occur within a ten-year period of the first criminal act. Crimes that display a pattern of racketeering include any act or threat of murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, and/or extortion.
Other criminal acts that can be prosecuted under RICO include embezzlement ofpension funds, welfare fraud, sports bribery, interstate transportation of stolen vehicles, sexual exploitation of children, obstruction of justice and mail fraud.
Conviction under the RICO statue could result in a maximum 20 year sentencedfor each violation. Additionally, the accused, if convicted, must forfeit anyprofits from the criminal enterprise and can be liable for damages in civilcourt.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Vol. 7. Minneapolis, MN: West Publishing, 1998.
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