Valley Forge College v. Americans United

Petitioner
Valley Forge Christian College
Respondent
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That donation of a surplus federal facility to a private sectarian college did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
C. Clark Hodgson, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Lee Boothby
Justices for the Court
Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
12 January 1982
Decision
Reversed a court of appeals finding that citizens can sue the government forspending public monies on religious institutions by claiming violation of theFirst Amendment's Establishment Clause.
Significance
The Supreme Court found that private taxpayers could not challenge federal spending programs in court without proving specific injuries. Without the showof injury, a requirement basic to the concept of "standing" before the courts, the complaint was considered a general grievance more appropriately directed towards the legislative or executive branches of government. Public pressure mounted for the Court to broaden its definition of standing. Using a narrowdefinition, government actions can potentially violate the Constitution withno one able to challenge in a timely manner.
In 1942, the Department of the Army acquired 181 acres of land northwest of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On a 77-acre part of the property, the governmentbuilt Valley Forge General Hospital to provide medical care for members of the military. After 30 years of operation, the secretary of defense identifiedthe hospital in April of 1973 for closure as part of a national plan to reduce the number of military installations in the United States. Declared surplusproperty, the facility was transferred to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) for disbursement.
Under authority of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, HEW was directed to award the property to a party showing "the greatest public benefit." In response to an application from Valley Forge Christian College, HEW transferred the property to the college in August of 1976. HEW didnot charge the college for the $577,500 facility because of a 100 percent public benefit allowance calculated by the agency. The college, a nonprofit educational institution under supervision of the Assemblies of God religious order, was committed to use the facility solely for educational purposes for at least 30 years. The college expressed its intention to conduct "a program of education . . . meeting the accrediting standards of the State of Pennsylvania, the American Association of Bible Colleges, the Division of Education of the General Council of the Assemblies of God and the Veterans Administration."
Upon learning of the acquisition through a news release, four employees of the Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., filed a lawsuitin U.S. district court in October of 1976. They sought to block the propertytransfer, charging violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, which directs that the U.S. government can not provide support to religious organizations. Americans United, a nonprofit organization, claimed that due tothe transfer their members "would be deprived of the fair and constitutionaluse of his (her) tax dollar . . . in violation of his (her) rights under theFirst Amendment." Americans United asserted the government should have been paid full value for the property since a religious-oriented organization couldnot legally benefit all Americans.
Taxpayer Standing
Prior to 1968, citizens claiming general injury as federal taxpayers in opposition to legislation authorizing government spending programs were routinelydenied "standing" by the Court. Standing means that only persons considered directly affected by or involved in a dispute may sue in federal court. The persons initiating a suit must demonstrate clearly that they have "suffered some actual or threatened injury" as a result of supposedly unlawful activity, that the injury can be traced to the challenged action, and that it can be resolved by a court decision. Also, the injured party must be the one bringing legal action, not another party speaking on their behalf. These requirements also serve to protect those that may be the target of lawsuits by providing afactual forum for them to defend themselves and appeal unfavorable decisions.A taxpayer can challenge constitutionality of government spending under thevarious articles and amendments of the Constitution. Options include the Taxand Spend Clause of Article I, the Judicial Powers Clause of Article III, andthe Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The restriction to federal taxpayer standing was established in 1923 by the Frothingham v. Mellow case. A taxpayer claimed financial injury by a federal law providing funds to states implementing programs to reduce maternaland infant mortality. Though the Court previously ruled taxpayers had standing to sue local governments over spending issues, the question of federal government spending had not been addressed. The Court ruled the taxpayer had no basis to bring suit by simply asserting that Congress was acting unconstitutionally. No specific injury to the individual could be identified. The Court asserted "the relation of a taxpayer to the United States is very different" than with local governments because their interest was "shared with millions ofothers." Any personal effects would be comparatively minor. The Court wrote,"The party who invokes the power [of judicial review] must be able to show not only that the (law) is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediatelyin danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."
The Frothington prohibition rigidly held until 1968 when the Court created a limited exception. In Flast v. Cohen (1968), the Court determined the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provided sufficient connection between the taxpayer's constitutional claims and government spending tocreate standing.
In the Valley Forge case, the district court dismissed the lawsuit ruling that Americans United failed to demonstrate any actual injury other thandisagreement with the government action. Americans United then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals which reversed the lower court's decision. The courtof appeals agreed with the district court's finding that American United lacked standing for suing as American taxpayers, but asserted that they "had standing merely as `citizens,' claiming (injury) to their . . . right to a government that `shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.'" Thecollege appealed to the Supreme Court.
In assessing Americans United's standing, Justice Rehnquist, writing on behalf of the 5-4 majority, found that Americans United were challenging the action by HEW under the Tax and Spending Clause of Article I, but HEW was actuallyoperating under the Property Clause of Article IV. Taxpayer standing did notapply to land grant actions under that article. Rehnquist claimed that citizens as taxpayers could only challenge congressional spending, not spending bythe executive branch of government. Rehnquist noted that the property in question was in Pennsylvania, the respondents lived in Maryland and Virginia with their office in Washington, D.C., and that they learned of the transfer through a news release. The Court concluded "that any connection between the challenged property transfer and respondents' tax burden is at best speculativeand at worst nonexistent." In fact public funds spent in acquiring the property and building the facility were actually spent 30 years before Americans United claimed injury. In finding no specific injury, Rehnquist wrote that "standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or fervor of this advocacy." In sum, Rehnquist wrote that the Establishment Clause doesnot provide citizens "a special license to roam the country in search of governmental wrongdoing and to reveal their discoveries in federal court. The federal courts were simply not created as overseers of the general welfare." Rehnquist sharply criticized the lower court by going out of their way in finding "an available plaintiff" to try the case. The Court reversed the court of appeals decision essentially overruling the Establishment Clause exemption ofFlast.
Right to Sue
With Justices Marshall and Blackmun joining in dissent, Justice Brennan strongly protested the majority using "standing to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs." He believed the Court had far more flexibility in determiningstanding under the Constitution. Brennan criticized the majority on several issues. First, he believed standing is not lost because many people may claimthe same injury, contrary to the Frothington ruling. The Constitutiondoes not draw distinction between large injuries and smaller ones. Secondly,under Article III, if a causal relationship can be identified, it does not matter how indirect. Thirdly, even though a taxpayer cannot sue for return of tax payments, they can file a complaint that public funds are being spent in violation of the Constitution. This question is not one of standing, but of legal rights.
Unlike any other clause in the Constitution, the Establishment Clause imposesa restriction on the power to tax based on manner of spending. This restriction was established in the 1947 Everson v. Board of Education case bystating, "No tax in any amount . . . can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions." Therefore, the Establishment Clause automaticallygives citizens standing to challenge the spending of tax funds to advance religion. In addition, all taxpayers suffer the same injury under an Establishment Clause violation. Brennan added that taxpayers must be able to challengeEstablishment Clause violations in court. Objections cannot be raised at thetime of paying a tax since it is paid before the actual spending, and taxpayers cannot challenge the tax collectors, because there is no way of separatingthose monies that will be spent in support of religion from the general funds of the nation. Therefore, the taxpayer must be able to challenge at the time of the violation "in order to halt the . . . intolerable burden on his pocketbook, his conscience, and his constitutional rights."
Impact
The Valley Forge case centered on when taxpayers may challenge government spending in courts. As demonstrated by the sharply divided vote, the Court did not easily recognize collective public complaints. Individuals must establish personal standing to represent public interest. Court actions in the 1990s maintained these strict standards for standing. In April of 1998 the Supreme Court heard arguments in NEA v. Finley concerning standards imposed by Congress on fellowships and grants given by the National Endowment of the Arts. Identification of any precise injury to specific individuals were initial points the Court debated before considering whether to tackle First Amendment censorship questions. A taxpayer issue in the late 1990s was Congressional efforts to authorize spending public funds on private schools, many of which are parochial, through a special voucher, or coupon, system.
Congressional watchdog groups composed of taxpayers, such as People for the American Way, multiplied significantly in the 1990s. Such groups fear if important questions are left to elections rather than the courts, constitutional "relativism" would follow, resulting in fundamental rights changing with public mood swings. A broadening of standing by courts would possibly allow resolution of fundamental constitutional issues in the courts before national crises escalate, politically dividing the country.
Related Cases

• Frothingham v. Mellow, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
  
• Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
  
• Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
  
• National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, U.S. 97=371 (1998).