Petitioner
Danny Escobedo
Respondent
State of Illinois
Petitioner's Claim
That once a person detained by police for questioning about a crime becomes asuspect, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel becomes effective.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Barry L. Kroll
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
James R. Thompson
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Arthur Goldberg (writing for the Court), Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
Tom C. Clark, John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
22 June 1964
Decision
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court ruled that because Escobedo's request toconsult with his attorney had been denied and because he had not been warnedof his constitutional right to remain silent, his confession was inadmissibleand his conviction was reversed.
Significance
Escobedo is less important in and of itself than as part of a movementled by the Court to liberalize due process in criminal procedure.
On the night of 19 January 1960, Danny Escobedo's brother-in-law was fatallyshot. Shortly thereafter, police arrested Escobedo without a warrant. He wastaken into custody and interrogated. Escobedo did not, however, give police astatement, and he was released that afternoon after his lawyer filed a writof habeas corpus in state court alleging that there was not enough evidence to hold his client. On 30 January, Escobedo was rearrested, together with his sister, after Benedict DiGerlando, another individual being questionedabout the murder, told police that Escobedo had fired the shots that killedhis brother-in-law.
Escobedo was handcuffed and, as he was driven to the police station, the arresting officers told him repeatedly that he had been fingered as the culprit and might as well confess. They did not warn him of his Fifth Amendment rightto remain silent. Escobedo repeatedly asked to consult with his attorney, buteven after his lawyer arrived at the station, police refused to permit him to speak with his client. Told by an officer that he and his sister would be released if he made a statement incriminating DiGerlando, Escobedo did so, andon the basis of his statement he was tried and found guilty of murder. His appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and Escobedo then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review of his conviction.
The Supreme Court Confirms a Criminal Suspect's Right to Have an Attorney
Earlier that year, in Massiah v. United States (1964), the Court had thrown out a criminal confession obtained without benefit of counsel. But theoutcome in Massiah rested on the fact that the confession had been obtained after criminal proceedings had begun but before the accused had retained a lawyer. Now the Court was confronted with a situation that involved a confession obtained without benefit of counsel before the suspect had been indicted. Justice Goldberg, writing for the Court, held that under the circumstances in Escobedo, a confession was equally inadmissible:
Escobedo enlarged the Court's holding in Massiah, but the particularity of Justice Goldberg's opinion left some doubt as to just how to apply the new ruling. On the one hand, the Escobedo Court provided littleclear guidance as to when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered;on the other, the circumstances laid out in the opinion seemed so specific that the Court seemed only to be addressing Danny Escobedo's case.
The sub-text of Escobedo, the Fifth Amendment prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination, became the focus two years later of another right-to-counsel case, Miranda v. Arizona (1966). Miranda proved to be an even more controversial decision, in part because it clearly stated thatin order to avoid Fifth Amendment problems, criminal suspects must be alerted not only to their right to remain silent, but to their right to be represented by a lawyer. And instead of waiting until some rather ill-defined momentwhen a detainee becomes a primary suspect, as in Escobedo, after Miranda police were on notice that the right to counsel is activated when an individual is taken into custody. Miranda clarified the import of Escobedo by stating plainly that the only way to preserve a criminal suspect's privilege against self-incrimination was to provide him or her with the opportunity to retain a lawyer as soon as possible.
Related Cases
The Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the "accusedshall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
Yet, courts have struggled with deciding exactly when this right begins, especially in cases where the accused confesses during interrogation and then recants. In Crooker v. California the defendant confessed after he refused to be appointed counsel. The court ruled that the confession was voluntaryand dismissed the defendant's argument that he had a right to counsel at thepolice station.
Later in Cicencia v. La Gay when the defendant was found guilty afterhaving been denied access to his attorney at the police station, the Court upheld the conviction. In White v. Maryland the absolute right to counsel in a capital case was held applicable to a pretrial proceedings, such as preliminary arrangements.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Vol. 3. Minneapolis, MN: West Publishing, 1998.
Danny Escobedo
Respondent
State of Illinois
Petitioner's Claim
That once a person detained by police for questioning about a crime becomes asuspect, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel becomes effective.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Barry L. Kroll
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
James R. Thompson
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Arthur Goldberg (writing for the Court), Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
Tom C. Clark, John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
22 June 1964
Decision
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court ruled that because Escobedo's request toconsult with his attorney had been denied and because he had not been warnedof his constitutional right to remain silent, his confession was inadmissibleand his conviction was reversed.
Significance
Escobedo is less important in and of itself than as part of a movementled by the Court to liberalize due process in criminal procedure.
On the night of 19 January 1960, Danny Escobedo's brother-in-law was fatallyshot. Shortly thereafter, police arrested Escobedo without a warrant. He wastaken into custody and interrogated. Escobedo did not, however, give police astatement, and he was released that afternoon after his lawyer filed a writof habeas corpus in state court alleging that there was not enough evidence to hold his client. On 30 January, Escobedo was rearrested, together with his sister, after Benedict DiGerlando, another individual being questionedabout the murder, told police that Escobedo had fired the shots that killedhis brother-in-law.
Escobedo was handcuffed and, as he was driven to the police station, the arresting officers told him repeatedly that he had been fingered as the culprit and might as well confess. They did not warn him of his Fifth Amendment rightto remain silent. Escobedo repeatedly asked to consult with his attorney, buteven after his lawyer arrived at the station, police refused to permit him to speak with his client. Told by an officer that he and his sister would be released if he made a statement incriminating DiGerlando, Escobedo did so, andon the basis of his statement he was tried and found guilty of murder. His appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and Escobedo then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review of his conviction.
The Supreme Court Confirms a Criminal Suspect's Right to Have an Attorney
Earlier that year, in Massiah v. United States (1964), the Court had thrown out a criminal confession obtained without benefit of counsel. But theoutcome in Massiah rested on the fact that the confession had been obtained after criminal proceedings had begun but before the accused had retained a lawyer. Now the Court was confronted with a situation that involved a confession obtained without benefit of counsel before the suspect had been indicted. Justice Goldberg, writing for the Court, held that under the circumstances in Escobedo, a confession was equally inadmissible:
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has beentaken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogationsthat lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment . . .
Escobedo enlarged the Court's holding in Massiah, but the particularity of Justice Goldberg's opinion left some doubt as to just how to apply the new ruling. On the one hand, the Escobedo Court provided littleclear guidance as to when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered;on the other, the circumstances laid out in the opinion seemed so specific that the Court seemed only to be addressing Danny Escobedo's case.
The sub-text of Escobedo, the Fifth Amendment prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination, became the focus two years later of another right-to-counsel case, Miranda v. Arizona (1966). Miranda proved to be an even more controversial decision, in part because it clearly stated thatin order to avoid Fifth Amendment problems, criminal suspects must be alerted not only to their right to remain silent, but to their right to be represented by a lawyer. And instead of waiting until some rather ill-defined momentwhen a detainee becomes a primary suspect, as in Escobedo, after Miranda police were on notice that the right to counsel is activated when an individual is taken into custody. Miranda clarified the import of Escobedo by stating plainly that the only way to preserve a criminal suspect's privilege against self-incrimination was to provide him or her with the opportunity to retain a lawyer as soon as possible.
Related Cases
- Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
- Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
- Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
- Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the "accusedshall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
Yet, courts have struggled with deciding exactly when this right begins, especially in cases where the accused confesses during interrogation and then recants. In Crooker v. California the defendant confessed after he refused to be appointed counsel. The court ruled that the confession was voluntaryand dismissed the defendant's argument that he had a right to counsel at thepolice station.
Later in Cicencia v. La Gay when the defendant was found guilty afterhaving been denied access to his attorney at the police station, the Court upheld the conviction. In White v. Maryland the absolute right to counsel in a capital case was held applicable to a pretrial proceedings, such as preliminary arrangements.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Vol. 3. Minneapolis, MN: West Publishing, 1998.
User Comments Add a comment…
3 months ago
This man SHOULD NOT have been let free. he should have been locked up. now my kids are running around with a murderer on the lose. soooooooooo yea.