Evans v. Newton

Petitioner
Evans, et al.
Respondent
Newton, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That a Macon, Georgia park that had been left to the city on the condition that it be open to white people be desegregated, even though the park had recently reverted to private control.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Jack Greenberg
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
C. Baxter Jones and Frank C. Jones
Justices for the Court
William J. Brennan, Jr., Tom C. Clark, William O. Douglas (writing for the Court), Abe Fortas, Earl Warren, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Hugo Lafayette Black, John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
17 January 1966
Decision
Upheld the petitioners' claim, reversing the decisions of two lower courts and ruling that, due to its history as a public facility, and to the public nature of parks in general, the park must be operated on a desegregated basis.
Significance
The ruling opened a number of seemingly private activities to scrutiny regarding their adherence to the equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following the Court's decision in this case, the operation of private establishments within public buildings was considered a public activity, and as such was required to adhere to constitutional requirements.
The decade of the 1960s was a time of great social and political upheaval. Popular causes, such as the women's movement and the crusade against American participation in the conflict in Vietnam, emerged and gained nearly unprecedented political momentum. The most significant movement among the political causes of the decade, however, was the Civil Rights movement. The 1960s saw theend of segregation in the southern United States, and a serious attempt to address issues of racial discrimination in the desegregated North. Throughout the decade, the Supreme Court showed its sympathy for the causes of desegregation and racial equity, consistently interpreting the Constitution in such a way as to create a more just society. From a contemporary perspective it is difficult to believe the level of resistance that certain racial equity measures encountered only a short time ago.
A Bequest to the Public
Upon his death in 1911, former United States Senator Augustus O. Bacon left atract of land within the city of Macon, Georgia, for use as a public park. However, the bequest came with a condition: that the park be maintained for the use of white people only. Senator Bacon, while stating that he had "only the kindest feelings toward Negroes," also believed that "in their social relations the two races should remain forever separated." And so it was, for a time.
Eventually the City of Macon opened the park to use by all its citizens on the grounds that, as a public facility, the segregation of the park would not stand up to a test of constitutionality. When the city made this adjustment inits policy regarding the park, several park trustees took exception and brought suit against the city. The trustees contended that instead of desegregating the park, the city should let it revert to private control, thus exemptingit from the need to abide by the equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. At this point in the proceedings, a group of African Americans joined the dispute, asking that the city not be allowed to appoint privatetrustees to operate the park. The City of Macon thereupon resigned as the park's trustee, and the court was forced to appoint trustees to take over its operation. African American groups then appealed the case to the Georgia Supreme Court, which held that Senator Bacon had the right to leave his property toany subgroup of individuals he desired. The Georgia Supreme Court further held that, in its present guise as a privately operated facility, the park trustees could allow or deny access to whomever they wished. The state supreme court also ruled that the appointment of private trustees to maintain the segregation of the park and insure compliance with the conditions of Senator Bacon's will was a legally acceptable solution to the situation. The case was thenappealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard arguments in the matter on 9and 10 November 1965.
A Public or a Private Facility?
William O. Douglas, writing for the majority, identified two conflicting principles operating in this case: the right of the individual to select the people with whom he or she wishes to associate; and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits state preferences for any particular class of person. In the Court's view, the Fourteenth Amendment took precedence in this case, and, by a 5-3 margin, the decision of the Georgia SupremeCourt was reversed and the park was ordered to open to the public on a desegregated basis.
In reaching its decision, the Court had to determine the exact status of thepark. The park had operated for years as a segregated public facility, for somewhat less time as a desegregated public facility, and for a brief time in the very recent past as a segregated private facility. As the Court noted, "conduct that is formally `private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject tothe constitutional limitations placed upon state action." The park was judged to fall into this category, given its years of public operation, during which time it was maintained and policed by state authorities. In the Court's view, participation by agents of the state would always be integral to the park's operation, given maintenance of roads and sidewalks leading to the park, for instance, and the use of public utilities such as light and water in the park's operation. As such, regardless of its ownership status, the park qualified as a public facility, and had to adhere to constitutional standards in its admittance policies.
Impact
Evans v. Newton was an important case for supporters of desegregationand racial equity. In its broad definition of a public facility, the Court made a number of previously private facilities subject to the same scrutiny aspublic places. Businesses operating within public buildings, for example, would now have to maintain constitutional policies regarding the clientele theyserved. Significantly, following the Court's ruling in this case, the newly appointed private trustees of the park decided to shut it down altogether rather than desegregate it. This led to another case, Evans v. Abney (1970), brought by African American groups who claimed that the park's closing violated their constitutional right to equal protection. The Court did not credit their argument, however, ruling that the park's closure affected all racesequally, and as such was constitutional.
Related Cases

• Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of the City Trusts of Philadelphia, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
  
• Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
  
• Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).

De Facto Segregation
De facto segregation is segregation "by the facts." It exists in a situationwhere no law dictates segregation, but where segregation occurs simply as a matter of practice. It has a different legal meaning than de jure segregation,or segregration by law: the Fourteenth Amendment has long been understood toinvalidate de jure segregation, but its use with regard to de facto segregation has been more difficult.
De facto segregation verges into the area of freedom of association, which isgenerally understood to be protected under the Constitution--though not in the years since the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, when freedom of association signified discrimination. Many observers have noted that America sincethe 1960s has been more or less in a state of de facto segregation in some areas. For instance, African American students and white students, who are freeto sit with one another at college cafeteria tables around the country, tendto separate into small racial groups. This is voluntary segregation, a moredifficult phenomenon to counteract because it is beyond the reach of law.
Sources
Bradley, David and Shelley Fisher Fishkin, eds. The Encyclopedia of CivilRights in America. Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1998.