Petitioner
Earl Enmund
Respondent
State of Florida
Petitioner's Claim
That his death sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violationof the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for aiding a felony that ended up amurder, even though he did not participate in the murder or intend for it tohappen.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
James S. Liebman
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Lawrence A. Kaden
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
2 July 1982
Decision
The Supreme Court held that Enmund's sentence violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to fair punishment proportionate to his role in the crime. The Court found that Enmund's deed warranted a serious punishment, but notcapital punishment, as the state of Florida argued.
Significance
The Supreme Court's decision in this case stands out as one of the more liberal opinions of the Court for cases involving the death sentence of a person who did not actually attempt or intend to kill the victim. Because the state conceded that it could not prove that Enmund attempted or intended to kill thevictim, the Court reversed the lower courts' rulings. However, the Supreme Court ruled differently in later cases, indicating that the Court has grown less lenient over the years.
The Facts of the Crime
The state of Florida charged Earl Enmund, the petitioner, with first-degree murder and robbery perpetrated against two elderly people. The Florida SupremeCourt upheld this decision, although it recognized that the court could onlyinfer that Enmund drove the car that helped the killers, Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong, escape. Under Florida law, the state could prosecute Enmund as aconstructive accomplice because he drove the getaway car, considering him equally responsible for the homicides.
Based on witness testimony, the court deduced that Enmund had driven the Armstrongs to and from the scene of the crime, although no direct evidence existed. According to the court's theory, Enmund waited in the car while the Armstrongs pretended to need water to stop his car from overheating. Sampson Armstrong then pulled a gun on one of the residents, Thomas Kersey. Kersey called his wife for help, who came out with a gun and shot Jeanette Armstrong, wounding her. After that, Sampson Armstrong killed and robbed the Kerseys. Then theArmstrongs fled in the car driven by Enmund.
The Legal Process
The court charged Enmund with and convicted him of two counts of first-degreemurder and one count of robbery. Because Enmund received the death penalty,he appealed his sentence to the Florida Supreme Court, which upheld the lowercourt's decision. The Florida Supreme Court argued that because Enmund was an accomplice in an armed robbery when the murders took place and because Enmund was previously convicted of a felony involving at least the threat of violence, the death sentence suited the crime.
On 23 March 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court began hearing the case and considering whether states could apply the death penalty without violating the Eighthand Fourteenth Amendments to felons "who neither took life, attempted to takelife, nor intended to take life." In the 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court majority contended that the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishmentdid not allow a capital punishment sentence in this case, because of previous Supreme Court decisions such as Weems v. United States (1910) wherea man was sentenced to 15 years of hard labor for falsifying a public document and Coker v. Georgia (1977) where a man received the death penalty for raping a woman. With these Supreme Court decisions in the background, themajority also compared the sentences of other jurisdictions with Enmund's sentence and found that of the 36 jurisdictions only 8 permit the death penaltyin similar cases. Furthermore, the Court considered jury verdicts for death sentences and the death row population and noticed that accomplices who did not participate in the murder accounted for only a small minority, demonstrating that the general population rejects the use of the death penalty for an accomplice such as Enmund, who do not plan or attempt to kill.
Given this foundation, the Court found that although Enmund's robbery conviction was indeed a serious offense that warranted a stiff penalty, it was not so atrocious that it warranted capital punishment. While the Court admitted that the death penalty can apply to robbers who commit murder in the process ofrobbing without violating the Constitution, it maintained that in order forit to apply to Enmund's case and ones like it, courts must demonstrate that Enmund's behavior directly led to the murder, thus making him responsible. Bystudying statistics of robberies in the United States, the Court concluded that murders occur in conjunction with robberies only less than one percent ofthe time and so it showed that as a robber alone Enmund should not have anticipated murder as a possible outcome. Therefore, the Supreme Court majority reversed the state supreme court's ruling, finding the death penalty in this case a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Degree of Responsibility
However, the dissenting justices believed that the majority's decision interfered with the state criteria for determining guilt, relying too much on intent. They also point out that 23 states allow courts to impose capital punishment even when the accused neither kills or intends to kill the victim. Consequently, they reached a different conclusion than the majority. Contrary to theclaim that society largely disapproves of the death penalty for cases such as Enmund's, they found that two-thirds of the states that have the death penalty embrace it as an acceptable and appropriate punishment for accessories tofelonies that result in murder.
Furthermore, the dissenting justices argued that the Eighth Amendment calls not only for a ban on cruel and unusual punishment, but also for a sentence proportionate to the harm and damage caused by degree of responsibility of theaccused. Since Enmund set the crime in motion by planning it and driving theArmstrongs to the Kersey home, he must accept a greater share of the guilt than he or the Supreme Court majority admitted, according to the dissenting justices.
Implications of Decision
Although the Supreme Court majority decided to overturn the lower courts' rulings, its decision did not constitute the final say in the execution of accomplice felons who did not attempt or intend to kill the victim in crimes thatresulted in murder. The Court never overruled this decision, but it reached more stringent decisions for similar cases afterwards, reducing the role intent plays. For example, in 1995 the Court denied a man a stay of execution, even though the state admitted that he did not participate in the killing of thevictim, whom he helped kidnap in Jacobs v. Scott.
Related Cases
Accessory to Murder
Under the system of law passed down to Americans via the English common-law system, guilt is personal and individual, rather than collective. This is theessence of the liberal Western tradition. By contrast, in a country such as China, family members are routinely held responsible for the crimes of a relative.
The only way an American citizen can be held guilty for another person's crime is if it can be proven that they aided or abetted the crime. They may either be an accessory before the fact, if they encouraged, ordered, aided, or advised the commission of a crime; or an accessory after the fact, if they gaveaid to someone who they knew was a felon by assisting him in eluding captureor by destroying evidence.
These common-law classifications, which are coupled with principals in the first degree (those who actually commit the crime) and principals in the seconddegree (those who assist in the commission of the crime) are subject to somevariation. For instance, in the case of Charles Manson, whose disciples murdered seven adults in Los Angeles over the course of two nights in August of 1969, Manson was clearly more than an accomplice before the fact, even thoughhe was not actually present at the scene of the murders.
Sources
Kadish, Sanford H., ed. Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice. New York: Free Press, 1983.
Earl Enmund
Respondent
State of Florida
Petitioner's Claim
That his death sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violationof the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for aiding a felony that ended up amurder, even though he did not participate in the murder or intend for it tohappen.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
James S. Liebman
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Lawrence A. Kaden
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
2 July 1982
Decision
The Supreme Court held that Enmund's sentence violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to fair punishment proportionate to his role in the crime. The Court found that Enmund's deed warranted a serious punishment, but notcapital punishment, as the state of Florida argued.
Significance
The Supreme Court's decision in this case stands out as one of the more liberal opinions of the Court for cases involving the death sentence of a person who did not actually attempt or intend to kill the victim. Because the state conceded that it could not prove that Enmund attempted or intended to kill thevictim, the Court reversed the lower courts' rulings. However, the Supreme Court ruled differently in later cases, indicating that the Court has grown less lenient over the years.
The Facts of the Crime
The state of Florida charged Earl Enmund, the petitioner, with first-degree murder and robbery perpetrated against two elderly people. The Florida SupremeCourt upheld this decision, although it recognized that the court could onlyinfer that Enmund drove the car that helped the killers, Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong, escape. Under Florida law, the state could prosecute Enmund as aconstructive accomplice because he drove the getaway car, considering him equally responsible for the homicides.
Based on witness testimony, the court deduced that Enmund had driven the Armstrongs to and from the scene of the crime, although no direct evidence existed. According to the court's theory, Enmund waited in the car while the Armstrongs pretended to need water to stop his car from overheating. Sampson Armstrong then pulled a gun on one of the residents, Thomas Kersey. Kersey called his wife for help, who came out with a gun and shot Jeanette Armstrong, wounding her. After that, Sampson Armstrong killed and robbed the Kerseys. Then theArmstrongs fled in the car driven by Enmund.
The Legal Process
The court charged Enmund with and convicted him of two counts of first-degreemurder and one count of robbery. Because Enmund received the death penalty,he appealed his sentence to the Florida Supreme Court, which upheld the lowercourt's decision. The Florida Supreme Court argued that because Enmund was an accomplice in an armed robbery when the murders took place and because Enmund was previously convicted of a felony involving at least the threat of violence, the death sentence suited the crime.
On 23 March 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court began hearing the case and considering whether states could apply the death penalty without violating the Eighthand Fourteenth Amendments to felons "who neither took life, attempted to takelife, nor intended to take life." In the 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court majority contended that the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishmentdid not allow a capital punishment sentence in this case, because of previous Supreme Court decisions such as Weems v. United States (1910) wherea man was sentenced to 15 years of hard labor for falsifying a public document and Coker v. Georgia (1977) where a man received the death penalty for raping a woman. With these Supreme Court decisions in the background, themajority also compared the sentences of other jurisdictions with Enmund's sentence and found that of the 36 jurisdictions only 8 permit the death penaltyin similar cases. Furthermore, the Court considered jury verdicts for death sentences and the death row population and noticed that accomplices who did not participate in the murder accounted for only a small minority, demonstrating that the general population rejects the use of the death penalty for an accomplice such as Enmund, who do not plan or attempt to kill.
Given this foundation, the Court found that although Enmund's robbery conviction was indeed a serious offense that warranted a stiff penalty, it was not so atrocious that it warranted capital punishment. While the Court admitted that the death penalty can apply to robbers who commit murder in the process ofrobbing without violating the Constitution, it maintained that in order forit to apply to Enmund's case and ones like it, courts must demonstrate that Enmund's behavior directly led to the murder, thus making him responsible. Bystudying statistics of robberies in the United States, the Court concluded that murders occur in conjunction with robberies only less than one percent ofthe time and so it showed that as a robber alone Enmund should not have anticipated murder as a possible outcome. Therefore, the Supreme Court majority reversed the state supreme court's ruling, finding the death penalty in this case a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Degree of Responsibility
However, the dissenting justices believed that the majority's decision interfered with the state criteria for determining guilt, relying too much on intent. They also point out that 23 states allow courts to impose capital punishment even when the accused neither kills or intends to kill the victim. Consequently, they reached a different conclusion than the majority. Contrary to theclaim that society largely disapproves of the death penalty for cases such as Enmund's, they found that two-thirds of the states that have the death penalty embrace it as an acceptable and appropriate punishment for accessories tofelonies that result in murder.
Furthermore, the dissenting justices argued that the Eighth Amendment calls not only for a ban on cruel and unusual punishment, but also for a sentence proportionate to the harm and damage caused by degree of responsibility of theaccused. Since Enmund set the crime in motion by planning it and driving theArmstrongs to the Kersey home, he must accept a greater share of the guilt than he or the Supreme Court majority admitted, according to the dissenting justices.
Implications of Decision
Although the Supreme Court majority decided to overturn the lower courts' rulings, its decision did not constitute the final say in the execution of accomplice felons who did not attempt or intend to kill the victim in crimes thatresulted in murder. The Court never overruled this decision, but it reached more stringent decisions for similar cases afterwards, reducing the role intent plays. For example, in 1995 the Court denied a man a stay of execution, even though the state admitted that he did not participate in the killing of thevictim, whom he helped kidnap in Jacobs v. Scott.
The question before us is not the proportionality of death as a penalty for murder, but rather the validity of capital punishment for Enmund's own conduct. The focus must be on his accountability, not on those who committed the robbery andshot the victims, for we insist on `individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.'
Related Cases
- Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
- Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
- Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986).
- Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
- Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1987).
- Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067 (1995).
Accessory to Murder
Under the system of law passed down to Americans via the English common-law system, guilt is personal and individual, rather than collective. This is theessence of the liberal Western tradition. By contrast, in a country such as China, family members are routinely held responsible for the crimes of a relative.
The only way an American citizen can be held guilty for another person's crime is if it can be proven that they aided or abetted the crime. They may either be an accessory before the fact, if they encouraged, ordered, aided, or advised the commission of a crime; or an accessory after the fact, if they gaveaid to someone who they knew was a felon by assisting him in eluding captureor by destroying evidence.
These common-law classifications, which are coupled with principals in the first degree (those who actually commit the crime) and principals in the seconddegree (those who assist in the commission of the crime) are subject to somevariation. For instance, in the case of Charles Manson, whose disciples murdered seven adults in Los Angeles over the course of two nights in August of 1969, Manson was clearly more than an accomplice before the fact, even thoughhe was not actually present at the scene of the murders.
Sources
Kadish, Sanford H., ed. Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice. New York: Free Press, 1983.
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1996.
- Camper, Diane. "The Court's Hectic Finale." Newsweek, July 12, 1982.
- Greenhouse, Linda. "Court Upholds Execute Order Appeal Denied Despite Recant."Times=Picayune, January 3, 1995.
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