Petitioner
Joshaway Davis
Respondent
State of Alaska
Petitioner's Claim
By being prohibited from cross-examining a prosecution witness regarding thewitness's status as a juvenile offender (under a state law protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders), petitioner was denied his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth (and Fourteenth) Amendments.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Robert H. Wagstaff
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Charles M. Merriner
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger (writing for theCourt), William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., PotterStewart
Justices Dissenting
William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
27 February 1974
Decision
A defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses outweighs a state's interest in protecting the anonymity of a juvenile offender when the juvenile is a witness for the prosecution in a criminal case.
Significance
Further reinforces the importance of Sixth Amendment protections for criminaldefendants.
The Facts of the Case
Joshaway Davis was charged with burglary of a bar and theft of a safe containing more than $1,000, Green a witness for the prosecution, testified that hehad seen Davis, holding a crowbar, and another man standing by Davis's car near the site where the pried-open, empty safe was later found (which was the property of Green's stepfather). There was other evidence that pointed to Davis as the thief--paint chips and insulation matching that of the stolen safe were found in his car--but Green's testimony was important as direct, eyewitness evidence linking Davis to the place where the safe was discovered shortlyafter the crime.
Green, a minor, was himself on probation at the time for the burglary of twocabins. Before the trial of Davis for grand larceny and burglary, the prosecutor asked for and obtained a protective order prohibiting any reference during cross-examination to Green's status as a juvenile offender under an Alaskastate law protecting the identities of minors charged with crimes, despite the opposition of Davis's counsel.
Davis's counsel wanted to discredit Green's testimony by showing that as a probationer he was subject to police pressure to testify in the manner they desired. At trial, although prohibited from bringing up Green's status as a juvenile offender, he questioned Green regarding his state of mind: was he "upset" when he heard about the discovery of the safe near his home? Did he feel "uncomfortable" about it? Did he "suspect for a moment that the police might somehow think that [he] was involved in this"? After eliciting from Green the fact that Green had been driven to the police station and that he had been questioned by two investigators, Davis's counsel asked, "Had you been questionedlike that before by any law enforcement officers?" to which Green replied, "No." At this point the prosecution objected, and the judge sustained the objection, cutting off further inquiry in that direction.
Davis was convicted of burglary and grand larceny, and he appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court on grounds that the limits on his cross-examination of Green violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, the crux of which is the right to cross-examine them and, if desired, to impeach their credibility. The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court, stating that "counsel for the defendant was able adequately to question[Green] in considerable detail concerning the possibility of bias or motive." Because of this the "jury . . . was afforded the opportunity to pass on [Green's] credibility"; thus there was no need to rule on any possible conflictof the state's protection of Green as a minor and Davis's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.
The requisite number of justices did see the necessity of adjudicating a conflict of rights in this instance, however, and the U.S. Supreme Court grantedcertiorari. In a 7-2 decision the Court reversed Davis's conviction, ruling that the state of Alaska had prevented him from effective cross-examination of Green in violation the Sixth Amendment.
The Majority Decision
Chief Justice Burger began by stating that the Sixth Amendment has always been construed to include not only a defendant's right to be physically presentduring the testimony of witnesses against him but to include cross-examination of those witnesses. This is in the interest of the state as well as that ofa defendant because such questioning "is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested." This goes beyond simple examination of possible inaccuracy of fact or memory: "the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to . . . discredit the witness."Presenting "possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives" is material tothe credibility of the witness and is "a proper and important function of theconstitutionally protected right of cross-examination."
Although defense counsel attempted to demonstrate bias on Green's part, he was prohibited from presenting a record of fact that would have supported his contention and indeed would have presented another reason for the jurors to question Davis's truthfulness: his position as a juvenile offender on probationrendered him vulnerable to police pressure. Without such knowledge the jurycould have concluded that there was no basis to the defense's imputations ofbias. Davis's counsel could have questioned Green more effectively regardinghis possible worry that the police might have suspected Green himself of theburglary and perhaps, more importantly, also could have effectively brought forth the issue of possible police pressure on Green, resulting in a fear of jeopardizing his probationary status if he did not cooperate with them.
The "accuracy and truthfulness of Green's testimony were key elements in theState's case," but nonetheless it was not necessary for the petitioner to prove that had the cross-examination not been restricted the jury would have made a different judgment of Green's credibility. The jurors were "entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them" but were not given the opportunity to hear facts that may have affected their evaluation of Green's testimony. Davis "was thus denied the right of effective cross-examination."
Recognizing the legitimacy of state interest in the protection of minors, theCourt did not attack the constitutionality of the Alaska state law itself; rather, the majority argued that the state's interest in protecting Green "must fall before the right of petitioner to seek out the truth in the process ofdefending himself." Had the state wished to, it could have abstained from presenting Green as a witness.
Justice Stewart, in a brief concurring opinion, noted that the balancing of rights in this specific case resulting in a ruling for the petitioner did notmean that in every case the right to discredit a witness by making referenceto "past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions" during cross-examination was automatically conferred.
Although it was not addressed in the Court's decision, the petitioner had also cited in his claim the Fourteenth Amendment, which made the protections ofthe Bill of Rights applicable to the states.
The Dissent
Justice White issued a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Rehnquist. Theydeclared that "there [was] no constitutional principle at stake here." Trialcourts have the power to "control or limit cross-examination," and appellatecourts may uphold controls. The Supreme Court "insists on second-guessing" the judgment of trial judges and appellate courts. White and Rehnquist believedthat such "second-guessing" was unlikely to result in superior judgments, given "fact-bound cases and a cold record."
Impact
The decision in Davis further stressed the importance of the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to confront and cross-examine their accusers. The case has often been referred to in efforts to impeach the testimonyof witnesses during cross examination. The important ruling in Davis was that discrediting a witness by revealing their motives is inherent to an individual's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. In Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) the sanctity of the Confrontation Clause stressed in Davis was reaffirmed. The ruling in Davis also undermined the ability ofstates to protect the anonymity of juvenile offenders. In Smith v. DailyMail Publishing Co. the Court cited Davis (1979) ruling that a state cannot prohibit the "truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name."
Davis has been also been a popular citation in child abuse and rape cases. In a Western New England Law Review article, Jason M. Price wrote: "Courts usually employ . . . Davis in interpreting rape shield statutes to allow sexual history evidence related to victim's motive to fabricate." In Olden v. Kentucky (1988) the Court employed Davis to allowthe cross examination of a witness whose testimony had significant bearing on the truthfulness of the events. In this case, what appeared to be rape on the surface, turned out to be an extramarital affair upon cross examination.
Related Cases
Separate Rights for Juveniles?
If persons under the age of 18 are to enjoy the same rights as adults, is itfair that they should have privileges denied to adults, included anonymity for juvenile offenders? Australia, which like the United States has a legal system based in part on English common law, appears to think not: in 1996 the government of New South Wales began considering removal of the time-honored juvenile right to anonymity as a means of curbing crime among youths.
The Australian measure is in keeping with rising concerns among Americans regarding kids and crime. As the newspapers are filled with stories of juvenilemurderers, numerous jurisdictions in the United States have adopted measuresto treat underage killers as adults.
Is this an appropriate response? Many would say that if a child can commit the crime of an adult, he should serve the time of an adult. Others emphasize the fact that youths possess a lesser degree of judgment than adults, and maynot know as clearly what they are doing when they commit a crime--even murder. Still others say that an increase in juvenile crime is a sign of deep societal problems that cannot be dealt with simply by a change of laws.
Sources
Levy, Leonard W. ed. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. New York: Macmillan, 1986.
Joshaway Davis
Respondent
State of Alaska
Petitioner's Claim
By being prohibited from cross-examining a prosecution witness regarding thewitness's status as a juvenile offender (under a state law protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders), petitioner was denied his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth (and Fourteenth) Amendments.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Robert H. Wagstaff
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Charles M. Merriner
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger (writing for theCourt), William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., PotterStewart
Justices Dissenting
William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
27 February 1974
Decision
A defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses outweighs a state's interest in protecting the anonymity of a juvenile offender when the juvenile is a witness for the prosecution in a criminal case.
Significance
Further reinforces the importance of Sixth Amendment protections for criminaldefendants.
The Facts of the Case
Joshaway Davis was charged with burglary of a bar and theft of a safe containing more than $1,000, Green a witness for the prosecution, testified that hehad seen Davis, holding a crowbar, and another man standing by Davis's car near the site where the pried-open, empty safe was later found (which was the property of Green's stepfather). There was other evidence that pointed to Davis as the thief--paint chips and insulation matching that of the stolen safe were found in his car--but Green's testimony was important as direct, eyewitness evidence linking Davis to the place where the safe was discovered shortlyafter the crime.
Green, a minor, was himself on probation at the time for the burglary of twocabins. Before the trial of Davis for grand larceny and burglary, the prosecutor asked for and obtained a protective order prohibiting any reference during cross-examination to Green's status as a juvenile offender under an Alaskastate law protecting the identities of minors charged with crimes, despite the opposition of Davis's counsel.
Davis's counsel wanted to discredit Green's testimony by showing that as a probationer he was subject to police pressure to testify in the manner they desired. At trial, although prohibited from bringing up Green's status as a juvenile offender, he questioned Green regarding his state of mind: was he "upset" when he heard about the discovery of the safe near his home? Did he feel "uncomfortable" about it? Did he "suspect for a moment that the police might somehow think that [he] was involved in this"? After eliciting from Green the fact that Green had been driven to the police station and that he had been questioned by two investigators, Davis's counsel asked, "Had you been questionedlike that before by any law enforcement officers?" to which Green replied, "No." At this point the prosecution objected, and the judge sustained the objection, cutting off further inquiry in that direction.
Davis was convicted of burglary and grand larceny, and he appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court on grounds that the limits on his cross-examination of Green violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, the crux of which is the right to cross-examine them and, if desired, to impeach their credibility. The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court, stating that "counsel for the defendant was able adequately to question[Green] in considerable detail concerning the possibility of bias or motive." Because of this the "jury . . . was afforded the opportunity to pass on [Green's] credibility"; thus there was no need to rule on any possible conflictof the state's protection of Green as a minor and Davis's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.
The requisite number of justices did see the necessity of adjudicating a conflict of rights in this instance, however, and the U.S. Supreme Court grantedcertiorari. In a 7-2 decision the Court reversed Davis's conviction, ruling that the state of Alaska had prevented him from effective cross-examination of Green in violation the Sixth Amendment.
The Majority Decision
Chief Justice Burger began by stating that the Sixth Amendment has always been construed to include not only a defendant's right to be physically presentduring the testimony of witnesses against him but to include cross-examination of those witnesses. This is in the interest of the state as well as that ofa defendant because such questioning "is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested." This goes beyond simple examination of possible inaccuracy of fact or memory: "the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to . . . discredit the witness."Presenting "possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives" is material tothe credibility of the witness and is "a proper and important function of theconstitutionally protected right of cross-examination."
Although defense counsel attempted to demonstrate bias on Green's part, he was prohibited from presenting a record of fact that would have supported his contention and indeed would have presented another reason for the jurors to question Davis's truthfulness: his position as a juvenile offender on probationrendered him vulnerable to police pressure. Without such knowledge the jurycould have concluded that there was no basis to the defense's imputations ofbias. Davis's counsel could have questioned Green more effectively regardinghis possible worry that the police might have suspected Green himself of theburglary and perhaps, more importantly, also could have effectively brought forth the issue of possible police pressure on Green, resulting in a fear of jeopardizing his probationary status if he did not cooperate with them.
The "accuracy and truthfulness of Green's testimony were key elements in theState's case," but nonetheless it was not necessary for the petitioner to prove that had the cross-examination not been restricted the jury would have made a different judgment of Green's credibility. The jurors were "entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them" but were not given the opportunity to hear facts that may have affected their evaluation of Green's testimony. Davis "was thus denied the right of effective cross-examination."
Recognizing the legitimacy of state interest in the protection of minors, theCourt did not attack the constitutionality of the Alaska state law itself; rather, the majority argued that the state's interest in protecting Green "must fall before the right of petitioner to seek out the truth in the process ofdefending himself." Had the state wished to, it could have abstained from presenting Green as a witness.
Justice Stewart, in a brief concurring opinion, noted that the balancing of rights in this specific case resulting in a ruling for the petitioner did notmean that in every case the right to discredit a witness by making referenceto "past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions" during cross-examination was automatically conferred.
Although it was not addressed in the Court's decision, the petitioner had also cited in his claim the Fourteenth Amendment, which made the protections ofthe Bill of Rights applicable to the states.
The Dissent
Justice White issued a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Rehnquist. Theydeclared that "there [was] no constitutional principle at stake here." Trialcourts have the power to "control or limit cross-examination," and appellatecourts may uphold controls. The Supreme Court "insists on second-guessing" the judgment of trial judges and appellate courts. White and Rehnquist believedthat such "second-guessing" was unlikely to result in superior judgments, given "fact-bound cases and a cold record."
Impact
The decision in Davis further stressed the importance of the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to confront and cross-examine their accusers. The case has often been referred to in efforts to impeach the testimonyof witnesses during cross examination. The important ruling in Davis was that discrediting a witness by revealing their motives is inherent to an individual's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. In Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) the sanctity of the Confrontation Clause stressed in Davis was reaffirmed. The ruling in Davis also undermined the ability ofstates to protect the anonymity of juvenile offenders. In Smith v. DailyMail Publishing Co. the Court cited Davis (1979) ruling that a state cannot prohibit the "truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name."
Davis has been also been a popular citation in child abuse and rape cases. In a Western New England Law Review article, Jason M. Price wrote: "Courts usually employ . . . Davis in interpreting rape shield statutes to allow sexual history evidence related to victim's motive to fabricate." In Olden v. Kentucky (1988) the Court employed Davis to allowthe cross examination of a witness whose testimony had significant bearing on the truthfulness of the events. In this case, what appeared to be rape on the surface, turned out to be an extramarital affair upon cross examination.
Related Cases
- Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
- Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
- Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988).
- Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
Separate Rights for Juveniles?
If persons under the age of 18 are to enjoy the same rights as adults, is itfair that they should have privileges denied to adults, included anonymity for juvenile offenders? Australia, which like the United States has a legal system based in part on English common law, appears to think not: in 1996 the government of New South Wales began considering removal of the time-honored juvenile right to anonymity as a means of curbing crime among youths.
The Australian measure is in keeping with rising concerns among Americans regarding kids and crime. As the newspapers are filled with stories of juvenilemurderers, numerous jurisdictions in the United States have adopted measuresto treat underage killers as adults.
Is this an appropriate response? Many would say that if a child can commit the crime of an adult, he should serve the time of an adult. Others emphasize the fact that youths possess a lesser degree of judgment than adults, and maynot know as clearly what they are doing when they commit a crime--even murder. Still others say that an increase in juvenile crime is a sign of deep societal problems that cannot be dealt with simply by a change of laws.
Sources
Levy, Leonard W. ed. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. New York: Macmillan, 1986.
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1996.
- Price, Jason M. "Sex, Lies, and Rape Shield Statutes: The Constitutionality of Interpreting Rape Shield Statutes to Exclude Evidence Relating to the Victim's Motive to Fabricate." Western New England Law Review, Vol. 18,no. 541, 1996.
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