Davis v. Alaska

Chief Justice Burger began by stating that the Sixth Amendment has always been construed to include not only a defendant's right to be physically present during the testimony of witnesses against him but to include cross-examination of those witnesses. This is in the interest of the state as well as that of a defendant because such questioning "is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested." This goes beyond simple examination of possible inaccuracy of fact or memory: "the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to . . . discredit the witness." Presenting "possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives" is material to the credibility of the witness and is "a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination."

Although defense counsel attempted to demonstrate bias on Green's part, he was prohibited from presenting a record of fact that would have supported his contention and indeed would have presented another reason for the jurors to question Davis's truthfulness: his position as a juvenile offender on probation rendered him vulnerable to police pressure. Without such knowledge the jury could have concluded that there was no basis to the defense's imputations of bias. Davis's counsel could have questioned Green more effectively regarding his possible worry that the police might have suspected Green himself of the burglary and perhaps, more importantly, also could have effectively brought forth the issue of possible police pressure on Green, resulting in a fear of jeopardizing his probationary status if he did not cooperate with them.

The "accuracy and truthfulness of Green's testimony were key elements in the State's case," but nonetheless it was not necessary for the petitioner to prove that had the cross-examination not been restricted the jury would have made a different judgment of Green's credibility. The jurors were "entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them" but were not given the opportunity to hear facts that may have affected their evaluation of Green's testimony. Davis "was thus denied the right of effective cross-examination."

Recognizing the legitimacy of state interest in the protection of minors, the Court did not attack the constitutionality of the Alaska state law itself; rather, the majority argued that the state's interest in protecting Green "must fall before the right of petitioner to seek out the truth in the process of defending himself." Had the state wished to, it could have abstained from presenting Green as a witness.

Justice Stewart, in a brief concurring opinion, noted that the balancing of rights in this specific case resulting in a ruling for the petitioner did not mean that in every case the right to discredit a witness by making reference to "past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions" during cross-examination was automatically conferred.

Although it was not addressed in the Court's decision, the petitioner had also cited in his claim the Fourteenth Amendment, which made the protections of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.