Appellant
Walter M. Pierce, Governor of Oregon
Appellees
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, Hill Military Academy
Appellant's Claim
That an Oregon law requiring students between eight and sixteen years old toattend public schools did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyers for Appellant
George E. Chamberlain, Albert H. Putney
Chief Lawyer for Appellees
William D. Guthrie
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Oliver Wendell Holmes, James Clark McReynolds (writing for the Court), Edward Terry Sanford, Harlan Fiske Stone, GeorgeSutherland, William Howard Taft, Willis Van Devanter
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
1 June 1925
Decision
The Court affirmed a lower court's injunction prohibiting enforcement of theOregon law.
Significance
Following up on its 1923 decision in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court saidparents have the right to choose how their children are educated, though thestates can compel children to attend some kind of school and set minimum standards for private schools. As with Meyer, the Pierce decisionwas later used to help craft an unwritten constitutional right to privacy.
After World War I, some states concerned about the influence of immigrants and "foreign" values looked to public schools for help. The states drafted lawsdesigned to use schools to promote a common American culture. But in their patriotic zeal, the states sometimes trampled on the constitutional rights oftheir citizens. Oregon was one of the states that tried to dictate how children should be educated, but the Supreme Court thwarted the effort.
In 1922, Oregon voters approved an initiative that required all students between eight and sixteen years old--with limited exceptions--to attend public schools. Parents or legal guardians who disobeyed the law faced arrest on misdemeanor charges. The drive for the Compulsory Education Act was led by the KuKlux Klan and the Scottish Rite Masons, and it reflected anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic sentiments. The law's supporters did not want students of different religious or ethnic backgrounds studying together in private schools. Thelaw was supposed to take effect on 1 September 1926, but private schools were already feeling its effects, as parents removed their children or stopped enrolling new students. Two organizations, the Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, and the Hill Military Academy, filed for injunctions against the Compulsory Education Act.
The Society of Sisters was a Roman Catholic order that took care of orphans and operated a number of parochial schools. Many of its students were betweenages eight and sixteen. Hill was a private military academy that also taughtstudents between those ages. Both schools argued that the education law denied them property-their income from tuition--without due process. Both schoolsalso claimed the compulsory school law infringed on the liberty of parents tochoose the school they desired for their children. The state of Oregon, however, planned to enforce the law, leading to the request for an injunction. Anumber of religious groups supported the request, which was granted by a federal district court. The state then appealed the ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.
A Recent Precedent Sets the Way
The Court voted unanimously to affirm the injunction and strike down the Oregon law. Justice McReynolds drew on the reasoning used in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923). In that case, the Court struck down a Nebraska law prohibiting teachers from using a foreign language in the classroom. In that instance, theCourt said parents had a right to raise their children as they saw fit, andthis applied to the kind of schooling they chose. The same principle, the appellees had argued, was at work in Pierce, and McReynolds agreed:
McReynolds agreed with the appellees' second point as well. The Oregon law denied private schools their right to property by destroying their business. Byforcing students to attend public schools the state would, in practice, shutdown private schools geared toward students between the ages of eight and sixteen.
The Court's decision recognized that states could compel some form of minimumeducation, and had an interest in regulating schools. The state could inspect a school building to ensure it was sound, require teachers to have high moral character, and insist certain courses be taught, but restricting educationto public schools was unconstitutional.
Although Pierce involved a Catholic organization, and parochial schools were an implied target of the Compulsory Education Act, the Court did not address any First Amendment issues regarding the establishment or prohibitionof religion. At the time, the Court had not made the Establishment Clause applicable to the states. It would be another 15 years before that constitutional protection applied to state law in Cantwell v. Connecticut, (1940).But in Pierce, the Court used an economic interpretation, common at the time, of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This "substantive" due process was often invoked to the advantage of American corporationswhen states tried to regulate their behavior. In this case, the economic reasoning was paired with the protection of individual liberty.
The decision in Pierce also reinforced a new concept introduced in Meyer, an implied constitutional right to privacy. In this case, the right extended to how parents raise their children. Forty years later, some members of the Supreme Court used the concept to defend contraceptive rights in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), and then a woman's right to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade (1973). Legal expert Mark Yudof wrote, "If, as some scholars have asserted, America has an `unwritten constitution,' Pierce is a critical example of its invocation."
Related Cases
Walter M. Pierce, Governor of Oregon
Appellees
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, Hill Military Academy
Appellant's Claim
That an Oregon law requiring students between eight and sixteen years old toattend public schools did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyers for Appellant
George E. Chamberlain, Albert H. Putney
Chief Lawyer for Appellees
William D. Guthrie
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Oliver Wendell Holmes, James Clark McReynolds (writing for the Court), Edward Terry Sanford, Harlan Fiske Stone, GeorgeSutherland, William Howard Taft, Willis Van Devanter
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
1 June 1925
Decision
The Court affirmed a lower court's injunction prohibiting enforcement of theOregon law.
Significance
Following up on its 1923 decision in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court saidparents have the right to choose how their children are educated, though thestates can compel children to attend some kind of school and set minimum standards for private schools. As with Meyer, the Pierce decisionwas later used to help craft an unwritten constitutional right to privacy.
After World War I, some states concerned about the influence of immigrants and "foreign" values looked to public schools for help. The states drafted lawsdesigned to use schools to promote a common American culture. But in their patriotic zeal, the states sometimes trampled on the constitutional rights oftheir citizens. Oregon was one of the states that tried to dictate how children should be educated, but the Supreme Court thwarted the effort.
In 1922, Oregon voters approved an initiative that required all students between eight and sixteen years old--with limited exceptions--to attend public schools. Parents or legal guardians who disobeyed the law faced arrest on misdemeanor charges. The drive for the Compulsory Education Act was led by the KuKlux Klan and the Scottish Rite Masons, and it reflected anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic sentiments. The law's supporters did not want students of different religious or ethnic backgrounds studying together in private schools. Thelaw was supposed to take effect on 1 September 1926, but private schools were already feeling its effects, as parents removed their children or stopped enrolling new students. Two organizations, the Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, and the Hill Military Academy, filed for injunctions against the Compulsory Education Act.
The Society of Sisters was a Roman Catholic order that took care of orphans and operated a number of parochial schools. Many of its students were betweenages eight and sixteen. Hill was a private military academy that also taughtstudents between those ages. Both schools argued that the education law denied them property-their income from tuition--without due process. Both schoolsalso claimed the compulsory school law infringed on the liberty of parents tochoose the school they desired for their children. The state of Oregon, however, planned to enforce the law, leading to the request for an injunction. Anumber of religious groups supported the request, which was granted by a federal district court. The state then appealed the ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.
A Recent Precedent Sets the Way
The Court voted unanimously to affirm the injunction and strike down the Oregon law. Justice McReynolds drew on the reasoning used in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923). In that case, the Court struck down a Nebraska law prohibiting teachers from using a foreign language in the classroom. In that instance, theCourt said parents had a right to raise their children as they saw fit, andthis applied to the kind of schooling they chose. The same principle, the appellees had argued, was at work in Pierce, and McReynolds agreed:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The childis not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for higher obligations.
McReynolds agreed with the appellees' second point as well. The Oregon law denied private schools their right to property by destroying their business. Byforcing students to attend public schools the state would, in practice, shutdown private schools geared toward students between the ages of eight and sixteen.
The Court's decision recognized that states could compel some form of minimumeducation, and had an interest in regulating schools. The state could inspect a school building to ensure it was sound, require teachers to have high moral character, and insist certain courses be taught, but restricting educationto public schools was unconstitutional.
Although Pierce involved a Catholic organization, and parochial schools were an implied target of the Compulsory Education Act, the Court did not address any First Amendment issues regarding the establishment or prohibitionof religion. At the time, the Court had not made the Establishment Clause applicable to the states. It would be another 15 years before that constitutional protection applied to state law in Cantwell v. Connecticut, (1940).But in Pierce, the Court used an economic interpretation, common at the time, of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This "substantive" due process was often invoked to the advantage of American corporationswhen states tried to regulate their behavior. In this case, the economic reasoning was paired with the protection of individual liberty.
The decision in Pierce also reinforced a new concept introduced in Meyer, an implied constitutional right to privacy. In this case, the right extended to how parents raise their children. Forty years later, some members of the Supreme Court used the concept to defend contraceptive rights in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), and then a woman's right to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade (1973). Legal expert Mark Yudof wrote, "If, as some scholars have asserted, America has an `unwritten constitution,' Pierce is a critical example of its invocation."
Related Cases
- Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
- Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
- Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
- Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
- Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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