Petitioners
Okanogan, Methow, San Poelis, Nespelem, Colville, and Lake Indian Tribes or Bands of Washington State
Respondent
United States
Petitioners' Claim
That the U.S. Court of Claims erred in finding a suit by the Okanogan Indians, et al. to be without legal foundation.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
William S. Lewis
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
William D. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Oliver Wendell Holmes, James Clark McReynolds, Edward Terry Sanford (writing for the Court), Harlan Fiske Stone, GeorgeSutherland, William Howard Taft, Willis Van Devanter
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
27 May 1929
Decision
The court of claims decision was affirmed.
Significance
The Court's decision legitimized presidential rejection of legislation by useof the "pocket veto."
Related Cases
The Pocket Veto
The Constitution mandates that the president has ten days to veto a bill; ifhe does not return it with a veto during that time, the bill will automatically become a law. But if Congress is adjourned when those ten days are up, hemay "pocket" the bill, thus vetoing it by default. This is the pocket veto, which has been used in two-fifths of all presidential vetoes. Supporters of astrong executive have favored the pocket veto, whereas adherents of a strongparliamentary government have tended to be opposed to it. Advocates stress that, though the pocket veto is not spelled out in the Constitution, it is a safety valve left there by the framers as a way of making government less rigidby allowing greater input from the executive branch in certain situations. Furthermore, Congress puts itself in the situation of being stymied by a pocket veto. Detractors argue that the pocket veto gives the president too much power and that the veto itself is a mere constitutional loophole.
Sources
Nelson, Michael, ed. The Presidency A to Z: A Ready Reference Encyclopedia. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1994.
President Coolidge's Pocket Veto and the Washington Tribes
Whenever a new law is passed by both houses of the U.S. Congress, the proposed statute is passed to the president, who has the option of approving the lawby signing it or rejecting it with a veto. A vetoed bill is normally returned to Congress with the president's objections noted so that Congress can reconsider the bill. If the president neither signs nor vetoes the bill within ten days, not counting Sundays, the measure automatically becomes law.
If Congress passes the measure and then adjourns, however, leaving the president less than the required ten days to consider the bill, the president may ignore the bill. Under such circumstances, the lack of a presidential signature prevents the bill from becoming law. This is called a pocket veto.
Presidents, beginning with James Madison, used the pocket veto to reject legislation handed to them at the close of congressional terms. Yet the constitutionality of the pocket veto was not tested in the Supreme Court until 1929, in a case which pitted the legislative and executive branches of the government against each other.
In 1926, Congress passed a bill allowing a group of American Indian tribes from the state of Washington to present a bill to the court of claims for the loss of tribal lands. The bill was signed by the 69th Congress and presented to President Calvin Coolidge on 24 June 1926. When Congress adjourned on 3 July, President Coolidge had still not signed the bill. If Congress had not gonehome for the summer, it could have expected the bill back by 6 July, a datewhich passed with no word from the White House.
When the Okanogan Indians and other tribes presented their suit to the courtof claims, they assumed that ten working days of Congress had passed, automatically making their bill law even without Coolidge's signature. The court ofclaims, however, dismissed the Indians suit, ruling that the congressional bill upon which their claims were based had been "pocket-vetoed" and was therefore invalid.
The Washington tribes were not the only ones outraged. A 1925 congressional resolution providing for a federal takeover of the Muscle Shoals power stationin Alabama had also been placed on the president's desk. It too lacked a presidential signature. Congressional supporters of the Indian relief bill--along with those who had voted for the Muscle Shoals resolution--were pitted against the White House. The Washington tribes appealed the court of claims' decision to the Supreme Court, which accepted the case to rule on the collision between the legislative and executive branches of the government.
When the case was heard on 11 March 1929, U.S. Attorney General William D. Mitchell argued the case for the executive branch, proposing that the court ofclaims' judgment should stand. Mitchell noted that 119 important cases had been decided by pocket vetoes in the past century. To suddenly declare that thepractice was invalid would create havoc within the legislative process, opening the way for retroactive legal challenges. The so-called pocket vetoes, Mitchell argued, were an accepted method of disposing of legislation a president might otherwise formally veto.
The Indians' attorney, William S. Lewis, responded that the bill had been properly forwarded to President Coolidge for his signature. Lewis argued that Congress had merely gone home for the summer recess and had not adjourned. Whenthe required ten days passed without the president signing the bill or returning it with a veto and enumerating his objections, the bill had automatically become law. To this, Attorney General Mitchell replied that there was no way to return a bill to a body that was not in session. Ten days, by Mitchell'sdefinition, meant ten calendar days.
Attorney Lewis was joined by Texas Representative Hatton W. Sumners, the senior member of the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee. Sumners appeared before the Supreme Court with an amicus curiae or "friend of the court" brief supporting the Okanogan position. Congressman Sumners argued thatthe pocket veto gave presidents powers not granted by the Constitution. Theseincluded an absolute veto, eliminating any opportunity to overcome presidential rejection of legislation with a vote by two-thirds of Congress. A pocketveto also sidestepped a president's responsibility to explain executive objections to a bill.
A Definition of Adjournment
On 27 May, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the court of claims' decision not to hear the Okanogan claims. In the written opinion, Justice Sanford emphasized that Congress had no power to shorten or lengthen the amount of time a president was allowed to consider a bill. The Court placed responsibilityfor providing the ten-day consideration period on Congress, which had adjourned without giving the president the required time to sign the bill or applya normal veto.
Even under this interpretation, the case centered upon what the Constitutionmeant by the word "adjournment." The Court agreed with Attorney General Mitchell's contention that an adjournment as referred to in the ten-day rule meantany cessation of congressional activity. The Constitution did not qualify its definition with the word "final." Since there was no mention of "legislative days" or any other descriptive adjective in the Constitution, the Court declared that the rule simply applied to ten calendar days.
Past Congresses and presidents had accepted the use of pocket vetoes for overa century. In judging constitutional issues, the Court concluded, such a "long settled and well established practice" could not be ignored.
Ironically, President Coolidge, whose missing signature brought about the suit, left office before the Court finally and officially legitimized the use ofpocket vetoes. In 1938, in its Wright v. United States decision, theCourt declared that a clerk or other representative of Congress could receivea presidential veto during a short recess and deliver it upon Congress's return. While this had the practical effect of providing a ten-day period for executive perusal of new legislation even when Congress was not in its chambers, later presidents continued to employ pocket vetoes, often with controversial results.
Okanogan, Methow, San Poelis, Nespelem, Colville, and Lake Indian Tribes or Bands of Washington State
Respondent
United States
Petitioners' Claim
That the U.S. Court of Claims erred in finding a suit by the Okanogan Indians, et al. to be without legal foundation.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
William S. Lewis
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
William D. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Oliver Wendell Holmes, James Clark McReynolds, Edward Terry Sanford (writing for the Court), Harlan Fiske Stone, GeorgeSutherland, William Howard Taft, Willis Van Devanter
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
27 May 1929
Decision
The court of claims decision was affirmed.
Significance
The Court's decision legitimized presidential rejection of legislation by useof the "pocket veto."
Related Cases
- Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
- Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938).
The Pocket Veto
The Constitution mandates that the president has ten days to veto a bill; ifhe does not return it with a veto during that time, the bill will automatically become a law. But if Congress is adjourned when those ten days are up, hemay "pocket" the bill, thus vetoing it by default. This is the pocket veto, which has been used in two-fifths of all presidential vetoes. Supporters of astrong executive have favored the pocket veto, whereas adherents of a strongparliamentary government have tended to be opposed to it. Advocates stress that, though the pocket veto is not spelled out in the Constitution, it is a safety valve left there by the framers as a way of making government less rigidby allowing greater input from the executive branch in certain situations. Furthermore, Congress puts itself in the situation of being stymied by a pocket veto. Detractors argue that the pocket veto gives the president too much power and that the veto itself is a mere constitutional loophole.
Sources
Nelson, Michael, ed. The Presidency A to Z: A Ready Reference Encyclopedia. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1994.
President Coolidge's Pocket Veto and the Washington Tribes
Whenever a new law is passed by both houses of the U.S. Congress, the proposed statute is passed to the president, who has the option of approving the lawby signing it or rejecting it with a veto. A vetoed bill is normally returned to Congress with the president's objections noted so that Congress can reconsider the bill. If the president neither signs nor vetoes the bill within ten days, not counting Sundays, the measure automatically becomes law.
If Congress passes the measure and then adjourns, however, leaving the president less than the required ten days to consider the bill, the president may ignore the bill. Under such circumstances, the lack of a presidential signature prevents the bill from becoming law. This is called a pocket veto.
Presidents, beginning with James Madison, used the pocket veto to reject legislation handed to them at the close of congressional terms. Yet the constitutionality of the pocket veto was not tested in the Supreme Court until 1929, in a case which pitted the legislative and executive branches of the government against each other.
In 1926, Congress passed a bill allowing a group of American Indian tribes from the state of Washington to present a bill to the court of claims for the loss of tribal lands. The bill was signed by the 69th Congress and presented to President Calvin Coolidge on 24 June 1926. When Congress adjourned on 3 July, President Coolidge had still not signed the bill. If Congress had not gonehome for the summer, it could have expected the bill back by 6 July, a datewhich passed with no word from the White House.
When the Okanogan Indians and other tribes presented their suit to the courtof claims, they assumed that ten working days of Congress had passed, automatically making their bill law even without Coolidge's signature. The court ofclaims, however, dismissed the Indians suit, ruling that the congressional bill upon which their claims were based had been "pocket-vetoed" and was therefore invalid.
The Washington tribes were not the only ones outraged. A 1925 congressional resolution providing for a federal takeover of the Muscle Shoals power stationin Alabama had also been placed on the president's desk. It too lacked a presidential signature. Congressional supporters of the Indian relief bill--along with those who had voted for the Muscle Shoals resolution--were pitted against the White House. The Washington tribes appealed the court of claims' decision to the Supreme Court, which accepted the case to rule on the collision between the legislative and executive branches of the government.
When the case was heard on 11 March 1929, U.S. Attorney General William D. Mitchell argued the case for the executive branch, proposing that the court ofclaims' judgment should stand. Mitchell noted that 119 important cases had been decided by pocket vetoes in the past century. To suddenly declare that thepractice was invalid would create havoc within the legislative process, opening the way for retroactive legal challenges. The so-called pocket vetoes, Mitchell argued, were an accepted method of disposing of legislation a president might otherwise formally veto.
The Indians' attorney, William S. Lewis, responded that the bill had been properly forwarded to President Coolidge for his signature. Lewis argued that Congress had merely gone home for the summer recess and had not adjourned. Whenthe required ten days passed without the president signing the bill or returning it with a veto and enumerating his objections, the bill had automatically become law. To this, Attorney General Mitchell replied that there was no way to return a bill to a body that was not in session. Ten days, by Mitchell'sdefinition, meant ten calendar days.
Attorney Lewis was joined by Texas Representative Hatton W. Sumners, the senior member of the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee. Sumners appeared before the Supreme Court with an amicus curiae or "friend of the court" brief supporting the Okanogan position. Congressman Sumners argued thatthe pocket veto gave presidents powers not granted by the Constitution. Theseincluded an absolute veto, eliminating any opportunity to overcome presidential rejection of legislation with a vote by two-thirds of Congress. A pocketveto also sidestepped a president's responsibility to explain executive objections to a bill.
A Definition of Adjournment
On 27 May, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the court of claims' decision not to hear the Okanogan claims. In the written opinion, Justice Sanford emphasized that Congress had no power to shorten or lengthen the amount of time a president was allowed to consider a bill. The Court placed responsibilityfor providing the ten-day consideration period on Congress, which had adjourned without giving the president the required time to sign the bill or applya normal veto.
Even under this interpretation, the case centered upon what the Constitutionmeant by the word "adjournment." The Court agreed with Attorney General Mitchell's contention that an adjournment as referred to in the ten-day rule meantany cessation of congressional activity. The Constitution did not qualify its definition with the word "final." Since there was no mention of "legislative days" or any other descriptive adjective in the Constitution, the Court declared that the rule simply applied to ten calendar days.
Past Congresses and presidents had accepted the use of pocket vetoes for overa century. In judging constitutional issues, the Court concluded, such a "long settled and well established practice" could not be ignored.
Ironically, President Coolidge, whose missing signature brought about the suit, left office before the Court finally and officially legitimized the use ofpocket vetoes. In 1938, in its Wright v. United States decision, theCourt declared that a clerk or other representative of Congress could receivea presidential veto during a short recess and deliver it upon Congress's return. While this had the practical effect of providing a ten-day period for executive perusal of new legislation even when Congress was not in its chambers, later presidents continued to employ pocket vetoes, often with controversial results.
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