Patton v. United States

Appellants
John Patton, Harold Conant, Jack Butler
Appellee
United States
Appellants' Claim
That defendants in a federal criminal trial cannot waive their right to a trial by jury composed of fewer than 12 jurors.
Chief Lawyer for Appellants
Claude Nowlin
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Charles E. Hughes, U.S. Solicitor General
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Oliver Wendell Holmes, James Clark McReynolds, Harlan Fiske Stone, Edward Terry Sanford, George Sutherland (writing forthe Court), Willis Van Devanter
Justices Dissenting
None (William Howard Taft did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
14 April 1930
Decision
The Court affirmed a defendant's right to waive a trial by jury in federal criminal cases, but required the presiding judge and government attorneys to agree to the waiver as well.
Significance
Clarified the circumstances under which a defendant may waive the right to atrial.
An accused person's right to a trial by jury predates the Constitution, withdeep roots in American and English common law. Sometimes, however, defendantsmight agree to waive that right, or to accept a jury with fewer than 12 members. That is what John Patton, Harold Conant, and Jack Butler did, and when they later changed their minds, the Supreme Court upheld a right the men wished they had not exercised.
During the days of Prohibition, the three men were involved in bootlegging alcohol. After conspiring to bribe a federal Prohibition agent, Patton and hisassociates were arrested and tried in an Oklahoma Federal District Court. Thethree defendants pleaded not guilty. The trial began on 19 October 1927 with12 jurors. A week later, however, one juror fell seriously ill and could nolonger serve on the panel. Patton, Conant, and Butler, along with their attorneys, agreed to let the trial continue with just 11 jurors. The government and the trial judge also agreed. The next day the jury found the defendants guilty.
Patton and the other men then appealed their conviction to the Eighth CircuitCourt of Appeals, claiming they had no power to waive their right to a jurytrial with fewer than 12 jurors. The circuit court, not sure how to decide the case, asked the Supreme Court for instruction.
Trial by Jury and the Constitution
Patton's lawyer, Charles Nowlin, filed a brief to the Supreme Court citing cases in which the Court suggested a defendant was not entitled to waive the right to trial by jury. But in this case, the Court voted 4-3 to explicitly give defendants in federal criminal cases the power to waive their right to a trial by jury. Justice Sutherland noted that the issue was an important one, aslower courts had differed on the question and the Supreme Court had never directly ruled on it.
Sutherland began his decision by examining the constitutional rights to trialby jury, as contained in Article III Section 2 and the Sixth Amendment. Sutherland defined what constituted a trial by jury: a jury of 12 people, a judgewith the power to instruct jurors on points of law and advise them on facts,and a unanimous verdict. These three components, Sutherland wrote, rested oncommon law principles that were beyond the reach of any legislative tampering. The elimination of any one of the three elements violated a defendant's constitutional rights.
Sutherland then came to the crux of the issue in Patton, as the Courtsaw it: was the right to trial by jury "a part of the frame of government" orjust a "guarantee to the accused the right to such a trial"? After exploringseveral state and federal cases on the topic, Sutherland reached this conclusion:

The record of English and colonial jurisprudence antedatingthe Constitution will be searched in vain for evidence that trial by jury incriminal cases was regarded as part of the structure of government, as distinguished from a right or privilege of the accused. On the contrary, it uniformly was regarded as a valuable privilege bestowed upon the person accused of crime for the purpose of safeguarding him against the oppressive power of theking and the arbitrary or partial judgment of the court . . . Article III Section 2 . . . was meant to confer a right upon the accused which he may foregoat his election. To deny his power to do is to convert a privilege into an imperative requirement.

Sutherland again referred to English Common Law, acknowledging that it mightseem to contradict the power the Court just granted to a defendant to waive atrial by jury. Under common law, the accused was not permitted to waive thatright "as generally he was not permitted to waive any right which was intended for his protection." But in earlier times, the accused did not have the other legal protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. These protectionsincluded the right of a defendant to testify on his own behalf, the right toan attorney, and the protection from cruel and unusual punishment. With thoseguarantees in place, it was fair to let a defendant waive the right to a trial by jury.
The Court did set some limits on the right to waive a trial by jury, or by ajury with fewer than 12 members. The defendant had to give "express and intelligent consent" to the waiver, and both the government's counsel and the judge had to agree as well. The presiding judge was obligated to use "sound and advised discretion" before granting the right to waive, "with caution increasing as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity."
Related Cases

• In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
  
• Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1919).