Plaintiff
American Libraries Association, et al.
Defendant
George Pataki, Governor of the State of New York, et al.
Plaintiff's Claim
That a New York law prohibiting the dissemination of obscene materials to children through a computer placed impermissible burdens on commerce between thestates, and was thus unconstitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Plaintiff
Jeanne Lahiff, Assistant Attorney General of the State of New York
Chief Defense Lawyer
Michael K. Hertz
Judge
Loretta A. Preska
Place
New York, New York
Date of Decision
20 June 1997
Decision
That the New York statute placed substantial burdens on the free flow of commerce and conflicted with generally applicable federal laws, and thus was unconstitutional.
Significance
By invalidating New York's attempt to regulate Internet communications, the court made it clear that the broad, national character of the Internet renderssuch communications susceptible only to regulation by the federal government. Thus, state attempts to regulate Internet communications will always be invalid. Viewed in conjunction with the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) which struck down a law similar to the New York law on the ground that it violated the First Amendment right to free speech, the Court's decision was a welcome relief to Internet uses who feared increasing government regulation of this rapidly expanding area of communication.
Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution describes the powers of the U.S. Congress. Clause 3 of this section, generally referred to as the Commerce Clause, in part grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several states." Although the Commerce Clause speaks in terms of a positivegrant of power to the federal government, the Commerce Clause has long beenrecognized to carry an implicit negative component prohibiting the state government from regulating interstate commerce in certain respects, notably wherethe state regulation would burden the free flow of commerce from state to state. This "Negative Commerce Clause" was first recognized by Justice Thomas Johnson in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824). Specifically, the Supreme Court hasrecognized three types of state laws or regulations which are prohibited bythe negative aspect of the Commerce Clause: (1) regulations which are aimed directly at prohibiting interstate commerce; (2) regulations which unduly burden interstate commerce; and (3) regulations aimed at aspects of commerce which by their very nature require uniform treatment throughout the United States. In American Libraries Association v. Pataki, the court system considered the extent to which the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibited the state of New York from imposing restrictions on the types of material received over the Internet.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the proliferation of computers and computer technologies led to the development of the Internet. The Internet, a vast, complex network of interconnected computers, allows millions of computerusers to communicate with each other and to access information from around the world on virtually any topic. Among these various categories of information, a large amount of material dealing with topics from drugs to pornography toweaponry is transmitted over the Internet. New York, along with a number ofother states and the federal government, sought to limit the extent to whichsuch material was sent and received over the Internet. Specifically, New Yorkpassed a law making it a crime to knowingly send over any computer communications system any sexually explicit material to a minor.
The American Library Association, along with a number of other library associations, bookstore associations, Internet service providers, and publishers filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that New York had no power to regulate interstate transmission ofmaterial over the Internet, and thus the law was an unconstitutional violation of the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause. The plaintiffs asked the court to enter a preliminary injunction preventing the state from enforcing thelaw. The court concluded that the New York statute violated the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause, and thus the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction preventing the state from enforcing the law.
Negative Commerce Clause Applies to Internet
Judge Loretta Preska began her analysis by noting that while the Internet iscertainly an innovative technological field, "the innovativeness of the technology does not preclude the application of traditional legal principles provided that those principles are adaptable to cyberspace." Judge Preska first concluded that the Internet, and the New York law, relate to "commerce" under the Commerce Clause. She noted that people engage in commercial transactions over the Internet, and even those who use the Internet for purely noncommercial reasons often do so through a commercial Internet service. Thus, Judge Preska applied the traditional legal principles related to the negative aspect ofthe Commerce Clause and concluded that the New York law violated the Commerce Clause in three ways.
First, Judge Preska concluded that the New York statute was impermissible under the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause because it regulates conduct which occurs wholly outside of New York. She rejected New York's argument thatthe statute sought only to regulate the conduct of New York residents sendingindecent material over the Internet, reasoning that the very nature of the Internet precludes such an argument. She concluded that "[t]he Internet is wholly insensitive to geographic distinctions." She based this conclusion on several factors. For example, she noted that there is no way for a person posting an Internet web page to screen who is accessing the web page based on the location of the user, thus making it impossible for a web poster outside of New York to block a minor in New York from accessing the material. Similarly, people communicating through newsgroup postings or "chat rooms"--both of whichinvolve forms of group electronic discussions--have no way of knowing the location of the other people participating in the discussion. Further, it is possible, and quite frequent, for people communicating via chat rooms or electronic mail to mask the location from which they are communicating. Finally, electronic mail may be routed through New York even though both the sender andrecipient are outside New York, or conversely may be routed through another state even though both the sender and recipient are in New York. Thus, Judge Preska concluded, "[t]he New York Act . . . cannot effectively be limited to purely intrastate communications over the Internet because no such communications exist. No user could reliably restrict her communications only to New York recipients."
Next, Judge Preska concluded that, even if the New York law was interpreted as involving only an incidental burden on interstate commerce rather than a direct burden, the statute violated the negative aspect of the Commerce Clausebecause the burdens the law places on commerce between the states outweigh the benefits received by the state from the law. In the 1970 case of Pike v.Bruce Church, Inc. the Court set forth a balancing test for analyzing laws which only indirectly burden interstate commerce. Under this test, the state law "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Applying this test in American Libraries Association, Judge Preska agreed with the state that theprotection of children from receiving indecent materials is a legitimate purpose for the state to pursue. Nevertheless, she concluded that the benefits of the law are not overwhelming. She reasoned that it was unlikely that out ofstate senders of such material would be prosecuted in New York under the law. She also noted that New York has other, more effective laws designed to protect children from sexual exploitation. On the contrary, Judge Preska concluded that the New York law substantially burdens interstate commerce because it"casts its net worldwide" and is likely to deter people from sending communications which may not be banned by the law if the person is unsure of the extent of the law. Thus, she concluded, as a second basis for striking down theNew York law, that "[t]he severe burden on interstate commerce resulting fromthe New York statute is not justifiable in light of the attenuated local benefits arising from it."
Finally, Judge Preska concluded that the Internet was the type of commerce which, by its very nature, demanded uniform, national regulation and not inconsistent regulation by the states. Relying on Supreme Court cases noting that certain aspects of commerce, such as highway and railway regulations, must beuniform across the United States if an efficient economic system is to be maintained, Judge Preska noted that "effective regulation [of the Internet] willrequire national, and more likely global, cooperation. Regulation by any single state can only result in chaos, because at least some states will likelyenact laws subjecting Internet users to conflicting obligations." Accordingly, the need for uniform national regulation of the Internet provided a third basis for concluding that the New York law violated the negative aspect of theCommerce Clause.
Impact
The court's decision in American Libraries Association is extremely important. If followed by other federal courts, the decision means that only Congress, and not the states, will be able to regulate the flow of informationover the Internet. This impact is particularly important given the Supreme Court's subsequent holding in the 1997 case of Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union. In American Libraries Association, Judge Preska did notreach the plaintiffs' argument that the New York statute violated the FirstAmendment's guarantee of free speech, because the law was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. In Reno, the Court invalidated a federal lawregulating indecent material over the Internet which was similar to the New York law on the ground that it violated the right to free speech. Thus taken together, American Libraries Association and Reno provide broadprotections for Internet users. Under these decisions, only the U.S. Congress, and not the states, may regulate the Internet, and Congress must do so in away which does not violate the First Amendment.
Related Cases
Ralph Nader
Born in 1934 in Winsted, Connecticut, Ralph Nader is an attorney and consumerrights advocate who is considered to be the founding father of the consumerrights movement. In the 1980s Nader campaigned against car insurance rates inCalifornia and a 50 percent wage increase for members of Congress. His success with these two high profile issues stand as vivid illustrations of the consumer rights movement which Nader is associated. Nader is the founder of theCenter for Responsive Law, Public Interest Research Group, Center for Auto safety, Clean Water Action Project, the Disability Rights Center, and the Project for Corporate Responsibility.
Nader has been most influential in the area of public safety. He has writtennumerous books on the subject of consumer protection the most notable of which is Unsafe at Any Speed in 1965. The book resulted in the discontinuation of GM's Corvair which Nader reported was dangerous in high speedturns. He was also instrumental in the formation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (1970), the Freedom of Information Act (1974), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (1976). During the deregulating Reagan era the term "Naderism" was coined to characterize the consumer rights movement as an extreme.
Sources
Current Biography, 1986 p. 402.
Mayhem Manuals
The explosion in Internet usage has raised new questions about whether all information therein has a guarantee of Freedom of the Press under the First Amendment. The Constitution guaranteed a free and uncensored press; later expansions provide similar coverages to other print and broadcast media. The 1986 Communication Privacy Act protects individual privacy rights in using email, bulletin boards, and other electronic media.
The devastation caused by the Oklahoma City bombing increased awareness thatthe Internet was itself a tool used by hate groups and others advocating violence and anarchy. Materials detailing how to construct bombs, such as a 93 page "mayhem manual," are available on the Internet, as well as in print. During a Senate Subcommittee debate on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Senators discussed ways that public safety might be maintained without censorship. Up for debate was whether censorship was permissible in casessuch as bomb building manuals. Further, if censorship of such materials was imposed, whether it was feasible to monitor and control such information considering the vastness of the Internet. Senator Arlen Specter noted a 1969 U.S.Supreme Court decision that stated, "Speech could not be punished unless it was `an incitement to imminent lawless action.'"
Sources
Hernandez, Debra Gersh. "Mayhem Online." Editor & Publisher, 24 June 1995, p. 34.
American Libraries Association, et al.
Defendant
George Pataki, Governor of the State of New York, et al.
Plaintiff's Claim
That a New York law prohibiting the dissemination of obscene materials to children through a computer placed impermissible burdens on commerce between thestates, and was thus unconstitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Plaintiff
Jeanne Lahiff, Assistant Attorney General of the State of New York
Chief Defense Lawyer
Michael K. Hertz
Judge
Loretta A. Preska
Place
New York, New York
Date of Decision
20 June 1997
Decision
That the New York statute placed substantial burdens on the free flow of commerce and conflicted with generally applicable federal laws, and thus was unconstitutional.
Significance
By invalidating New York's attempt to regulate Internet communications, the court made it clear that the broad, national character of the Internet renderssuch communications susceptible only to regulation by the federal government. Thus, state attempts to regulate Internet communications will always be invalid. Viewed in conjunction with the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) which struck down a law similar to the New York law on the ground that it violated the First Amendment right to free speech, the Court's decision was a welcome relief to Internet uses who feared increasing government regulation of this rapidly expanding area of communication.
Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution describes the powers of the U.S. Congress. Clause 3 of this section, generally referred to as the Commerce Clause, in part grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several states." Although the Commerce Clause speaks in terms of a positivegrant of power to the federal government, the Commerce Clause has long beenrecognized to carry an implicit negative component prohibiting the state government from regulating interstate commerce in certain respects, notably wherethe state regulation would burden the free flow of commerce from state to state. This "Negative Commerce Clause" was first recognized by Justice Thomas Johnson in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824). Specifically, the Supreme Court hasrecognized three types of state laws or regulations which are prohibited bythe negative aspect of the Commerce Clause: (1) regulations which are aimed directly at prohibiting interstate commerce; (2) regulations which unduly burden interstate commerce; and (3) regulations aimed at aspects of commerce which by their very nature require uniform treatment throughout the United States. In American Libraries Association v. Pataki, the court system considered the extent to which the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibited the state of New York from imposing restrictions on the types of material received over the Internet.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the proliferation of computers and computer technologies led to the development of the Internet. The Internet, a vast, complex network of interconnected computers, allows millions of computerusers to communicate with each other and to access information from around the world on virtually any topic. Among these various categories of information, a large amount of material dealing with topics from drugs to pornography toweaponry is transmitted over the Internet. New York, along with a number ofother states and the federal government, sought to limit the extent to whichsuch material was sent and received over the Internet. Specifically, New Yorkpassed a law making it a crime to knowingly send over any computer communications system any sexually explicit material to a minor.
The American Library Association, along with a number of other library associations, bookstore associations, Internet service providers, and publishers filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that New York had no power to regulate interstate transmission ofmaterial over the Internet, and thus the law was an unconstitutional violation of the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause. The plaintiffs asked the court to enter a preliminary injunction preventing the state from enforcing thelaw. The court concluded that the New York statute violated the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause, and thus the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction preventing the state from enforcing the law.
Negative Commerce Clause Applies to Internet
Judge Loretta Preska began her analysis by noting that while the Internet iscertainly an innovative technological field, "the innovativeness of the technology does not preclude the application of traditional legal principles provided that those principles are adaptable to cyberspace." Judge Preska first concluded that the Internet, and the New York law, relate to "commerce" under the Commerce Clause. She noted that people engage in commercial transactions over the Internet, and even those who use the Internet for purely noncommercial reasons often do so through a commercial Internet service. Thus, Judge Preska applied the traditional legal principles related to the negative aspect ofthe Commerce Clause and concluded that the New York law violated the Commerce Clause in three ways.
First, Judge Preska concluded that the New York statute was impermissible under the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause because it regulates conduct which occurs wholly outside of New York. She rejected New York's argument thatthe statute sought only to regulate the conduct of New York residents sendingindecent material over the Internet, reasoning that the very nature of the Internet precludes such an argument. She concluded that "[t]he Internet is wholly insensitive to geographic distinctions." She based this conclusion on several factors. For example, she noted that there is no way for a person posting an Internet web page to screen who is accessing the web page based on the location of the user, thus making it impossible for a web poster outside of New York to block a minor in New York from accessing the material. Similarly, people communicating through newsgroup postings or "chat rooms"--both of whichinvolve forms of group electronic discussions--have no way of knowing the location of the other people participating in the discussion. Further, it is possible, and quite frequent, for people communicating via chat rooms or electronic mail to mask the location from which they are communicating. Finally, electronic mail may be routed through New York even though both the sender andrecipient are outside New York, or conversely may be routed through another state even though both the sender and recipient are in New York. Thus, Judge Preska concluded, "[t]he New York Act . . . cannot effectively be limited to purely intrastate communications over the Internet because no such communications exist. No user could reliably restrict her communications only to New York recipients."
Next, Judge Preska concluded that, even if the New York law was interpreted as involving only an incidental burden on interstate commerce rather than a direct burden, the statute violated the negative aspect of the Commerce Clausebecause the burdens the law places on commerce between the states outweigh the benefits received by the state from the law. In the 1970 case of Pike v.Bruce Church, Inc. the Court set forth a balancing test for analyzing laws which only indirectly burden interstate commerce. Under this test, the state law "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Applying this test in American Libraries Association, Judge Preska agreed with the state that theprotection of children from receiving indecent materials is a legitimate purpose for the state to pursue. Nevertheless, she concluded that the benefits of the law are not overwhelming. She reasoned that it was unlikely that out ofstate senders of such material would be prosecuted in New York under the law. She also noted that New York has other, more effective laws designed to protect children from sexual exploitation. On the contrary, Judge Preska concluded that the New York law substantially burdens interstate commerce because it"casts its net worldwide" and is likely to deter people from sending communications which may not be banned by the law if the person is unsure of the extent of the law. Thus, she concluded, as a second basis for striking down theNew York law, that "[t]he severe burden on interstate commerce resulting fromthe New York statute is not justifiable in light of the attenuated local benefits arising from it."
Finally, Judge Preska concluded that the Internet was the type of commerce which, by its very nature, demanded uniform, national regulation and not inconsistent regulation by the states. Relying on Supreme Court cases noting that certain aspects of commerce, such as highway and railway regulations, must beuniform across the United States if an efficient economic system is to be maintained, Judge Preska noted that "effective regulation [of the Internet] willrequire national, and more likely global, cooperation. Regulation by any single state can only result in chaos, because at least some states will likelyenact laws subjecting Internet users to conflicting obligations." Accordingly, the need for uniform national regulation of the Internet provided a third basis for concluding that the New York law violated the negative aspect of theCommerce Clause.
Impact
The court's decision in American Libraries Association is extremely important. If followed by other federal courts, the decision means that only Congress, and not the states, will be able to regulate the flow of informationover the Internet. This impact is particularly important given the Supreme Court's subsequent holding in the 1997 case of Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union. In American Libraries Association, Judge Preska did notreach the plaintiffs' argument that the New York statute violated the FirstAmendment's guarantee of free speech, because the law was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. In Reno, the Court invalidated a federal lawregulating indecent material over the Internet which was similar to the New York law on the ground that it violated the right to free speech. Thus taken together, American Libraries Association and Reno provide broadprotections for Internet users. Under these decisions, only the U.S. Congress, and not the states, may regulate the Internet, and Congress must do so in away which does not violate the First Amendment.
Related Cases
- Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
- Price v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
- Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
- Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 512 U.S. 844 (1997).
Ralph Nader
Born in 1934 in Winsted, Connecticut, Ralph Nader is an attorney and consumerrights advocate who is considered to be the founding father of the consumerrights movement. In the 1980s Nader campaigned against car insurance rates inCalifornia and a 50 percent wage increase for members of Congress. His success with these two high profile issues stand as vivid illustrations of the consumer rights movement which Nader is associated. Nader is the founder of theCenter for Responsive Law, Public Interest Research Group, Center for Auto safety, Clean Water Action Project, the Disability Rights Center, and the Project for Corporate Responsibility.
Nader has been most influential in the area of public safety. He has writtennumerous books on the subject of consumer protection the most notable of which is Unsafe at Any Speed in 1965. The book resulted in the discontinuation of GM's Corvair which Nader reported was dangerous in high speedturns. He was also instrumental in the formation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (1970), the Freedom of Information Act (1974), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (1976). During the deregulating Reagan era the term "Naderism" was coined to characterize the consumer rights movement as an extreme.
Sources
Current Biography, 1986 p. 402.
Mayhem Manuals
The explosion in Internet usage has raised new questions about whether all information therein has a guarantee of Freedom of the Press under the First Amendment. The Constitution guaranteed a free and uncensored press; later expansions provide similar coverages to other print and broadcast media. The 1986 Communication Privacy Act protects individual privacy rights in using email, bulletin boards, and other electronic media.
The devastation caused by the Oklahoma City bombing increased awareness thatthe Internet was itself a tool used by hate groups and others advocating violence and anarchy. Materials detailing how to construct bombs, such as a 93 page "mayhem manual," are available on the Internet, as well as in print. During a Senate Subcommittee debate on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Senators discussed ways that public safety might be maintained without censorship. Up for debate was whether censorship was permissible in casessuch as bomb building manuals. Further, if censorship of such materials was imposed, whether it was feasible to monitor and control such information considering the vastness of the Internet. Senator Arlen Specter noted a 1969 U.S.Supreme Court decision that stated, "Speech could not be punished unless it was `an incitement to imminent lawless action.'"
Sources
Hernandez, Debra Gersh. "Mayhem Online." Editor & Publisher, 24 June 1995, p. 34.
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