American Libraries Association v. Pataki

Judge Loretta Preska began her analysis by noting that while the Internet is certainly an innovative technological field, "the innovativeness of the technology does not preclude the application of traditional legal principles provided that those principles are adaptable to cyberspace." Judge Preska first concluded that the Internet, and the New York law, relate to "commerce" under the Commerce Clause. She noted that people engage in commercial transactions over the Internet, and even those who use the Internet for purely noncommercial reasons often do so through a commercial Internet service. Thus, Judge Preska applied the traditional legal principles related to the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause and concluded that the New York law violated the Commerce Clause in three ways.

First, Judge Preska concluded that the New York statute was impermissible under the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause because it regulates conduct which occurs wholly outside of New York. She rejected New York's argument that the statute sought only to regulate the conduct of New York residents sending indecent material over the Internet, reasoning that the very nature of the Internet precludes such an argument. She concluded that "[t]he Internet is wholly insensitive to geographic distinctions." She based this conclusion on several factors. For example, she noted that there is no way for a person posting an Internet web page to screen who is accessing the web page based on the location of the user, thus making it impossible for a web poster outside of New York to block a minor in New York from accessing the material. Similarly, people communicating through newsgroup postings or "chat rooms"--both of which involve forms of group electronic discussions--have no way of knowing the location of the other people participating in the discussion. Further, it is possible, and quite frequent, for people communicating via chat rooms or electronic mail to mask the location from which they are communicating. Finally, electronic mail may be routed through New York even though both the sender and recipient are outside New York, or conversely may be routed through another state even though both the sender and recipient are in New York. Thus, Judge Preska concluded, "[t]he New York Act . . . cannot effectively be limited to purely intrastate communications over the Internet because no such communications exist. No user could reliably restrict her communications only to New York recipients."

Next, Judge Preska concluded that, even if the New York law was interpreted as involving only an incidental burden on interstate commerce rather than a direct burden, the statute violated the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause because the burdens the law places on commerce between the states outweigh the benefits received by the state from the law. In the 1970 case of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. the Court set forth a balancing test for analyzing laws which only indirectly burden interstate commerce. Under this test, the state law "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Applying this test in American Libraries Association, Judge Preska agreed with the state that the protection of children from receiving indecent materials is a legitimate purpose for the state to pursue. Nevertheless, she concluded that the benefits of the law are not overwhelming. She reasoned that it was unlikely that out of state senders of such material would be prosecuted in New York under the law. She also noted that New York has other, more effective laws designed to protect children from sexual exploitation. On the contrary, Judge Preska concluded that the New York law substantially burdens interstate commerce because it "casts its net worldwide" and is likely to deter people from sending communications which may not be banned by the law if the person is unsure of the extent of the law. Thus, she concluded, as a second basis for striking down the New York law, that "[t]he severe burden on interstate commerce resulting from the New York statute is not justifiable in light of the attenuated local benefits arising from it."

Finally, Judge Preska concluded that the Internet was the type of commerce which, by its very nature, demanded uniform, national regulation and not inconsistent regulation by the states. Relying on Supreme Court cases noting that certain aspects of commerce, such as highway and railway regulations, must be uniform across the United States if an efficient economic system is to be maintained, Judge Preska noted that "effective regulation [of the Internet] will require national, and more likely global, cooperation. Regulation by any single state can only result in chaos, because at least some states will likely enact laws subjecting Internet users to conflicting obligations." Accordingly, the need for uniform national regulation of the Internet provided a third basis for concluding that the New York law violated the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause.