Petitioner
City of Boerne, Texas
Respondent
Father P. F. Flores, Archbishop of San Antonio, and the United States
Petitioner's Claim
That the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded Congress' constitutionalpowers under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Marci A. Hamilton
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
Douglas Laycock and Walter Dellinger
Justices for the Court
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Stephen Breyer, Sandra Day O'Connor, David H. Souter
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 June 1997
Decision
Ruled in favor of Boerne, overturning two lower court decisions, and held that Congress impermissibly intruded on the powers of the states to enact laws for the general health and welfare of their citizens by enacting the ReligiousFreedom Restoration Act.
Significance
The Court's decision placed distinct limits on the power of Congress to regulate areas traditionally subject to state, not federal, regulation. The decision also limited the power of Congress to pass statutes overturning Supreme Court interpretations of constitutional provisions.
The First Amendment to the Constitution provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. Prior to 1990, any law which burdened a religious practice was invalid under the First Amendment unless it met the "compelling interest test." Under this test, whichis the strictest test that can be applied to a law or governmental action, alaw is invalid unless it serves a "compelling" interest of the government andis narrowly drawn to serve that interest. However, in 1990, the Supreme Court decided in Employment Division v. Smith that a law not directed specifically towards a religious practice, but generally applicable to all citizens equally need not satisfy the compelling interest test even if it burdens areligious practice. Thus, for example, a law prohibiting the use of drugs isvalid even though certain Native American religions use the drug as part oftheir religious ceremony.
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to restore the compelling interest test applied by the Supreme Court prior to Smith. The RFRA provided that if a federal, state, or local law of general applicability "substantially burdened" a person's exercise of religion, then the law was invalid unless it could pass the strict scrutiny test. Essentially, the RFRA overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Smith.
In the early 1990s, St. Peter Catholic Church in the city of Boerne, Texas, sought to expand its church building to accommodate its growing number of parishioners. Boerne is situated approximately 30 miles outside of San Antonio. The church structure, built in 1923, replicated the Spanish mission style of architecture important to the region's heritage. At about the same time, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing its Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a plan for preservation of the city's historic landmarks. P. F. Flores, Archbishop of San Antonio applied for a permit to expand the church, which was denied because the city designated the area in which the church was located as a historic district. The archbishop filed a suit in the U.S.District Court for the Western District of Texas, arguing the ordinance violated the RFRA because it burdened the church members' exercise of religion and did not satisfy the compelling interest test. The district court found thatthe RFRA was unconstitutional and upheld the ordinance. The archbishop thenappealed to decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which concluded the RFRA was constitutional. This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court through a procedure known as a petition for writ of certiorari.
Court Limits Scope of Congressional Power
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, finding theRFRA unconstitutional. Congress passed the RFRA pursuant to its powers underthe Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from denying a person of due process of law and of the equal protectionof the laws. Section 5 gives Congress the power to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of "the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 6-3 majority, concluded that the RFRA was not a proper exercise of power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kennedy reasoned that by passing the RFRA, Congress was not "enforcing" any right guaranteedby the Fourteenth Amendment but was creating a new right. Kennedy wrote that,
In reaching his conclusion, Kennedy relied heavily on two principles governing the structure of the American government: separation of powers and federalism. Separation of powers describes the distribution of the powers of government among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government.According to Kennedy, the RFRA violated separation of powers principles because, ultimately, it is within the judiciary branch's scope of power to determine what the Constitution means. However, in enacting the RFRA, Congress substituted its own judgment for that of the Supreme Court. Kennedy also concluded that the RFRA violated principles of federalism. Federalism describes the relationship between the federal government and the state governments, in which the federal government has certain powers and the state governments have others. Kennedy wrote that the RFRA constituted "a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens."
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justices David H. Souter and Stephen Breyer, dissented. O'Connor did not disagree with the Court's opinion regarding interpretation of Congress' powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, she was very displeased with the earlier Smith ruling bythe Court. O'Connor wrote, "In Smith, five Members of this Court without briefing or argument on the issue interpreted the Free Exercise Clause topermit the government to prohibit, without justification, conduct mandated by an individual's religious beliefs, so long as the prohibition is generallyapplicable." She asserted the decision "harmed religious liberty" and the Court should have overturned the decision in the Boerne case. O'Connor argued that "the Free Exercise Clause is not simply an antidiscrimination principle that protects only against those laws that single out religious practicefor unfavorable treatment." The Clause is "an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious practices . . . without . . . government interference." She concluded that government must have to justify any significant burdens on religious practice by a compelling state interest with restrictions narrowly designed to attain that interest.
Impact
The decision constituted the first significant restriction of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment since the late 1800s. Indeed, the Court's decision was a marked contrast from the civil rights cases decided in the 1960s, which generally held that Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment was extremely broad. Even more significant, however, the Court's reliance on principles of federalism and separation of powers followed a trend of cases decided in the mid-1990s striking down federal laws on the grounds thatthose laws intruded into areas, particularly crime and safety, traditionallysubject to regulation by the state governments. These rulings markedly retreated from the decisions of the 1960s which broadened Congress' powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the wake of the Boerne decision, several efforts were mounted in Congress under public pressure to counter the Court's action. The Religious Liberty Protection Act was considered by Congress in 1998. The act would prohibit state and local governments from enacting land use legislation that would potentially burden religious exercise unless the laws promoted a compelling government interest. Critics, including the National League of Cities, feared the implications of the bill on cities' ability to regulate religious-based land uses through zoning ordinances.
What did pass Congress and was signed into law late in 1998 was the international Religious Freedom Act. The act sought to protect religious believers from persecution overseas. The law provides the president a range of options topenalize nations that allow such persecution. Some business and political leaders in the United States did not support the act fearing implications on foreign trade and possible implications to other foreign policy goals over sucha globally sensitive issue. The act also formed a Commission on InternationalReligious Liberty to monitor progress and advise Congress.
Congress also continued to pursue the proposed Religious Freedom Amendment tothe Constitution, with little prospects for success. Many believed the proposed amendment would disrupt classrooms, allow religious displays on public property, and permit public tax support for sectarian schools. All of these efforts raised concerns over the United States imposing its notion of religiousfreedom on other cultures and domestically subjecting local religious minorities to various burdens by religious majorities.
Related Cases
Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993. The actwas a response to a 1990 ruling by the Supreme Court that effectively endedthe Court's established procedures for free-exercise protection. RFRA required federal courts to reinstate earlier and broader free-exercise standards.
RFRA was used to restore and defend a variety of religious freedoms, such asMuslims' wearing of head coverings. As part of RFRA, a state government had to provide a compelling justification for laws that substantially interfered with an individual's religious practices. When the Supreme Court was ruling onthe constitutionality of RFRA, a 90-member coalition of religious groups spoke out in support of the act. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was deemed unconstitutional with the Supreme Court decision in City of Boerne v. Flores (1996).
Sources
Marquand, Robert. "High Court Clips Protections for Religous Freedom in the U.S."The Christian Science Monitor, 26 June 1997.
City of Boerne, Texas
Respondent
Father P. F. Flores, Archbishop of San Antonio, and the United States
Petitioner's Claim
That the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded Congress' constitutionalpowers under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Marci A. Hamilton
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
Douglas Laycock and Walter Dellinger
Justices for the Court
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Stephen Breyer, Sandra Day O'Connor, David H. Souter
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 June 1997
Decision
Ruled in favor of Boerne, overturning two lower court decisions, and held that Congress impermissibly intruded on the powers of the states to enact laws for the general health and welfare of their citizens by enacting the ReligiousFreedom Restoration Act.
Significance
The Court's decision placed distinct limits on the power of Congress to regulate areas traditionally subject to state, not federal, regulation. The decision also limited the power of Congress to pass statutes overturning Supreme Court interpretations of constitutional provisions.
The First Amendment to the Constitution provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. Prior to 1990, any law which burdened a religious practice was invalid under the First Amendment unless it met the "compelling interest test." Under this test, whichis the strictest test that can be applied to a law or governmental action, alaw is invalid unless it serves a "compelling" interest of the government andis narrowly drawn to serve that interest. However, in 1990, the Supreme Court decided in Employment Division v. Smith that a law not directed specifically towards a religious practice, but generally applicable to all citizens equally need not satisfy the compelling interest test even if it burdens areligious practice. Thus, for example, a law prohibiting the use of drugs isvalid even though certain Native American religions use the drug as part oftheir religious ceremony.
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to restore the compelling interest test applied by the Supreme Court prior to Smith. The RFRA provided that if a federal, state, or local law of general applicability "substantially burdened" a person's exercise of religion, then the law was invalid unless it could pass the strict scrutiny test. Essentially, the RFRA overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Smith.
In the early 1990s, St. Peter Catholic Church in the city of Boerne, Texas, sought to expand its church building to accommodate its growing number of parishioners. Boerne is situated approximately 30 miles outside of San Antonio. The church structure, built in 1923, replicated the Spanish mission style of architecture important to the region's heritage. At about the same time, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing its Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a plan for preservation of the city's historic landmarks. P. F. Flores, Archbishop of San Antonio applied for a permit to expand the church, which was denied because the city designated the area in which the church was located as a historic district. The archbishop filed a suit in the U.S.District Court for the Western District of Texas, arguing the ordinance violated the RFRA because it burdened the church members' exercise of religion and did not satisfy the compelling interest test. The district court found thatthe RFRA was unconstitutional and upheld the ordinance. The archbishop thenappealed to decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which concluded the RFRA was constitutional. This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court through a procedure known as a petition for writ of certiorari.
Court Limits Scope of Congressional Power
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, finding theRFRA unconstitutional. Congress passed the RFRA pursuant to its powers underthe Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from denying a person of due process of law and of the equal protectionof the laws. Section 5 gives Congress the power to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of "the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 6-3 majority, concluded that the RFRA was not a proper exercise of power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kennedy reasoned that by passing the RFRA, Congress was not "enforcing" any right guaranteedby the Fourteenth Amendment but was creating a new right. Kennedy wrote that,
The design of the Amendment and the test of 5 are inconsistentwith the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States. Legislation which altersthe meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what theright is. It has been given the power "to enforce," not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.
In reaching his conclusion, Kennedy relied heavily on two principles governing the structure of the American government: separation of powers and federalism. Separation of powers describes the distribution of the powers of government among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government.According to Kennedy, the RFRA violated separation of powers principles because, ultimately, it is within the judiciary branch's scope of power to determine what the Constitution means. However, in enacting the RFRA, Congress substituted its own judgment for that of the Supreme Court. Kennedy also concluded that the RFRA violated principles of federalism. Federalism describes the relationship between the federal government and the state governments, in which the federal government has certain powers and the state governments have others. Kennedy wrote that the RFRA constituted "a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens."
Impact
The decision constituted the first significant restriction of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment since the late 1800s. Indeed, the Court's decision was a marked contrast from the civil rights cases decided in the 1960s, which generally held that Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment was extremely broad. Even more significant, however, the Court's reliance on principles of federalism and separation of powers followed a trend of cases decided in the mid-1990s striking down federal laws on the grounds thatthose laws intruded into areas, particularly crime and safety, traditionallysubject to regulation by the state governments. These rulings markedly retreated from the decisions of the 1960s which broadened Congress' powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the wake of the Boerne decision, several efforts were mounted in Congress under public pressure to counter the Court's action. The Religious Liberty Protection Act was considered by Congress in 1998. The act would prohibit state and local governments from enacting land use legislation that would potentially burden religious exercise unless the laws promoted a compelling government interest. Critics, including the National League of Cities, feared the implications of the bill on cities' ability to regulate religious-based land uses through zoning ordinances.
What did pass Congress and was signed into law late in 1998 was the international Religious Freedom Act. The act sought to protect religious believers from persecution overseas. The law provides the president a range of options topenalize nations that allow such persecution. Some business and political leaders in the United States did not support the act fearing implications on foreign trade and possible implications to other foreign policy goals over sucha globally sensitive issue. The act also formed a Commission on InternationalReligious Liberty to monitor progress and advise Congress.
Congress also continued to pursue the proposed Religious Freedom Amendment tothe Constitution, with little prospects for success. Many believed the proposed amendment would disrupt classrooms, allow religious displays on public property, and permit public tax support for sectarian schools. All of these efforts raised concerns over the United States imposing its notion of religiousfreedom on other cultures and domestically subjecting local religious minorities to various burdens by religious majorities.
Related Cases
- Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993. The actwas a response to a 1990 ruling by the Supreme Court that effectively endedthe Court's established procedures for free-exercise protection. RFRA required federal courts to reinstate earlier and broader free-exercise standards.
RFRA was used to restore and defend a variety of religious freedoms, such asMuslims' wearing of head coverings. As part of RFRA, a state government had to provide a compelling justification for laws that substantially interfered with an individual's religious practices. When the Supreme Court was ruling onthe constitutionality of RFRA, a 90-member coalition of religious groups spoke out in support of the act. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was deemed unconstitutional with the Supreme Court decision in City of Boerne v. Flores (1996).
Marquand, Robert. "High Court Clips Protections for Religous Freedom in the U.S."The Christian Science Monitor, 26 June 1997.
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