Appellants
President William J. Clinton and other government officials
Appellees
City of New York, Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., et al.
Appellants' Claim
That the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 delegating increased law making powers tothe president by Congress was constitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Appellants
Seth P. Waxman, U.S. Solicitor General
Chief Lawyers for Appellees
Charles Cooper, Louis Cohen
Justices for the Court
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, William H. Rehnquist, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens (writing for the Court), Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Stephen Breyer, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 June 1998
Decision
Ruled in favor of New York and affirmed a lower court decision by finding that the line-item veto law violated constitutional procedures for making laws.
Significance
The decision recognized the limits of Congress in delegating its legislativepowers to the president and maintained a traditional separation of power between the two branches of government. The Court asserted that Congress could alter the president's role in determining the final text of a law only by constitutional amendment. No constitutional provisions otherwise exist for presidents to enact, repeal, or amend laws. Having witnessed the application of theveto for 18 months and given the strong Court ruling, support diminished forfurther efforts at instituting a line-item veto power.
In defining the legislative process for making laws, the framers assigned thepresident veto power in section 7 of Article 1 of the Constitution, later known as the Presentment Clause. The section reads that a bill passed by Congress "shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it." Congress could still pass the law as written over the president's veto with twothirds vote of each house. The veto was seen as a barrier against hastily enacting "improper" laws.
Since the 1870s, presidents have often sought line a item veto option, vetoing portions of bills while the remainder became law. In the early 1970s, President Richard M. Nixon liberally applied an impounded strategy, a constitutionally questionable process of not spending funds Congress had obtained. In reaction, Congress passed the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 requiring congressional approval of impoundment "cuts."
The Line Item Veto
The line-item veto issue came to the political forefront during the 1980s asthe national deficit dramatically rose. President Ronald Reagan's administration contended the problem was not due to his tax cuts or defense buildup, butrather Congress' large domestic spending programs under Democratic leadership. The Republicans identified the line-item veto as a key issue in their 1994"Contract With America" during the 1994 national elections. Upon victoriously assuming control of Congress after the elections, the Republicans were suddenly faced with enacting the law while having a Democrat president. As an amendment to the 1974 Impoundment Act, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act and President Bill Clinton signed it into law in April of 1996. But the Republican leaders delayed its effective date to January of 1997 in hopes they mightrecapture the presidency in the previous November elections.
The Line Item Veto Act granted the president power to cancel three kinds of provisions signed into law: (1) all discretionary spending not required by law; (2) any new direct spending; and, (3) limited tax benefits. Under the new law, Congress would, as usual, approve tax and funding bills and send them tothe president for his signature. However, after signing the legislation, thepresident had five days to eliminate specific lines of spending and notify Congress of his deletions. Congress could resurrect the lined out items within30 days by a single majority vote. Also, any spending deleted had to be applied to reducing the deficit, not for some other purpose. Rather than being anactual veto, in an effort to avoid violating the Constitution, the deletion was more an enhanced recision power, since it occurred after passage of the law.
Some Senate opponents, led by Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), contested the bill's validity. However, the Supreme Court ruled in Raines v. Byrd (1997) they lacked legal standing to pursue the claim since they had suffered noactual injury or loss.
In total, Clinton used his new, historic power to veto 82 legislative items with Congress overriding only one, a military construction bill providing $287million for 38 projects. The line-item vetoes that stood reversed $869 million in spending and tax breaks. Among those items canceled was one affecting New York State and another affecting Idaho potato farmers.
The Social Security Act had authorized the federal government to provide substantial funding to states to help finance indigent medical care. However, Congress passed legislation in 1991 directing that these federal subsidies wouldbe reduced by the amount of certain taxes assessed by the states on health care providers. As a result, in 1994 Congress required New York to return improper excess Medicaid payments to the United States. The state lobbied Congress for relief. In August of 1997, Congress responded by resolving the matter in New York's favor, saving the state some $2.6 billion for the five year period. Six days later, President Bill Clinton sent notices to the Senate and House of Representatives canceling that part of the law claiming it improperly gave preferential treatment to one state.
Another specific spending item also caught Clinton's attention. A company profiting from the sale of property is generally subject to a capital gains tax.However, a business could sell to another through a merger or stock transaction without being taxed. Excluded from such tax relief were farmer's cooperatives. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 offered such tax breaks to businesses selling processing plants to farmers cooperatives. Clinton canceled this limited tax benefit as well.
In reaction to the cancellations, two separate lawsuits were filed in U.S. district court against Clinton and other federal officials. The New York case involved New York City, two hospital associations, a hospital, and two unionsrepresenting health care employees. The second action involved a farmer's cooperative, Snake River Potato Growers Inc., representing of about 30 potato growers in Idaho, and an individual officer of the cooperative. The court combined the cases and determined that legal standing existed in each.
In February of 1998, the district court found the line-item vetoes unconstitutional. The very nature of the laws after the presidential cancellations wasdifferent from that agreed upon by both houses of Congress. Therefore, the court found that Clinton violated Article I of the Constitution when he "vetoed" only parts of the laws. The court concluded the Line Item Veto Act significantly disrupted the carefully designed balance of powers among the three branches of government. Clinton appealed the decision directly to the Supreme Court.
Presentment Clause Violated
None of the parties disputed before the Court that the New York spending itemwas not an "item of new direct spending" or the other not a "limited tax benefit." Both qualified for potential elimination under the Line Item Veto Act.The issue was clearly the new presidential authority itself. By a 6-3 vote the Court affirmed the district court's decision. Justice Stevens, writing forthe majority, wrote that the Presentment Clause provided the president onlytwo choices upon receipt of a bill from Congress, approval or veto.
Stevens underscored important differences between a president vetoing a billin its entirety and the Line Item Veto Act. The veto of an entire bill takesplace before it becomes law, the partial cancellation occurs afterwards. Stevens found that Clinton essentially amended two acts of Congress by repealinga portion of each. The Constitution contained no provision authorizing the president to amend or repeal statutes. Although Articles I and II of the Constitution both assigned important responsibilities to the president directly related to the lawmaking process, neither provided for piece-meal revision of existing laws.
Consequently, the Line Item Veto Act clearly authorized the president to amend laws for his own policy reasons outside the procedures established in Article I of the Constitution. Stevens was not swayed by Clinton's contention thatthe president's new authority to cancel new direct spending and tax benefititems was like his traditional authority not to spend appropriated funds. Thecritical difference was that previous laws allowing presidential spending discretion had very specific congressional guidance. Stevens summarized,
Old Power Under New Name?
Justice Breyer, joined in dissent by Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia, wrote, "In my view the Line Item Veto Act does not violate any specific textualconstitutional command, nor does it violate any implicit Separation of Powersprinciple. Consequently, I believe that the Act is constitutional." Breyer,acknowledging that the functioning of the three branches of government with one another is always evolving, summarized his dissent,
Scalia contended that the president's discretion under the Line Item Veto Actwas no broader than the discretion traditionally granted the president in his execution of spending laws. Scalia wrote,
Impact
The Court ruled that a president holds no constitutional power to sign into law a bill different from the one sent to him by Congress. Though some supporters of the line-item veto vowed to pursue its acceptance, many became disillusioned after seeing how ineffective it appeared to be in practice. Sparinglyusing the new authority, Clinton reduced the 1997 budget less than one-tenthof one percent. Clinton largely sought to minimize conflict with Republican leadership who controlled Congress because of legislation he wished to see passed. The brief experiment demonstrated that effects on the legislative process were more political than fiscal. The president's role to bargain with Congress and influence laws was greatly increased, even changing how Washington lobbyists operated.
Governors of 43 states held line item veto power with few issues raised overtheir authority. But many asserted, the role of the president was far different than a state governor. Still, proponents claimed such a "veto" power served as a symbolic reminder to legislators to maintain some fiscal responsibility by minimizing expensive pet projects for their constituents back home.
Related Cases
The Line-Item Veto
For years, American leaders in the executive and legislative branches of government have bandied about the idea of a line-item veto. The president possesses veto power over legislation. The line-item veto would give him even greater power by allowing him to strike certain provisions ("line items") within appropriations bills. Supporters of the line-item veto have suggested that it allows him to "hold the pork"--as in pork-barrel spending, which occurs when alegislator works a costly government project (but one which benefits his orher constituents) into an appropriations bill. Opponents of the line-item veto have argued that it would upset the traditional balance of power between the branches of government, and would require the enumeration of all budgetarydetails in appropriations bills. It would also mean that the primary negotiation of a bill would take place not on the legislative floor but at the veto stage, largely removed from the public eye.
Sources
Bacon, Donald C., et al., eds. The Encyclopedia of the United States Congress. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
President William J. Clinton and other government officials
Appellees
City of New York, Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., et al.
Appellants' Claim
That the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 delegating increased law making powers tothe president by Congress was constitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Appellants
Seth P. Waxman, U.S. Solicitor General
Chief Lawyers for Appellees
Charles Cooper, Louis Cohen
Justices for the Court
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, William H. Rehnquist, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens (writing for the Court), Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Stephen Breyer, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 June 1998
Decision
Ruled in favor of New York and affirmed a lower court decision by finding that the line-item veto law violated constitutional procedures for making laws.
Significance
The decision recognized the limits of Congress in delegating its legislativepowers to the president and maintained a traditional separation of power between the two branches of government. The Court asserted that Congress could alter the president's role in determining the final text of a law only by constitutional amendment. No constitutional provisions otherwise exist for presidents to enact, repeal, or amend laws. Having witnessed the application of theveto for 18 months and given the strong Court ruling, support diminished forfurther efforts at instituting a line-item veto power.
In defining the legislative process for making laws, the framers assigned thepresident veto power in section 7 of Article 1 of the Constitution, later known as the Presentment Clause. The section reads that a bill passed by Congress "shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it." Congress could still pass the law as written over the president's veto with twothirds vote of each house. The veto was seen as a barrier against hastily enacting "improper" laws.
Since the 1870s, presidents have often sought line a item veto option, vetoing portions of bills while the remainder became law. In the early 1970s, President Richard M. Nixon liberally applied an impounded strategy, a constitutionally questionable process of not spending funds Congress had obtained. In reaction, Congress passed the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 requiring congressional approval of impoundment "cuts."
The Line Item Veto
The line-item veto issue came to the political forefront during the 1980s asthe national deficit dramatically rose. President Ronald Reagan's administration contended the problem was not due to his tax cuts or defense buildup, butrather Congress' large domestic spending programs under Democratic leadership. The Republicans identified the line-item veto as a key issue in their 1994"Contract With America" during the 1994 national elections. Upon victoriously assuming control of Congress after the elections, the Republicans were suddenly faced with enacting the law while having a Democrat president. As an amendment to the 1974 Impoundment Act, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act and President Bill Clinton signed it into law in April of 1996. But the Republican leaders delayed its effective date to January of 1997 in hopes they mightrecapture the presidency in the previous November elections.
The Line Item Veto Act granted the president power to cancel three kinds of provisions signed into law: (1) all discretionary spending not required by law; (2) any new direct spending; and, (3) limited tax benefits. Under the new law, Congress would, as usual, approve tax and funding bills and send them tothe president for his signature. However, after signing the legislation, thepresident had five days to eliminate specific lines of spending and notify Congress of his deletions. Congress could resurrect the lined out items within30 days by a single majority vote. Also, any spending deleted had to be applied to reducing the deficit, not for some other purpose. Rather than being anactual veto, in an effort to avoid violating the Constitution, the deletion was more an enhanced recision power, since it occurred after passage of the law.
Some Senate opponents, led by Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), contested the bill's validity. However, the Supreme Court ruled in Raines v. Byrd (1997) they lacked legal standing to pursue the claim since they had suffered noactual injury or loss.
In total, Clinton used his new, historic power to veto 82 legislative items with Congress overriding only one, a military construction bill providing $287million for 38 projects. The line-item vetoes that stood reversed $869 million in spending and tax breaks. Among those items canceled was one affecting New York State and another affecting Idaho potato farmers.
The Social Security Act had authorized the federal government to provide substantial funding to states to help finance indigent medical care. However, Congress passed legislation in 1991 directing that these federal subsidies wouldbe reduced by the amount of certain taxes assessed by the states on health care providers. As a result, in 1994 Congress required New York to return improper excess Medicaid payments to the United States. The state lobbied Congress for relief. In August of 1997, Congress responded by resolving the matter in New York's favor, saving the state some $2.6 billion for the five year period. Six days later, President Bill Clinton sent notices to the Senate and House of Representatives canceling that part of the law claiming it improperly gave preferential treatment to one state.
Another specific spending item also caught Clinton's attention. A company profiting from the sale of property is generally subject to a capital gains tax.However, a business could sell to another through a merger or stock transaction without being taxed. Excluded from such tax relief were farmer's cooperatives. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 offered such tax breaks to businesses selling processing plants to farmers cooperatives. Clinton canceled this limited tax benefit as well.
In reaction to the cancellations, two separate lawsuits were filed in U.S. district court against Clinton and other federal officials. The New York case involved New York City, two hospital associations, a hospital, and two unionsrepresenting health care employees. The second action involved a farmer's cooperative, Snake River Potato Growers Inc., representing of about 30 potato growers in Idaho, and an individual officer of the cooperative. The court combined the cases and determined that legal standing existed in each.
In February of 1998, the district court found the line-item vetoes unconstitutional. The very nature of the laws after the presidential cancellations wasdifferent from that agreed upon by both houses of Congress. Therefore, the court found that Clinton violated Article I of the Constitution when he "vetoed" only parts of the laws. The court concluded the Line Item Veto Act significantly disrupted the carefully designed balance of powers among the three branches of government. Clinton appealed the decision directly to the Supreme Court.
Presentment Clause Violated
None of the parties disputed before the Court that the New York spending itemwas not an "item of new direct spending" or the other not a "limited tax benefit." Both qualified for potential elimination under the Line Item Veto Act.The issue was clearly the new presidential authority itself. By a 6-3 vote the Court affirmed the district court's decision. Justice Stevens, writing forthe majority, wrote that the Presentment Clause provided the president onlytwo choices upon receipt of a bill from Congress, approval or veto.
Stevens underscored important differences between a president vetoing a billin its entirety and the Line Item Veto Act. The veto of an entire bill takesplace before it becomes law, the partial cancellation occurs afterwards. Stevens found that Clinton essentially amended two acts of Congress by repealinga portion of each. The Constitution contained no provision authorizing the president to amend or repeal statutes. Although Articles I and II of the Constitution both assigned important responsibilities to the president directly related to the lawmaking process, neither provided for piece-meal revision of existing laws.
Consequently, the Line Item Veto Act clearly authorized the president to amend laws for his own policy reasons outside the procedures established in Article I of the Constitution. Stevens was not swayed by Clinton's contention thatthe president's new authority to cancel new direct spending and tax benefititems was like his traditional authority not to spend appropriated funds. Thecritical difference was that previous laws allowing presidential spending discretion had very specific congressional guidance. Stevens summarized,
We do not lightly conclude that their action was unauthorized by the Constitution . . . Our decision rests on the narrow ground that the proceduresauthorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not authorized by the Constitution.If there is to be a new procedure in which the President will play a different role in determining the final text of what may become a law, such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth inArticle V of the Constitution.
Old Power Under New Name?
Justice Breyer, joined in dissent by Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia, wrote, "In my view the Line Item Veto Act does not violate any specific textualconstitutional command, nor does it violate any implicit Separation of Powersprinciple. Consequently, I believe that the Act is constitutional." Breyer,acknowledging that the functioning of the three branches of government with one another is always evolving, summarized his dissent,
I recognizethat the Act before us is novel. In a sense, it skirts a constitutional edge. But that edge has to do with means, not ends. The means chosen do not amount literally to the enactment, repeal, or amendment of a law. Nor, for that matter, do they amount literally to the "line item veto" that the Act's title announces . . . They do not improperly shift the constitutionally foreseen balance of power from Congress to the President. Nor, since they comply with Separation of Powers principles, do they threaten the liberties of individual citizens. They represent an experiment that may, or may not, help representative government work better. The Constitution, in my view, authorizes Congress and the President to try novel methods in this way. Consequently, with respect, I dissent.
Scalia contended that the president's discretion under the Line Item Veto Actwas no broader than the discretion traditionally granted the president in his execution of spending laws. Scalia wrote,
The title of the LineItem Veto Act, which was perhaps designed to simplify for public comprehension, or perhaps merely to comply with the terms of a campaign pledge, has succeeded in faking out the Supreme Court. The President's action it authorizes infact is not a line-item veto . . . and insofar as the substance of that action is concerned, it is no different from what Congress has permitted the President to do since the formation of the Union.
Impact
The Court ruled that a president holds no constitutional power to sign into law a bill different from the one sent to him by Congress. Though some supporters of the line-item veto vowed to pursue its acceptance, many became disillusioned after seeing how ineffective it appeared to be in practice. Sparinglyusing the new authority, Clinton reduced the 1997 budget less than one-tenthof one percent. Clinton largely sought to minimize conflict with Republican leadership who controlled Congress because of legislation he wished to see passed. The brief experiment demonstrated that effects on the legislative process were more political than fiscal. The president's role to bargain with Congress and influence laws was greatly increased, even changing how Washington lobbyists operated.
Governors of 43 states held line item veto power with few issues raised overtheir authority. But many asserted, the role of the president was far different than a state governor. Still, proponents claimed such a "veto" power served as a symbolic reminder to legislators to maintain some fiscal responsibility by minimizing expensive pet projects for their constituents back home.
Related Cases
- Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
- Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
- Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
The Line-Item Veto
For years, American leaders in the executive and legislative branches of government have bandied about the idea of a line-item veto. The president possesses veto power over legislation. The line-item veto would give him even greater power by allowing him to strike certain provisions ("line items") within appropriations bills. Supporters of the line-item veto have suggested that it allows him to "hold the pork"--as in pork-barrel spending, which occurs when alegislator works a costly government project (but one which benefits his orher constituents) into an appropriations bill. Opponents of the line-item veto have argued that it would upset the traditional balance of power between the branches of government, and would require the enumeration of all budgetarydetails in appropriations bills. It would also mean that the primary negotiation of a bill would take place not on the legislative floor but at the veto stage, largely removed from the public eye.
Sources
Bacon, Donald C., et al., eds. The Encyclopedia of the United States Congress. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
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