City of Boerne v. Flores

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, finding the RFRA unconstitutional. Congress passed the RFRA pursuant to its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from denying a person of due process of law and of the equal protection of the laws. Section 5 gives Congress the power to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of "the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 6-3 majority, concluded that the RFRA was not a proper exercise of power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kennedy reasoned that by passing the RFRA, Congress was not "enforcing" any right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment but was creating a new right. Kennedy wrote that,

The design of the Amendment and the test of 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power "to enforce," not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.

In reaching his conclusion, Kennedy relied heavily on two principles governing the structure of the American government: separation of powers and federalism. Separation of powers describes the distribution of the powers of government among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. According to Kennedy, the RFRA violated separation of powers principles because, ultimately, it is within the judiciary branch's scope of power to determine what the Constitution means. However, in enacting the RFRA, Congress substituted its own judgment for that of the Supreme Court. Kennedy also concluded that the RFRA violated principles of federalism. Federalism describes the relationship between the federal government and the state governments, in which the federal government has certain powers and the state governments have others. Kennedy wrote that the RFRA constituted "a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens."

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justices David H. Souter and Stephen Breyer, dissented. O'Connor did not disagree with the Court's opinion regarding interpretation of Congress' powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, she was very displeased with the earlier Smith ruling by the Court. O'Connor wrote, "In Smith, five Members of this Court without briefing or argument on the issue interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to permit the government to prohibit, without justification, conduct mandated by an individual's religious beliefs, so long as the prohibition is generally applicable." She asserted the decision "harmed religious liberty" and the Court should have overturned the decision in the Boerne case. O'Connor argued that "the Free Exercise Clause is not simply an antidiscrimination principle that protects only against those laws that single out religious practice for unfavorable treatment." The Clause is "an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious practices . . . without . . . government interference." She concluded that government must have to justify any significant burdens on religious practice by a compelling state interest with restrictions narrowly designed to attain that interest.