United States v. Seeger

Central to the issue of conscientious objector exemption has been the definition of religious belief. The 1917 Draft Law provided exemption only to those who were members of a "well-recognized religious sect or organization . . . whose existing creed or principles [forbid] its members to participate in war in any form." This, in effect, meant only organized religions in the traditional Judeo-Christian sense. In United States v. MacIntosh (1931), though, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes's opinion slightly expanded the definition. He wrote that the "essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." This definition became the basis for that adopted by Congress when it revised draft laws in the 1940s.

The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 reflected growing tolerance of religious diversity. It allowed conscientious objector status to persons conscientiously opposed to "war in any form" because of "religious training and belief," even if that belief was not contained in the dogma of an established church. In 1948, Congress changed the law to specify that religious training and belief should require belief "in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."

Daniel Andrew Seeger, an agnostic, was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of New York for refusing induction into military service. Seeger had filed for exemption in 1957, after his student draft classification had expired and he was reclassified 1-A. In his exemption claim, he declared that he was conscientiously opposed to war in any form because of his religious belief, but neither acknowledged nor denied a belief in a Supreme Being. He used the writings of philosophers Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza to support his ethical belief in moral integrity "without belief in God, except in the remotest sense." Though his belief was determined to be sincere and based upon individual training and belief, Seeger was denied exemption because his claim was not based on "belief in relation to a Supreme Being" as specified in the draft statute. The trial court convicted Seeger, who appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the Supreme Being requirement in the draft law distinguished "between internally derived and externally compelled beliefs" and thus was an "impermissible classification" under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court, which considered Seeger's case along with the related cases of two other defendants, Arno Sascha Jakobson and Forest Britt Peter, unanimously affirmed the appellate court's judgment.

Since the lower court had found Seeger's belief to be sincerely held, the issue in question was the definition of religious belief. This question, said the Court, was a narrow one--whether the phrase "Supreme Being" as used in the statute meant only the orthodox concept of God, or a "broader concept of a power or being, or a faith, `to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent.'" Examining the development of draft laws since 1917, the Court found no evidence that Congress wanted the act to apply only to those holding traditional theocratic beliefs, and noted the "well-established congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets." In his opinion for the unanimous court, Justice Clark wrote that the draft law's terminology was meant to include all religions, and further emphasized that exempting some religions but not others would be unconstitutional. Under this interpretation, the Court found, the proper test of religious belief should be "whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox beliefs in God of one who clearly qualifies for the [conscientious objector] exemption."

Justice Clark noted that this construction appropriately acknowledged "the ever-broadening understanding of the modern religious community." He cited the work of theologians Paul Tillich and John A. T. Robinson, Bishop of Woolwich, and the analysis of ethicist David Saville Muzzey, as well as the findings of the Second Vatican Council, as examples of this more tolerant understanding. And he emphasized that it is not the role of government to judge the truth of any person's religious beliefs. "As Mr. Justice Douglas stated in United States v. Ballard (1944) . . . ," Clark wrote, "Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others."

But, Clark emphasized, Congress clearly stated that the conscientious objector exemption should exclude persons whose beliefs are based on a "merely personal moral code." The Court determined that Congress intended this part of the law to exclude those whose moral code was not related to religious belief. Since the Court had already determined that Seeger's claim met the standard for religious belief, it could not therefore be considered a merely personal moral code. "We think it clear," Clark wrote, "that the beliefs that prompted [Seeger's] objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers." The Court upheld the circuit court's reversal of Seeger's conviction.

In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Douglas reiterated the importance of equal protection in religious matters. If Congress were to distinguish between religions, he wrote, this would violate both the free exercise of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Douglas also added that "The words `a Supreme Being' have no narrow technical meaning in the field of religion." He cited Hinduism and Buddhism, neither of which is based on the concept of a Supreme Being, as beliefs that "illustrat[e] the fluidity and evanescent scope of the concept." Douglas wrote that he was confident that Congress's tolerance and sophistication would acknowledge this broad construction of religious belief.