United States v. Seeger

Petitioner
United States
Respondent
Daniel Andrew Seeger
Petitioner's Claim
That only conscientious objection due to organized beliefs allowed exemptionto service.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Archibald Cox, U.S. Solicitor General
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Kenneth W. Greenwalt
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., Tom C. Clark (writing for theCourt), William O. Douglas, Arthur J. Goldberg, John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart, Earl Warren, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
8 March 1965
Decision
Upheld the appellate court's reversal of respondent's conviction of having refused to submit to military induction.
Significance
The ruling determined that conscientious objectors, who oppose participationin war on religious grounds, are entitled by law to seek exemption from compulsory military service if they hold unorthodox spiritual beliefs that are fundamentally equivalent to a traditional belief in God.
Since Congress first instituted compulsory military service during World WarI with the Draft Act of 1917, the issue of religious objection to conscription has caused controversy. Though the First Amendment protects the free exercise of religious belief, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that there is no constitutional right to exemption from draft registration or military service. Congress, however, has allowed such an exemption by statute. Thelaw requires that a person seeking exemption prove both that his religious beliefs prohibit him from participating in war, and that these religious beliefs are sincere.
Defining Religious Belief
Central to the issue of conscientious objector exemption has been the definition of religious belief. The 1917 Draft Law provided exemption only to thosewho were members of a "well-recognized religious sect or organization . . . whose existing creed or principles [forbid] its members to participate in warin any form." This, in effect, meant only organized religions in the traditional Judeo-Christian sense. In United States v. MacIntosh (1931), though, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes's opinion slightly expanded the definition. He wrote that the "essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." This definition became the basis for that adopted by Congress when it revised draft laws in the 1940s.
The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 reflected growing tolerance ofreligious diversity. It allowed conscientious objector status to persons conscientiously opposed to "war in any form" because of "religious training andbelief," even if that belief was not contained in the dogma of an establishedchurch. In 1948, Congress changed the law to specify that religious trainingand belief should require belief "in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."
Daniel Andrew Seeger, an agnostic, was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of New York for refusing induction into military service.Seeger had filed for exemption in 1957, after his student draft classification had expired and he was reclassified 1-A. In his exemption claim, he declared that he was conscientiously opposed to war in any form because of his religious belief, but neither acknowledged nor denied a belief in a Supreme Being. He used the writings of philosophers Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza to support his ethical belief in moral integrity "without belief in God, except in the remotest sense." Though his belief was determined to be sincere and based upon individual training and belief, Seeger was denied exemption because his claim was not based on "belief in relation to a Supreme Being" as specified inthe draft statute. The trial court convicted Seeger, who appealed. The courtof appeals reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the Supreme Being requirement in the draft law distinguished "between internally derived andexternally compelled beliefs" and thus was an "impermissible classification"under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court, which considered Seeger's case along with the related cases of two other defendants, Arno Sascha Jakobson and Forest Britt Peter, unanimously affirmed the appellatecourt's judgment.
Since the lower court had found Seeger's belief to be sincerely held, the issue in question was the definition of religious belief. This question, said the Court, was a narrow one--whether the phrase "Supreme Being" as used in thestatute meant only the orthodox concept of God, or a "broader concept of a power or being, or a faith, `to which all else is subordinate or upon which allelse is ultimately dependent.'" Examining the development of draft laws since 1917, the Court found no evidence that Congress wanted the act to apply only to those holding traditional theocratic beliefs, and noted the "well-established congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets." In his opinion for the unanimous court, Justice Clark wrote that the draft law's terminology was meant to include all religions, and further emphasized that exempting some religions but not others would be unconstitutional. Under this interpretation, the Courtfound, the proper test of religious belief should be "whether a given beliefthat is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessorparallel to that filled by the orthodox beliefs in God of one who clearly qualifies for the [conscientious objector] exemption."
Justice Clark noted that this construction appropriately acknowledged "the ever-broadening understanding of the modern religious community." He cited thework of theologians Paul Tillich and John A. T. Robinson, Bishop of Woolwich,and the analysis of ethicist David Saville Muzzey, as well as the findings of the Second Vatican Council, as examples of this more tolerant understanding. And he emphasized that it is not the role of government to judge the truthof any person's religious beliefs. "As Mr. Justice Douglas stated in United States v. Ballard (1944) . . . ," Clark wrote, "Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may beincomprehensible to others."
But, Clark emphasized, Congress clearly stated that the conscientious objector exemption should exclude persons whose beliefs are based on a "merely personal moral code." The Court determined that Congress intended this part of thelaw to exclude those whose moral code was not related to religious belief. Since the Court had already determined that Seeger's claim met the standard for religious belief, it could not therefore be considered a merely personal moral code. "We think it clear," Clark wrote, "that the beliefs that prompted [Seeger's] objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers." The Court upheld the circuit court's reversal of Seeger's conviction.
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Douglas reiterated the importance of equal protection in religious matters. If Congress were to distinguish between religions, he wrote, this would violate both the free exercise of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Douglas alsoadded that "The words `a Supreme Being' have no narrow technical meaning in the field of religion." He cited Hinduism and Buddhism, neither of which is based on the concept of a Supreme Being, as beliefs that "illustrat[e] the fluidity and evanescent scope of the concept." Douglas wrote that he was confident that Congress's tolerance and sophistication would acknowledge this broad construction of religious belief.
Vietnam Era Ferment
The Seeger decision came at a time when American military involvementin Vietnam was increasing. As casualties mounted after the mid-1960s, more and more young men were drafted and sent to fight an officially undeclared waron foreign soil. Many Americans felt the reasons for U.S. involvement were not clear, and increasing numbers questioned and then protested the war. The draft became a central issue. Many challenged the government by defying the draft law; they burned draft cards and refused induction. Though the Supreme Court found that the federal statute criminalizing draft card burning did not violate the First Amendment, the Court did protect dissent in rulings that Kermit L. Hall in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States claimed "reflected the mood of an American public growing increasinglydisaffected with the Vietnam conflict." Seeger, Hall suggested, "madeit easier for young men who did not wish to participate in the war to gain exemption from military service as conscientious objectors." Hall believed that the Court interpreted religious belief very broadly because a literal reading of the draft law-requiring a belief in a Supreme Being--would violate theFirst Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion. The Seeger ruling, Hall concluded, "blatantly distorted the intent of Congress" and "increased the numbers of men who could avoid serving in an increasingly unpopular war." It is important to note, however, that the Court, in Gillette v. United States (1971), did not grant conscientious objector status to persons who opposed only what they considered to be unjust conflicts.
In 1967, Congress revised the draft laws again. The Military Selective Service Act of 1967 reflected the Seeger decision, and took out the requirement in the exemption clause that specified belief in a Supreme Being:

[Nothing] contained in this Act shall be construed to require any personto be subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval forcesof the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. As used in this subsection, the term religious training and belief does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal code.

And in 1970, the Court construed the conscientious exemption provision to include persons who object to war on moral or ethical grounds based on beliefs "held with the strength of traditional religious convictions" (Welsh v. United States).
The draft ended in 1973, when the United States converted to an all-volunteermilitary. By April of 1975, men were no longer required to register with their draft boards. But registration was reimposed by President Carter in 1980 after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, and continues as a precaution against underestimating the number of military personnel needed in a future crisis.
Related Cases

• United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
  
• United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
  
• Welsh v. United States, 389 U.S. 333 (1970).
  
• Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).

Conscientious Objectors
A conscientious objector is someone who refuses to submit to conscription formilitary service on the basis of a moral prohibition against participation in war. It is customary for governments to require proof of commitment to a religious faith which proscribes military involvement. Examples of groups withdeeply pacifist belief systems include Anabaptists, Mennonites, Amish, and Quakers. Thanks to effective lobbying in 1940, several of these groups securedthe right of participation in Civilian Public Service (CPS) camps.
One may ask if it is unfair for such groups to enjoy the right of conscientious objection, since it would seem to violate the First Amendment separation of church and state. However, failure to respect their beliefs would violate these citizens' freedom of religion. Some pacifists have called for conscientious-objector provisions not related to religion, but again, it would be difficult to establish guidelines for such.
Sources
Bradley, David and Shelley Fisher Fishkin, eds. The Encyclopedia of CivilRights in America. Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1998.