Mistretta v. United States

By an 8-1 vote, the Court upheld the Sentencing Guidelines. Congress had neither delegated "excessive legislative power" to the commission, nor had it violated the separation-of-powers principle by establishing the commission within the judicial branch, by requiring federal judges to serve on the commission and share authority with non-judges, or by giving the president power to appoint and remove commission members. Nothing in the Constitution, the Court held, prohibited Congress

from delegating to an expert body within the Judicial Branch the intricate task of formulating sentencing guidelines consistent with such significant statutory discretion as is present here, nor from calling upon the accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch in creating policy on a matter uniquely within the ken of judges.

A judge, the Court's ruling suggested, would best know the business of judges, and Congress was simply calling on the knowledge and experience of the commission members.

Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, first addressed the delegation-of-powers issue, which Mistretta had raised with his charge that Congress had given the Committee excessive legislative authority. In this context, Blackmun quoted Chief Justice William Howard Taft, who wrote in the Court's opinion on Field v. Clark (1892): "In determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination." Common sense in the present situation, the Court indicated, would dictate some delegation of power, particularly in "our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems." Congress itself had established "the specific tool" that the commission was to use, the guidelines system, and while the Court could not "dispute [the] petitioner's contention that the Commission enjoys significant discretion in formulating guidelines," there was no basis in the Court's past rulings to say that a delegation could not "exercise judgment in matters of policy." In fact, the highly technical and complex nature of the commission's task was one that especially lent itself to delegation: since members of Congress were not likely to be authorities on sentencing laws, it was wise for them to work with people who were.

Justice Blackmun turned next to the separation of powers issue. President James Madison, often called "the master builder of the Constitution" for his central role in framing the document, had written that

the greatest security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of others.

Without these "means and motives," the United States could be in danger of becoming a dictatorship, and the Court had consistently upheld the separation doctrine. In cases specifically related to the judicial branch, the Court had been wary of attempts to assign to judges tasks that other branches could more properly accomplish, and of laws that "threaten[ed] the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch." In the present case, Mistretta held that Congress had on the one hand given too much authority to the judicial branch, by delegating to the commission legislative authority, and on the other hand had removed power from the judiciary by authorizing a member of the executive branch--the president--to appoint and dismiss commission members. With regard to these claims, the Court considered the commission from three standpoints: its "location" in the judicial branch, its composition, and the power of the president over it.

The commission was "located in the judicial branch, but it was not a court, nor did it hold judicial power." It was, as Justice Blackmun observed, "a peculiar institution within the framework of our Government." Although Article III of the Constitution limited the work of the judiciary to "Cases" and "Controversies," exceptions were possible, as in a situation involving a commission delegated to establish guidelines specifically relevant to the judicial branch. Nor did the existence of the commission within the judicial branch in any way threaten the power or integrity of the judiciary; given its lack of judicial power, there was no way that it could. As for its composition and Mistretta's challenge to its requirements that three federal judges serve on the commission and share their authority with non-judges, the Court admitted that "We find Congress' requirement of judicial service somewhat troublesome . . ." But "troublesome" did not equal "unconstitutional." Whereas the Constitution specifically prohibits legislators from serving in any other office during their term of service, it contained no such provisions for judges. Similarly, with regard to the president's power to appoint and remove members, it did not follow from this mere fact that the president therefore controlled the commission. Under the Constitution, the president has power to appoint many judges- -including those on the Supreme Court--but history has shown that judges by no means necessarily do the bidding of the executive who appointed them.

Thus, the Court held that, although the commission was "an unusual hybrid," it was constitutional. "Nor does our system of checked and balanced authority," concluded the Court, "prohibit Congress from calling upon the accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch in creating policy on a matter uniquely within the ken of judges."