Mistretta v. United States

"For almost a century," Justice Blackmun wrote for the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States, "the Federal Government employed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sentencing." There were statutes addressing specific crimes, of course, but judges had considerable latitude in establishing sentences. Hand in hand with this system of indeterminate sentencing went another system: that of parole boards, who decided when a prisoner should be released from incarceration and placed under the supervision of a parole officer.

The idea behind this arrangement was an optimistic one--that the prison system could rehabilitate criminals and make them useful members of society. The system required that judges and parole officers work closely together, and each had broad discretionary powers within their realms. Under the Constitution, Congress had the power to establish sentences for federal crimes, but the legislative branch tended to defer to the judicial branch in the area of sentencing, as it assumed that judges knew more about a given case than did Congressmen in Washington.

Soon, however, problems began to arise from this arrangement. Indeterminate sentencing resulted in great disparities--relatively heavy sentences for lesser crimes, or the reverse, all depending upon the judge who reviewed the case. A further problem came from the fact that the prison and parole systems were not rehabilitating criminals, but were recycling the same people again and again through a chain from crime to trial to prison to parole. As a result, in 1958 Congress called for the creation of judicial councils to establish sentencing guidelines. Fifteen years later, in 1973, the United States Parole Board adopted a set of guidelines for the length of time a prisoner should be confined, and in 1976 Congress passed the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act. Much greater reforms followed in 1984, with the passage of the legislation that would be challenged in Mistretta.

A Senate Report on the 1984 legislation cited two problems with the "outmoded rehabilitation model": disparity in sentencing, and prison terms whose length was made uncertain because parole boards too often intervened and shortened them. Therefore Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The act rejected the rehabilitation model; it consolidated the sentencing functions of judges and parole boards by creating the United States Sentencing Commission; it established sentences of fixed length that could be shortened only by a prisoner's good behavior; it made the Sentencing Commission's guidelines binding on the courts, although it did give judges some discretion with regard to mitigating factors in a given offense; and it authorized limited appellate review of sentences. The act established further the Sentencing Commission as an independent entity operating within the judicial branch of government. The commission would consist of seven voting members, three of them federal judges chosen from a list of six recommended to the president by the Judicial Conference of the United States. No more than four members of the commission could belong to the same political party, and the attorney general (or his or her designee) would serve as an eighth, non-voting member of the commission. The commission was charged with developing sentencing guidelines, periodically reviewing and revising the guidelines it established, and reporting to Congress any amendments it made.

On 10 December 1987, John M. Mistretta was indicted, along with another defendant, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri on three counts relating to a cocaine deal. Mistretta moved to have the Sentencing Commission's guidelines ruled unconstitutional, his claim being that the Sentencing Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine. Mistretta held that by creating the commission, Congress had established a judicial body with legislative powers. The district court disagreed, ruling that the commission was in effect an executive agency, and that its guidelines were similar in structure to rules established by comparable entities. Nor was the act invalid because it required judges, whose powers are granted in Article III of the Constitution, to serve on the commission. Nonetheless, the court stated that its ruling does not imply a lack of "serious doubts about some parts of the Sentencing Guidelines and the legality of their anticipated operation."

Mistretta having plead guilty to the first of his three indictment counts, conspiracy and agreement to distribute cocaine, the federal prosecutor moved to dismiss the other two counts. The motion was granted, and in accordance with commission guidelines, Mistretta was sentenced to 18 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release, along with a $1,000 fine and a $50 special assessment. He filed a notice of appeal in the Eighth Circuit, but both sides--Mistretta and the attorneys representing the United States--petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case before the circuit court gave its judgment. Rule 18 of the Court allowed petitioners to take such an extraordinary step if the issue to be decided was of "imperative public importance." The Court held that this was one of the situations, and agreed to review the case, along with an ancillary legal action, United States v. Mistretta. The Sentencing Commission filed an amicus curiae brief urging affirmance, as did an attorney representing Joseph E. DiNova. Lawyers representing the United States Senate and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers also filed briefs.